
Linda L. Fowler
Dartmouth College

R. Brian Law
University of California—Los Angeles

Abstract: The paper examines the decline in the internal prestige and external visibility of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in response to changes in the policy environment and polarization of the political parties from 1947-2004. Results from binomial regression provide empirical support for competing theories of party influence in Congress and indicate variation across committees in their response to institutional pressures. The declining fortunes of both Foreign Relations and Armed Services exemplify a contradiction between individual rationality and institutional effectiveness that often occurs in Congress, raising concerns about the capacity of the legislative branch to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in balancing executive actions.

Support from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and Dartmouth College’s Nelson A. Rockefeller Center provided leave time and research funds for the project. Christopher Deering and Charles Stewart generously made data available, and colleagues Michael Herron, Tim Groseclose, Jeff Lewis, and James Honaker fielded numerous methodological questions. David Lewis, Gerald Gamm, Barbara Sinclair and several anonymous reviewers provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. The authors are grateful to Dartmouth students, Matthew Slaine, Jared Hyatt, Ashley Hannebrink and Adam Shpeen, for their hard work in collecting data.
The U.S. Congress stood as the notable exception to the pattern of executive dominance that characterized western democracies throughout the twentieth century (Mayhew 2000). The institution lost ground to the president, of course, sometimes through the willing delegation of authority and sometimes through the inability to resist presidential activism (Peterson 1994; Cooper 2005). Yet, Congress managed to retain considerable leverage over policy because of its committee system, which provided the information, continuity and high-profile leaders to challenge executive proposals and decisions (Jones 2005). In the realm of foreign affairs, partisan divisions over the past two decades, when combined with changes in the external policy environment, have undermined the prestige of the key Senate committees, Foreign Relations and Armed Services, leaving Congress ever more vulnerable to the challenges of the national security state.

This paper examines trends in the internal and external prestige of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees from 1947-2004. It demonstrates that institutional change has arisen from party polarization within the Senate and individual committees, as well as from outside pressures, such as budgetary priorities and world events. Results from binomial regression provide empirical support for competing theories of party influence in Congress and indicate variation across committees in their response to institutional pressures. The declining fortunes of both Foreign Relations and Armed Services exemplify a contradiction between individual rationality and institutional wellbeing that often occurs in Congress, raising concerns about the capabilities within the legislative branch to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in balancing executive action. Although Congress still has the power of the purse and the appropriations process to rein
in the executive branch, the Senate’s diminished institutional capacity makes an already unequal battle more difficult.

I. Committee Change and the Senate in Foreign Affairs:

Woodrow Wilson’s (1956) *Congressional Government* focused on the tensions among committees, parties and the executive branch more than a century ago. Strong committees decentralized institutional power, fostering personal influence, minority vetoes and logrolling. Consequently, committees were the chief obstacles to the majoritarian system of responsible parties, led by a popularly accountable president, which Wilson envisioned.¹ Cycles of relatively decentralized committee government alternating with more centralized party government under presidential leadership have appeared frequently in the history of the contemporary Congress (Sundquist 1980). Over the past two decades, the conditions for stronger legislative parties have been particularly favorable (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2001), and the impact on the committee system has been pronounced. In the House, committees (and subcommittees) have succumbed to the Speaker’s heightened control over appointments, bill referral and floor debate, to the leadership’s exclusion of minority party committee members from conference, and to the caucus’s approval of chairmanships and its adoption of term limits. Even within the individualistic Senate, Republicans have restricted the independence of chairs by subjecting them to caucus votes and restrictions on tenure.

The resulting dilemma for the contemporary Congress is that once parties become stronger, committee members have fewer incentives—other than currying favor with constituency groups and lobbyists—to make the costly investment in policy specialization. A loss of informational capacity, in turn, diminishes the legislature’s ability to incubate
policy proposals, set program goals for the executive, establish procedural constraints on
deg�sions of authority, and oversee results. The resulting downward spiral in committee
prestige poses the risk that Congress loses its capacity to serve as the coequal branch that
the framers envisioned.

The Senate provides a useful starting point to examine the interplay of committees,
parties and presidents, not merely because most research on congressional parties and
committees has focused on the House. First, the institution’s unique constitutional
prerogatives and senators’ national visibility enable members to compete with the
executive and the party leadership, thus suggesting that the Senate might be more resistant
to institutional change than the House. The persistent individualism in the Senate limits
the ability of party leaders or presidents to impose constraints on committee members or
to protect their work on the floor. Nevertheless, conditions of party polarization and
discipline in the contemporary Senate are surprisingly high (Sinclair 2001; 2005; Poole
and Rosenthal 2006). Moreover, senators’ ability to gain assignments to multiple
committees and to range across policy domains tends to equalize influence across
committees and to offer many different avenues for individual senators to exercise
influence (Sinclair 1989). Yet, a strong hierarchy among committees has existed for
much of the Senate’s history and has experienced notable shifts in recent years (Canon
and Stewart 2002; Stewart and Groseclose 1999).

Second, the Senate provides a spectacular example of declining committee
fortunes in the case of the Foreign Relations Committee. The most prestigious committee
in the Senate—and arguably in Congress as a whole—for much of the twentieth century
(Fenno 1973), Foreign Relations lost considerable luster since its heyday after World War
II (Lindsay 1994). The shift is not simply the result of presidential dominance in diplomacy and national security—although that is part of the story—because the Armed Services Committee reputedly has not experienced as sharp a drop in status (Deering 2001). Although Deering (2005) has asserted that polarization along party lines has been an important factor in the committees’ ability to command respect inside and outside the chamber, Rohde (1994) has suggested that polarization heightens the president’s difficulties in gaining congressional support for foreign policy initiatives.

Finally, the Senate committees that oversee foreign affairs and defense policy are obvious places to look for signs of institutional change because the verdict about congressional performance in these domains is so mixed. On the one hand, critics have chastised lawmakers for failing to meet their constitutional responsibilities in the conduct of diplomacy and war (c.f. Koh 1990; Hinckley 1994; Peterson 1994; Silverstein 1997; Deering 2005). On the other hand, detractors have accused legislators of ill-considered interference with presidential initiatives (Crovitz and Rabkin 1989; Vanderbush and Haney 2002). Indeed, a top item among Republicans after gaining control of Congress in 1995 was repeal of the War Powers Resolution to “untie the hands of the president” (Silverstein 1997, 49). In addition, an emerging literature indicates that Congress exerts indirect influence on foreign policy and defense (Ripley and Lindsay 1993; Martin 2000; Auerswald and Maltzman 2003; Howell and Pevehouse 2005). Thus, a focus on Foreign Relations and Armed Services not only takes the distinction between foreign and domestic policy seriously (Lindsay 1994), but also addresses the impact of national security on American institutional development (Mayhew 2005).

II. Committees, Parties and External Pressures:
The relationship among committee power, partisan alignments and external events in the realm of international affairs raises challenging issues for the study of institutional change in the Senate. Existing theories do not translate well from their origins in the House; nor do they give adequate weight to external actors and events. Not surprisingly, they produce contradictory expectations about the impact of party polarization on committee status. In addition, committees respond in different ways to party and environmental pressures making generalizations difficult.

Theories of committees produce very different predictions about their characteristics, and according to Groseclose and King (2001), none adequately accounts for the attributes and the rules governing committee behavior. Similarly, theories of party influence provide a mix of explanations regarding their relationship to committees. Although most point to declining committee influence when parties become more disciplined, major differences arise regarding the regulatory mechanisms that shape committee behavior, as well as the location of partisan polarity—in the chamber as a whole or within the committee.

With respect to the rules that regulate committees, polarization within the chamber as a whole is the key factor. The distinct, coherent parties that lead to conditional party government are in a position to exercise control over committee agendas and floor procedures, thus disciplining unresponsive committees and rewarding those that further the majority party’s proposals (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde (2001). Indeed, Cox and Poole (2002) find that party polarization has a strong influence on procedural votes in the House. Similarly, well-defined parties seeking to promote their reputations within the electorate will appoint committees that will replicate the distribution of preferences in the
chamber as a whole (Cox and McCubbins 1993). In the latter case, committee bills will reflect the median position of the majority party without any specific inducements.

An alternative view of parties suggests that polarization in the chamber as a whole may not be particularly relevant to committees. When lawmakers vote their policy preferences, they may appear to be acting as partisans without any coercive mechanisms (Krehbiel 1998). Indeed the contemporary Senate, with its weak mechanisms of party control yet recent levels of high party unity, seems to fit this pattern. In Krehbiel’s (1991) theoretical work on committees, however, matters whether committee members are polarized along party lines or share the same outlying ideal point, because polarized committees are more reliable sources of information than consensual committees and will be less able to conceal rent seeking and other types of behavior detrimental to the chamber (Krehbiel 1991). As with the party models, committee-based theory posits that the remedy for “rogue” committees occurs through the majority party’s control of the rules for bringing bills to the floor. Generally, Krehbiel’s work can lead to the contradictory result that polarized legislatures probably have little need of committee cues, but any legislature would be better off with polarized committees.

These theoretical insights regarding the relationship between party polarization and committee influence reflect the institutional characteristics of the House, which has extensive procedures for regulating the floor agenda and amendments. What about the Senate? Smith and Gamm (2001) assert that the primary consequence of polarization in the Senate has been to promote obstruction. Do weak controls on the agenda and floor make party polarization irrelevant to committee power—because parties cannot effectively discipline or reward committees? Does polarization of the parties in the
chamber have any relationship to polarization within the committee? If so, what are the implications of party divisions? On the one hand, party polarization in the chamber could influence committee autonomy and prestige, because it reduces the incentives for members to invest in expertise. On the other hand, party polarization within a committee could enhance a committee’s reputation because it produces high value signals to the floor or because it makes gate keeping more consequential. It is important, therefore, to test for the influence of party polarity both in the chamber and on the floor.

The interaction of committees and parties is only part of the story affecting committee prestige; developments outside the legislature are important, as well. Although environmental constraints occupy a prominent place in Fenno’s (1973) classic study of committees, they are conspicuous in their absence from the theoretical literature on congressional institutions. Scholars have been especially critical of the neglect of presidential influence on legislative structures (c.f. Moe 2005, Whittington and Carpenter 2003; Cooper and Rybicki 2002; Cooper 2005), but with the notable exception of Sinclair’s study of the transformation of the Senate (1989) and Hurley and Wilson’s (1989) analysis of senators’ voting cohesion, the indictment extends to broad changes in the political environment. We explore a number of internal and external constraints to assess their relative weight in effecting institutional change, with particular attention to outside events that involve presidential power.

Adding to the theoretical ambiguities and gaps in the literature is the problem of measuring change in committee prestige. Institutional status is a subjective phenomenon, and the committee system itself is a collection of separate entities, each operating with particular goals and norms under varying conditions of environmental constraint (Fenno
1973; Smith and Deering 1984; Deering and Smith 1990; 1997). Shifts in prestige may vary across committees and move at different rates, making it difficult to infer systemic change from observations of individual committees. Although it is not feasible to model changes in all Senate committees, the comparison of Foreign Relations and Armed Services offers considerable leverage on the susceptibility of different committees in a similar policy domain to institutional pressures.

In sum, we examine how changes in congressional parties produce shifts in committee prestige, while controlling for the effects of environmental influences and differences in committee characteristics. The Senate represents a particularly challenging case for tapping party effects, but it is also the more visible than the House. The fact that this story plays out in the realm of national security makes the stakes more than academic.

III. A Tale of Two Committees:

Political reputations are elusive phenomena, dependent upon widespread perceptions among political elites both inside and outside an institution (Neustadt 1991). In the contemporary Senate, where individual obstruction and partisan cooperation occur in tandem (Sinclair 2005; Evans and Lipinski 2005), it is difficult to ascertain who is on top. Certainly, Senate party leaders have become more visible as spokespersons and legislative brokers, while legendary committee chairs, such as Senators Arthur Vandenberg or Richard Russell or Sam Nunn, are now rare. Evidence of long-term, systematic shifts across committees and parties in the institutional status of Foreign Relations and Armed Services emerge from the examination of committee assignments, national visibility and chair activity. Foreign Relations lost more ground, if only because it began with a loftier reputation, while Republicans altered their attitudes toward both
committees more than Democrats. By the start of the twenty-first century, neither committee appeared to have the stature to challenge the executive, a fact that has become painfully clear as the United States wrestles with an increasingly unpopular war in Iraq. As Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Chuck Hagel (R, IA) noted: the administration “[treats] Congress as an appendage, a constitutional nuisance” (Rosenbaum 2004).

The jurisdictions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee offer unique opportunities and constraints in sustaining institutional prestige. Foreign Relations oversees diplomacy, including treaties, appointment of the Secretary of State and ambassadors, authorization of foreign aid and weapons sales, and, ultimately, declarations of war; Armed Services authorizes military personnel and weaponry, along with approval of the Secretary of Defense and top military officers. Both are policy-oriented committees, although Armed Services has a strong constituency flavor, because of its connection to military procurement and personnel (Smith and Deering 1984; Deering and Smith 1990; 1997).

Yet, the two committees are directly affected by the rise of the national security state. Of all the committees in Congress, Foreign Relations and Armed Services have been most likely to feel the impact of the external environment on what Fenno (1973) termed the “strategic premises” that guide committee behavior. In Fenno’s path breaking study of congressional committees, the executive branch so dominated what was then the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the prime committee objective was persuasion of skeptical colleagues to pass the president’s foreign aid package (1973, 69-73). In contrast, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with its constitutional prerogatives as agent of
the Senate and its top-ranked status, enjoyed more independence to “contend with executive opinion” (Fenno 1973, 155). Yet Fenno cautioned that the Senate’s capacity for policy input might fail because senators had “done nothing to give their Foreign Relations Committee any special operating autonomy” (1973, 155-56).

Deering’s recent overviews of the role of Congress in foreign affairs suggested that Armed Services had been more effective than Foreign Relations in protecting its position through deft use of annual authorization of weapons systems and resourceful committee chairs (Deering 2001; 2005). The loss of responsibility for base closings to an independent commission and perceptions that the committee’s close ties to the Pentagon have led to “capture” by the uniformed services and military contractors have undermined the committee’s stature, however (Rundquist and Carsey 2002).

An equally pressing issue for both committees, moreover, is the politicization of national security (Destler 2001). The days when “party stopped at the water’s edge” are over, and presidential campaigns now emphasize ideological differences between candidates on defense spending, diplomacy and the use of military force. In addition, policy elites and the general public are divided along partisan lines more clearly than in the past (Shapiro and Boch-Elkon 2005). Given these emerging patterns, members of Foreign Relations and Armed Services feel pressure to defer to their party caucuses and leaders, and they also encounter difficulties finding common ground.

1. Internal Prestige: Historically, Foreign Relations has had greater prestige among senators according to the “Grosewart” measure of transfers off and on committees (Stewart and Groseclose 1999).ii With the exception of the period between the 14th and 49th Congresses, the committee has outranked Armed Services, and by the 67th Congress,
it ranked first among all committees in the years leading up to and including World War II (Canon and Stewart 2002, 172-73). Foreign Relations kept that position within the Senate from the 81st through the 93rd Congresses (Stewart and Groseclose 1999, 970), when it dropped to fifth place, behind Finance (1st), Rules and Administration (2nd), Appropriations (3rd), and, by a small margin, Armed Services (4th) (Stewart and Groseclose 1999, 970).iii

As a measure of committee prestige, the internal transfers captured by the Grosewart index have the advantage of catching members “voting with their feet.” Nevertheless, such indices are highly aggregated, typically including 8-12 Congresses, which inhibits their use in statistical analysis. In addition, they can produce anomalies, as in the recent second place ranking for Rules and Administration. Most important, transfer measures do not reflect the opportunities for movement available during each Congress that arise from members’ retirement, death or electoral defeat; nor do they capture the expansion and contraction of committees over time. As an alternative, we created a simple ratio for each Congress, which we term the Veteran Ratio: the number of members with two or more terms serving on a committee divided by the total number of senators on the committee. Although the Senate has democratized the committee assignment process and increased the size of committees to allow junior senators greater access to important seats (Sinclair 1989), newly elected lawmakers still face constraints getting on the most desirable committees. Not only do senior members tend to remain on prestigious committees, thus limiting the number of vacancies, but they also compete for the openings that do become available. A Veteran Ratio of one indicates a monopoly by senior
members on the committee’s seats; a value close to zero conveys that senators in their first-term dominate the committee.

Figure 1a compares the changes in internal prestige from 1947 to 2004 for Foreign Relations and Armed Services. The ratios are consistent with the “Grosewart” index in the sense that Foreign Relations had a high proportion of senior members in the aftermath of WWII period, while Armed Services was relatively more open to newcomers. Foreign Relations, moreover, retained its aura of exclusivity until 1989, a full decade after Armed Services had experienced a declining percentage of senior members. Interestingly, both committees had lost considerable prestige prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 as a result of pressures inside the Senate to disperse power more widely (Sinclair 1989). The fitted lines indicate a steeper change overall for Foreign Relations, but both committees have become disproportionately junior since the advent of war in Iraq.

Figures 1a—1b about here – Declining Internal Prestige

A comparison with the Senate Finance and Appropriations Committees in Figure 1b indicates that decline in internal prestige was not uniform as a result of democratization of the assignment process or turnover. As benchmarks, Appropriations and Finance have the advantage of consistency in sustaining high prestige in the post-WWII period, ranging between second and third on the “Grosewart” index (Stewart and Groseclose 1999, 970), with Finance moving into first position in recent years. The fitted line is essentially flat for Appropriations and slightly downward sloping for Finance, although Finance experienced a sharp drop in the 90th-93rd Congresses. It is important to recognize that high turnover in the Senate during the 1990s reduced the percentage of senior senators.
across the board, yet the effects on the money committees during that period are much less than for the national security committees. As we shall see further in the analysis, controlling for turnover is only part of the story.

A breakdown by party reveals significant differences between Democrats and Republicans for Foreign Relations and Armed Services in Figures 2a and 2b. Until the 1980s, the two parties steered junior senators away from Foreign Relations, although senior senators were less entrenched on the GOP side. The parties differed sharply thereafter, with senior Republicans avoiding the committee in significant numbers. Armed Services’ pattern has been mixed, reflecting the longstanding pressures on senior senators in some states to protect local interests and the desire among Democrats to burnish their “national security credentials.” Taken together, the graphs suggest that the two committees experienced differing impacts of external environmental and internal partisan trends and that Republicans’ valuation of both committees has changed more substantially than their Democratic counterparts. Separate analyses by party for Appropriations and Finance, (which we do not show here), reveal very modest party differences in the concentration of senior members, with veteran Republicans showing a slight increase and veteran Democrats a slight decrease in their representation.

Figures 2a and 2b about here—Party differences

2)External Prestige: One important aspect of a committee’s attractiveness to senators is its newsworthiness. Recalling front-page pictures of Senator Arthur Vandenberg working closely with President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson to frame the policy of containment or televised hearings of Senator William Fulbright grilling Johnson Administration officials about the Vietnam War, it is clear that Foreign
Relations provided something of a “bully pulpit” for members of the Senate. Indeed, during the period of 1969-1980, the committee’s members were the most prominent of all senators on the CBS evening news, outpacing those on the second-ranked committee (Judiciary) by a ratio of nearly 4:1 (Smith and Deering 1984,67). Armed Services, in contrast, was more of an insiders’ game, as members used their positions to ensure that defense contractors, military bases and service personnel in their home states received favorable treatment (Smith and Deering 1984; Deering and Smith 1990; 1997), although Senator Sam Nunn attained national prominence during his tenure as chair in the early 1990s.

External prestige of congressional committees depends upon recognition from political elites that members are power brokers in Washington. Through legislative and hearing activity, committee members can push to the forefront on particular issues, but they also may engage in back channel conversations with executive branch officials. For this reason, journalists rely heavily on committee chairs, members and staff as authoritative sources (Hess 1986). Committee chairs in the Senate are particularly important in providing coherence within the individualistic chamber (Evans 1991). Figures 3a and 3b capture the combination of policy entrepreneurship, behind-the-scenes negotiation and informative quotes that constitute external committee prestige. The measures involve overall coverage of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee and its members in The New York Times from 1947-2001, as well as headlines featuring the chairs through 2004. We selected the Times because of its longstanding, consistent reputation for covering international affairs. Although the media pay less
attention to Congress now than in the past (Mayhew 2000), senators have more resources today to help them attract the attention of journalists.

Figures 3a and 3b about here – Declining External Prestige

What is striking about the results is how closely they complement the findings for internal committee prestige in several respects. First, Foreign Relations was far more visible in the national news than Armed Services—a pattern that was consistent for both headline mentions of the chair and for the committee, generally. Second, both measures of external prestige declined significantly from the exceedingly high levels of the immediate postwar era. Third, the slopes of the fitted lines were steeper for Foreign Relations than for Armed Services. Fourth, the chairs of both committees did not appear in headlines during the first years of the Iraq War. In sum, when Foreign Relations and Armed Services enjoyed high prestige within the Senate, they commanded greater recognition outside the chamber, with the more prestigious Foreign Relations garnering a greater share of the coverage. The declining visibility of the chairs in recent years is particularly noteworthy in light of term limits imposed on Republican chairs since the mid-1990s.

3) Party Polarization: Coincidentally, the period of greatest instability in the internal prestige rankings for Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees began in the 1980s to late 1980s, a time frame that coincides with the steep rise in party polarization in the Congress (McCarty et al 2001; Ansolabehere et al 2001; Cox and Poole 2002), although the Democrats and Republicans differed in their transition to more homogeneous voting patterns (Roberts and Smith 2003). Figure 4 reports the trend in the difference between the party medians using first-dimension DW Nominate Scores for the
Senate as a whole and for the two committees. Until the 1980s, both committees were less polarized than the Senate chamber, but subsequently Foreign Relations became more polarized than either Armed Services or the chamber as a whole. The correlation between the polarity on Foreign Relations and Armed Services is .525, reflecting their history of divergence from the Senate party median distance at different periods. Simple OLS regression indicates that committee polarity increases by one unit for every 1.5 units of increase in Senate polarization, but the models account for 60 percent of the variance for Armed Services and 67 percent of the variance for Foreign Relations. From these summary measures, it appears that divisions within the committees reflect trends in chamber divergence, but involve other dynamics as well. Thus, we have empirical basis for examining the theoretical differences regarding the location of party polarization noted above.

Figure 4 about here—Polarity of Senate and Committees

IV. Hypotheses, Data and Methods:

What factors account for the declining fortunes of Foreign Relations and Armed Services? We examine explanatory variables that capture alterations in the committees’ external environment, as well as those influences that arise from change within the Senate. For external effects, the dataset includes budget allocations, military casualties, presidential approval and the duration of Cold War; for internal effects, the analysis utilizes partisan polarization in the Senate as a whole and within each committee, mean number of committee assignments, Senate turnover and the party affiliation of the committee chair.

1. Dependent Variables:
The dependent variables are the measures of internal and external prestige for Foreign Relations and Armed Services contained in Figures 1a and Figures 3a and 3b, designated as Veteran Ratio, Committee Mentions and Chair Mentions, respectively. Several clarifications about the time frame and the variables are necessary. First, committee assignments occur at the beginning of each Congress, so that the Veteran Ratio measure is calculated accordingly. We examined results inputting the Veteran Ratio by year, but tests examining the consequences from artificially doubling the size of the data set indicated that this was a poor practice. Furthermore, the measures of external prestige, Committee Mentions and Chair Mentions, occur on a yearly basis but have different endpoints, as noted above, because of the constraints of reliably augmenting the Proquest database with LexisNexis for committee members after 2001. Moreover, the data on casualties end with 2001. Finally, several of the independent variables that predict changes in internal prestige are lagged to reflect the fact that senators’ committee assignment decisions are based on prior information, which permits analysis of internal committee prestige through 2002, but truncates the data at 1949.

2. External Influences on the committee environment:

Congressional committees encounter a variety of external influences from federal agencies, media actors, advocacy groups, and constituents. For committees engaged in national security issues, however, the executive branch is the most potent environmental constraint (Fenno 1973). Although the particular orientations of individual presidents toward Congress are difficult to assess, the long-term trends in the federal budget provide good indicators of the relative importance of committee jurisdictions. Deering (2001; 2005) has suggested that early moves by Armed Services to develop an annual
authorization process for military expenditures were critical to the committee’s continued influence—a strategy that Foreign Relations was slow to adopt. We expect that as budget priorities shift away from a given committee’s jurisdiction its prestige will decline, but that Armed Services will experience less impact overall.

Much of the military defense budget and the entire international affairs budget fall within the category of “discretionary” spending. The percent of total outlays for both international affairs and national defense has declined relative to the period immediately after WWII, because of the growth of entitlement spending. Nevertheless, variation occurs from year to year, especially for defense expenditures. The variable Budget takes different values for each committee. For Armed Services it is the ratio of National Defense Outlay to the Total Government Outlay reported in the historical tables published by OMB on its website. For Foreign Relations it is the ratio of the International Affairs Outlay to the Total Government Outlay.\textsuperscript{vii}

The salience of international affairs was high during the Cold War era, but the intensity and duration of conflicts varied over time and both have consequences for committee prestige. On the one hand, conflict elevates the importance of the president, making it difficult for Congress to attract public attention. On the other hand, the potential for legislative oversight and disagreements about the conduct of military operations creates opportunities for senators to exercises influence. Public response to armed disputes varies from well-known rally effects that favor the president (Mueller 1973), to mixed evaluations of executive use of military force (Burk 1999; Gartner and Segura 1998; Berinsky 2005), to opposition toward lengthy military operations (Reiter and Stam 2002).
There are a number of possible ways to account for military conflict. Our measure, *Casualties*, comes from the PRIO/Uppsala IR research (Lacina and Gleditsch 2004; Strand et al 2004) and provides the number of casualties sustained by either side in armed conflicts in which the U.S. is involved.\textsuperscript{viii} We considered as an alternative the number of conflicts in which the U.S. is engaged, but found it had too little variation to be useful. Casualties, by increasing the salience of international conflict, should have a positive effect on the internal and external prestige of both Foreign Relations and Armed Services.

In addition, we control for the duration of the Cold War with a dummy variable, *Cold War ’89*, that takes the value of 1 for the period from 1947-1989.\textsuperscript{ix} The effect of the Cold War on the Senate has been paradoxical: creating dramatic opportunities to forge important policies in the early years, while undermining congressional influence over the long run as Congress delegated more power to the executive (Koh 1993; Silverstein 1997). With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, foreign policy became less salient in American politics until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Generally, our expectation is that the internal and external prestige of both committees would be higher during the Cold War.

Popular presidents have political capital that legitimizes their policy positions, enabling them to overshadow members of Congress in the public eye. The instability of presidential approval suggests that it is unlikely to affect legislators’ calculations about desirability of particular committee assignments. Nevertheless, individual senators and committee chairs will not only refrain from challenging presidents who are riding high in the polls, but also will have greater difficulty attracting the attention of the news media during periods of strong presidential ascendancy. We include the variable, *Presidential*
Approval, computed as the yearly average of responses to the Gallup question, in the model of external prestige, but exclude it from those for internal prestige. We expect that it will have a negative impact on both committees.

3) Internal Influences on Committee Desirability and Visibility:

The influence of committees in Congress arises from their gate keeping functions in setting the policy agenda, as well as their informational advantages. Increased polarization between Democrats and Republicans affects both aspects of committee power. As noted above, greater polarization within the chamber should have a negative affect on internal prestige and external visibility because of the majority parties’ ability to control the agenda and the floor. However, it is not clear that parties within the Senate have this kind of leverage. At the same time, party polarization inside the committee enhances the informational value of committee cues. The critical aspect of polarization is the distance between the Democratic and Republican party medians, which we calculate using first dimension DW-Nominate Scores to create two variables—Senate Polarity and Committee Polarity. We expect that party polarization will have a negative effect on the internal and external prestige of the two committees, although we do not have an a priori theoretical basis for predicting whether polarization within the Senate as a whole or divisions within the committee is more consequential.

Other possible sources of party influence on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees involve various types of congruence between the party of the president and the Senate majority, including the occurrence of divided government or the size of the president’s party coalition inside the Senate. We tested several different measures of these dynamics, as well as interactions among them, but none proved
satisfactory in accounting for either internal or external committee prestige. We also considered the additional possibility that ideological predispositions among Republicans, who increasingly tend to favor a strong commander-in-chief, might mute the efforts among Republican chairs—Senator Jesse Helms (R, NC) notwithstanding—to seek headlines on national security issues.

Finally, internal rules and norms of the Senate have the potential to affect the desirability of committee assignments. In particular, the Johnson Rule in the 1950s insured that each senator would have at least one important committee, while subsequent expansion of the size of committees enabled senators to enhance their influence by seeking membership on multiple committees (Sinclair 1989). In the 80th Congress, for example, the mean number of committee seats was 2.1 per senator, but by the 108th Congress it was 3.5. Dispersing assignments so widely, however, has the potential to dilute the influence of committees as a whole. Thus, we would expect that the rise in the number of committee assignments, all else being equal, would have a negative effect on internal committee prestige. Again, the impact on Armed Services should be less because of its strong constituency appeal.

A summary of the dependent variables and continuous independent variables follows below.

*Table 1 about here—Descriptive Statistics*

For our internal prestige models our dependent variable is the *Veteran Ratio*, the proportion of a committee made up of senior senators. We might think of each senator’s choice to be on the committee as a zero, one decision, and so characterized by the Bernoulli distribution. However, the committee is made up of a group of senators all
making a similar decision, so that the sum of the individual decisions for each Congress will be the Binomial distribution, as long as “the unobserved binary variables… are independent and identically distributed” (King 1998).

\[ Y_i \sim f_{\text{binomial}}(\pi) \]

Alternatively, if the independence of senators’ decisions to serve on a given committee does not hold, then King also offers an even more generalized specification in the “extended beta-binomial” (ebb) distribution. This model of the data generating process includes an additional parameter for the variation across the different Senators’ choices, as shown below.

\[ Y_i \sim f_{\text{ebb}}(\pi, \gamma) \]

Note that the binomial is nested inside the ebb, which makes it suitable for tests for independence. We ran comparisons of the two formulations, and in one of the four internal prestige models we use, the ebb was statistically significant, but the parameter was so tiny as to be inconsequential. A Likelihood ratio test indicated that the ebb model was not statistically different from the Binomial model.\textsuperscript{xii} Taken together, these results allow us to assume that these decisions are relatively independent and adopt the Binomial specification for the internal prestige models.

The equation for estimating internal committee prestige is:

\[
\text{Internal Prestige, Veteran Ratio} = \\
\alpha + \beta_1 * \text{Budget}_{t-1} + \beta_2 * \text{Casualties}_{t-1} + \beta_3 * \text{Cold War}_1 + [\beta_4 * \text{Senate Polarity}_1 \text{ or } \beta_4 * \text{Comm. Polarity}_{t-1}] + \beta_5 * \% \text{Veterans}_1 + \beta_6 * \text{Mean Comm. Assign}_1 + \mu_1
\]
With the external prestige models, the discrete nature of the dependent variables, *New York Times* mentions of committee members and committee chairs, suggested that the Poisson distribution was the appropriate estimation tool. However, a key assumption of the Poisson is that the mean and the variance are the same. With our count data the assumption did not hold, and the magnitude of the difference was extremely large in many cases. The negative binomial (*negbin* in STATA) is a more generalized specification of the Poisson that includes an additional parameter for overdispersion in the data (King 1998). STATA includes a Likelihood ratio test of whether the negative binomial is statistically different from a Poisson regression on the same data. The results were significant at the 0.000 level for all of the external prestige models for committee members and chairs. The equations are below:

*External Prestige, NYTimes Committee Mentions =*

\[
\alpha + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Budget}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Casualties}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{PresApproval}_t + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Cold War}_t + [\beta_5 \cdot \text{Senate Polarity}_t \text{ or } \beta_5 \cdot \text{Comm. Polarity}_{t-1}] + \mu_t
\]

*External Prestige, NYTimes Chair Mentions =*

\[
\alpha + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Budget}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Casualties}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{PresApproval}_t + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Cold War}_t + [\beta_5 \cdot \text{Senate Polarity}_t \text{ or } \beta_5 \cdot \text{Comm. Polarity}_{t-1}] + \beta_6 \cdot \text{RepubChair}_t + \mu_t
\]

V. Results

The statistical analyses confirm expectations that external factors and party polarization influence the overall prestige of Senate committees in the realm of international relations. The results also demonstrate how committees differ in their susceptibility to environmental and partisan pressures. With respect to the status of
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees within the Senate, the former is more vulnerable to changes in its policy sphere, to alterations in rules governing assignments, and to ideological divisions between Democrats and Republicans. With respect to the external visibility of the two committees, increasing partisanship exerts a significant influence on the *New York Times*’ coverage of individual members on both bodies, as well as the Armed Services’ chair. Overall, the findings reveal how the interaction party and committee structures within Congress in combination with developments in the political environment outside Congress can produce substantial institutional change.

Turning first to influences on internal prestige, measured as the proportion of veterans on a committee, it is clear why Foreign Relations and Armed Services have developed such different reputations within the contemporary Senate. The desirability of Foreign Relations is highly dependent upon the relative size of the federal budget devoted to aid and participation in multilateral activities—largely discretionary programs that bear the brunt of efforts to trim deficits. In contrast, the attraction of Armed Services to senators rises when defense spending shrinks as a percent of government outlays, no doubt in response to constituency pressures to protect valuable bases and military contracts. In addition, escalation of conflict raises the stock of Foreign Affairs, while exerting little influence on Armed Services. Contrary to expectations, neither committee appears to have experienced a significant alteration in its internal status as a result of ending the Cold War.

*Table 2 about here--Internal Prestige*

To provide a more substantive interpretation of these coefficients, we simulate the predicted and expected values for the model (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000)).
Figure 5a and Figure 5b below graphically present the expected values for the internal prestige of Foreign Relations across the range of casualties and of budget, holding all other variables at their means. The dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th percentile range around the expected values. In each case we see how internal prestige increases with higher values of these two significant independent variables, although the confidence interval for casualties expands as their number exceeds 250,000 deaths per year.

Figures 5a and 5b about here –Foreign Relations by Casualties and Budget

The chamber influences on the internal prestige of the committees reveal several important patterns. First, the highly significant coefficients for the percentage of senior members in the Senate at the beginning of each Congress indicates how critical it is to control for turnover in evaluating the status of committees overall. The retirement or defeat of senior lawmakers not only opens up slots for members to transfer, but also leads to the expansion of committees to accommodate newcomers without bumping senators who have been serving on the committee. More important, a flood of newcomers depresses the veteran ratio irrespective of a committee’s prestige. Again, the direction of the impact for the two committees is quite different. The influence of such short-term factors on the opportunities for members to vote with their feet takes on added importance given the staggered and lengthy terms of the members.

Second, partisan divisions within the committee are not as influential as we expected. Reputation effects from the preceding Congress, when a committee is polarized, did not surface. Party polarization within the Senate as a whole, however, depressed the inclination of senior members to serve on Foreign Relations, but not Armed Services. If senators expect that an increase in ideological distance between the parties
would limit the independence of their committee, as party theory predicts, they have the option of avoiding such venues. They appear to make that calculation solely with Foreign Relations.

Third, the decline of informal norms of apprenticeship that took place in the Senate during the mid-1970s to early 1980s (Sinclair 1989; Smith and Gamm 2001) and the accompanying expansion of the number of committees on which members may serve—has had a particularly detrimental effect on Foreign Relations. Without more direct observation of members’ motivations, we can only speculate whether Foreign Relations no longer serves senators’ goals for influence or whether they now have different goals that are better served elsewhere. Most likely, the ability to claim seats on several committees, along with the persistence of the rule in the Senate that treats Foreign Relations as a major committee, reduces its appeal in the eyes of members. Whatever the motivation, assignment to the committee seems to have little value as a reward for party loyalty (Cox and McCubbins 1993,), thus confirming Fenno’s (1973) concerns noted earlier about its future.

The external visibility of committee members echoes the pattern above, again depicting Foreign Relations as more sensitive to changes in the external environment. Although the prosecution of the Cold War benefited both committees in terms of their salience to the news media, its resolution represented an added blow to the external prestige of Foreign Relations because it lessened U.S. incentives to use aid as a means of competition with the Soviet Union. What is most striking in Table 3, however, is the impact of partisan divisions on both Foreign Relations and Armed Services. Ideological polarization in the Senate as a whole tends to diminish the visibility of the committees,
especially for Armed Services, as party leaders assume an increasing role in shaping their parties’ image in the news media (Evans and Lipinski 2005). Furthermore, an increase in the distance between the party medians within the committees lessens their capacity to command press attention, reflecting perhaps an inability to agree on an agenda or legislative proposals.

_Table 3 about here—External Prestige of Committee Members_

Again, we have simulated expected values to help interpret these coefficients substantively. Figure 6 below shows the effect of increasing ideological polarity within the Armed Services committee on external prestige, holding all other explanatory variables at their means. It is interesting to note how the confidence intervals, as represented by the 5th and 95th percentile dashed lines around the expected value spread out on either end of the scale. It appears that both high levels of ideological agreement and high levels of disagreement on Armed Services hamper the committee’s ability to capture press coverage. In other words, there seems to be a “sweet spot” for external prestige where the committee is just divided enough to consistently attract attention outside attention.

_Figure 6 about here—Armed Services External Prestige by Polarity_

Recalling from Figure 3b that the chairs of the two committees have disappeared from the headlines of the New York Times in recent years, it is noteworthy that they display different patterns of activity over time. The coverage of the Foreign Relations chair increases positively with the programmatic budget, the severity of international conflicts, and the conduct of the Cold War. Headlines for the chair do not respond to partisan divisions within the Senate or the committee. In contrast, Armed Services chairs’
ability to command headlines does not depend upon budgets or casualties and shows little impact from the Cold War. The chair’s press attention diminishes, furthermore, when the parties are divided in the Senate, either as a whole or in the committee. Both chairs experience a shift in visibility with the approval ratings of the president, although the signs differ. The chairs of Foreign Relations seem to benefit from a popular president, while those heading Armed Services experience a drop in their status as newsmakers. Interestingly, Republican chairs are more likely to be visible on Foreign Relations, all else being equal, than their counterparts on Armed Services, who suffer a loss in headline exposure.

Table 4 about here—External Prestige of Committee Chairs

In sum, downward shifts in a variety of measures of committee prestige reflect long-standing and more immediate influences in the political environment. Foreign Relations has had the more precipitous decline, battered by assignment procedures and policy and partisan trends. Armed Services, while not impervious to such forces, has experienced fewer effects, insulated no doubt by its dual function as a policy and constituency committee. Yet, it would be a mistake to suggest that Armed Services has thrived under the expansion of the national security state, and its vulnerability to partisan tides inside and outside the Senate chamber suggest that it will continue to confront challenges to its prestige.

VI. Conclusion:

The analysis indicates that party polarization and external influences exert significant influence on long-term trends in the prestige of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, even after controlling for turnover and expanded
opportunities to serve on multiple committees. The findings also confirm the committees’ differing responses to such pressures. For example, chamber polarization had an impact on the desire of members to remain on Foreign Relations, but neither chamber nor committee polarity influenced the decision of veteran senators to serve on Armed Services. Similarly, party polarization in the chamber and within the committee in the chamber negatively affected the external prestige for both committees, with the exception of the visibility of the chairs of Foreign Affairs. Budgets, casualties and the Cold War were generally more important to the prestige of Foreign Affairs than for Armed Services, but both the chairs of both committees were influenced by changes in presidential approval, albeit in different directions. Finally, Republican chairs appear to be less visible in making headline news.

The paper confirms the need to think about congressional institutions in a more comprehensive way. Parties influence procedures and roll calls, but their impact pervades legislatures in a myriad of ways. Rather than developing separate theories for each type of structure, theorists need to pay attention to the dynamic tension between parties and committees. Moreover, the findings suggest that measurable institutional change results not just from the adoption of formal rules and procedures, but arises from informal adaptations, as well. The committees’ experience further supports the value of exploring gradual shifts in institutional power through informal means as a result of inaction or inability to resist external pressure. In addition, the individual attributes of committees and the differing environments they confront suggest difficulties in generalizing about committee change. Even while reacting to broad trends in the party system, committees adapt at different rates and in response to different types of outside
stimuli. In this respect, the results confirm the concerns of many scholars that the literature on the Congress is, well, too Congress-centered. Finally, the research indicates the risks of applying theories that capture the characteristics of the House to the Senate. Taking institutions seriously as constraints on and inducements for particular patterns of behavior requires much more attention to the unique institutional parameters of the Senate in explaining legislative outcomes.

The findings complement the work of several different groups of scholars noted earlier that are pushing the study of institutions in different directions. Not only has the insularity of the literatures on Congress and the presidency outlived its usefulness, but the neglect of the national security state as a force in domestic affairs also appears increasingly untenable. The inertial force of the presidency extends beyond the personal skills of individual presidents and is highly sensitive to party systems (Skowronek 1993) and to war (Mayhew 2005), but it is hard to quantify a phenomenon as subjective as institutional power. Although our results demonstrate a systematic impact of the executive branch on Congress, the absence of summary measures that capture the full scope of the presidency makes it difficult to conclude whether the patterns we observe for Foreign Relations and Armed Services are isolated cases or symptomatic of something bigger—the canary in the congressional coalmine, as it were.

Congressional power has risen and fallen over the course of the nation’s history (Mayhew 2000; Cooper 2005), and some might suggest that our measures of institutional prestige are a thin reed on which to hang warnings about legislative decline. With fewer senior members on the key committees and diminished visibility in the press, the Senate has undeniably fewer avenues for constructive engagement with the president. An
ambitious lawmaker, such as Senator John McCain, may be able to compete with the president on a high profile issue, such as treatment of prisoners of war, and the power of the purse remains a potent check on specific executive programs, such as covert aid to the Contras. Indeed, as we conclude our research in March of 2006, stirrings of resistance to the war in Iraq are evident in both Foreign Relations and Armed Services. Yet episodic intervention is no substitute for sustained institutional partnership, and a personalized legislature is no match for a personalized presidency.

The irony is that a “semi-sovereign” Senate poses risks to the presidency. The United States, as the sole superpower, faces fewer rivals abroad, but confronts a stateless enemy engaged in terrorism around the globe. Such a struggle will not succeed solely through military means, and popular legitimacy also is essential to the prosecution of any presidential strategy, whether Republican or Democratic. The powerful tools of the presidency are insufficient to sustain the public will, as virtually every president has ruefully discovered. With the gradual decline of senatorial prestige, the nation risks losing an institution that can organize elite discourse about war and diplomacy, while the president risks political isolation when the going gets rough.
References


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Prestige - Veteran Ratio</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Relations Comm</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services Comm</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Prestige - NYTimes Mentions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Relations Comm</td>
<td>267.58</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>129.94</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Relations Chair</td>
<td>21.66</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>21.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services Comm</td>
<td>154.04</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>93.55</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services Chair</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>40.99</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>85.86</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>323.91</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (Def.)</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (Int'l.)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War '89</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm. Polarity (AS)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm. Polarity (FR)</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Comm Assign</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres Approval</td>
<td>55.04</td>
<td>56.54</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>27.83</td>
<td>76.21</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Polarity</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Veteran Senators</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm Negot Interval (FR)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm Negot Interval (AS)</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables, 1947-2004
Table 2: Models of Internal Committee Prestige, 81st-107th Congress

Dependent variable=Committee's veteran ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign Relations</th>
<th>Armed Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1a</td>
<td>Model 1b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External influences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget(L)</td>
<td>14.595 **</td>
<td>15.724 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7.151)</td>
<td>(7.303)</td>
<td>(0.985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casulties(L)</td>
<td>8.79E-06 ***</td>
<td>1.10E-05 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.23E-06)</td>
<td>(3.15E-06)</td>
<td>(1.41E-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War '89</td>
<td>-0.828</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.539)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Influences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Polarity</td>
<td>-6.031 *</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.533)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm Polarity(L)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Veteran Senators</td>
<td>5.109 ***</td>
<td>3.417 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.937)</td>
<td>(1.778)</td>
<td>(1.407)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Comm Assign</td>
<td>-1.556 **</td>
<td>-1.861 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.682)</td>
<td>(0.711)</td>
<td>(0.628)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.376 ***</td>
<td>3.262 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.711)</td>
<td>(2.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All models are binomial regressions using STATA's binary outcomes logit regression for grouped data
(L) indicates variables lagged by one Congress, reflecting prior committee history
Analysis is by Congress, beginning with the 81st in 1949 because of lagged variables
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 3: Models of External Committee Prestige, 1947-2002

Dependent Variable=New York Times committee mentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign Relations Mentions</th>
<th>Armed Services Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 3a</td>
<td>Model 3b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External influences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>3.099 **</td>
<td>3.309 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.338)</td>
<td>(1.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>6.87E-07</td>
<td>4.19E-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.52E-07)</td>
<td>(4.28E-07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres Approval</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War '89</td>
<td>0.930 ***</td>
<td>0.857 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Influences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Polarity</td>
<td>-1.307 *</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.738)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm Polarity</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>-0.916 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.377 ***</td>
<td>5.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.563)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.1,  **p<.05,  ***p<.01

All models are negative binomial regressions for count data
Overdispersion parameter is significant for all models, as is Likelihood ratio test of Poisson vs. NegBin
Analysis is by year and ends with 2002 Proquest database
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 4: Models of External Chair Prestige, 1947-2003
Dependent variable=New York Times mentions of committee chair

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign Relations Mentions</th>
<th>Armed Services Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 5a</td>
<td>Model 5b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External influences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>12.774 ***</td>
<td>13.033 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.074)</td>
<td>(4.748)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>4.45E-06 ***</td>
<td>06 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.81E-06)</td>
<td>(1.79E-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres Approval</td>
<td>0.017 *</td>
<td>0.018 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War '89</td>
<td>1.057 **</td>
<td>1.056 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Influences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Polarity</td>
<td>-1.911</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.549)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm Polarity</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>-0.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.232)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repub Chair</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.542 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.547)</td>
<td>(1.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

All models are negative binomial regressions for count data
Overdispersion parameter is significant for all models, as is Likelihood ratio test of Poisson vs. NegBin
Analysis is by year and includes observations for 2003 from LexisNexis search of New York Times
Standard errors in parentheses
Figure 1a

Internal Prestige - Foreign Relations & Armed Services
1947-2004

Congress

Veteran Ratio

80 90 100 110

Foreign Relations
Armed Services

Figure 1b

Internal Prestige - Finance & Appropriations
1947-2004

Congress

Veteran Ratio

80 90 100 110

Finance
Appropriations
Figure 2a
Internal Prestige - Foreign Relations By Party
1947-2004

Congress
Veteran Ratio
Democrats
Republicans

Figure 2b
Internal Prestige - Armed Services By Party
1947-2004

Congress
Veteran Ratio
Democrats
Republicans
Figure 3a

External Prestige - Committee Name Mentions
1947-2004

Year
Year

NYTimes Counts
NYTimes Counts

Foreign Relations
Armed Services

Figure 3b

External Prestige - Chair Name Mentions
1947-2004

Year
Year

NYTimes Counts
NYTimes Counts

Foreign Relations
Armed Services
Figure 4

Ideological Polarity Comparison
1947-2004

Congress

I ideological Polarity

- 10
- 8
- 6
- 4
- 2

80 90 100 110

AS FR Senate
Figure 5a

FR Internal Prestige by Budget

Figure 5b

NYTimes FR Committee Mentions by Casualties
Figure 6

NYTimes AS Committee Mentions by Polarity

Note: For 1000 simulation trials
End Notes

i Ultimately, his own presidency shattered in the titanic struggle with the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge, over congressional prerogatives and the Treaty of Versaille.

ii Unlike earlier measures of committee prestige that use transfers off and on committees, the Grosewart index controls for the committee from which the lawmaker transferred. It thus distinguishes between actual transfers and additional assignments.

iii Senators added Rules and Administration in this period without affecting other assignments.


v A Proquest search examined all headlines and articles from 1947-2001. The search engine is sensitive to phrases, delimiters, and the overall document parameters. To maximize the number of correct hits and minimize errors, we ran tests using different combinations of words, delimiting phrases and document definitions and compared them side-by-side for 1947, 1959 and 1999. We inspected all headline mentions of the chairs for accuracy and randomly selected every third list of article mentions for similar inspection. We configured the Proquest search to select individual chairs solely in connection with their committee, thus eliminating mentions such as the educational grants bearing the name of Foreign Relations Chair Claiborne Pell.

   We attempted to augment the Proquest data with LexisNexis searches for 2002-2004. Side-by-side comparison for 1989 and 2001 (again with different combinations) indicated only one discrepancy for the chair headline mentions, but significant disparities in mentions for the whole committee. To insure consistency, we use only the chair data through 2004.

vi In an earlier version of this paper, we also used William Howells data on significant executive orders as a proxy for tendencies among presidents to circumvent Congress, particularly advice and consent on treaties overseen by Foreign Relations.
Lacina and Gleditsch (2004) define battle deaths as “resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat.” The variable captures the intensity of military actions by counting deaths on both sides. Relying solely on US casualties can distort the scope of an engagement, such as the first Gulf War.

We also considered an alternative end date for the Cold War of 1991, when the former U.S.S.R. collapsed, but it did not alter the analysis, so we stay with the conventional notion of the war ending with the removal of the Berlin Wall.

Christopher Deering generously made his data on the median positions of both committees available for preliminary analysis. We subsequently went to the Poole-Rosenthal website in order to match the DW-Nominate scores to the members of the committees for each year.


Model 1a $p < \chi^2 = .873$. Model 2a $p < \chi^2 = .9265$. Model 2b $p < \chi^2 = .8744$

For Foreign Relations Committee Mentions: mean=267, var=16884. For Foreign Relations Chair Mention: mean=21, var=451. For Armed Services Committee Mentions: mean=154, var=8750. For Armed Services Chair Mentions: mean=7, var=142.

The R statistical program, available through Gary King’s Zelig package, does not have procedures for the Binomial distribution, but Brian Law created code for the simulations, which is available upon request.