

The Nationalization of Electoral Change in the Americas*

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WORK IN PROGRESS. COMMENTS WELCOME.

Abstract

This paper examines the degree of nationalization of inter-election change in congressional voting behavior in Latin America and the United States. Using methods appropriate for the analysis of compositional multiparty data, we measure the relative magnitude of national and sub-national shifts in electoral support across parties and elections in six Latin American countries, and the United States. Our findings indicate the widespread influence of district-specific (i.e. local) factors in electoral change, but highlight the drastic impact that intermittent nationalized shifts have on partisan support. We suggest implications for electoral strategies, legislative cohesion, and the governmental priority given to national political issues vis-à-vis regional concerns.

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Contents

1	Introduction	3
2	The Nationalization of Electoral Change	4
2.1	Partisan Configuration	4
2.2	Electoral Tides	5
3	National and Local Forces in Latin America and U.S.	6
4	Modeling & Measuring the Nationalization of Electoral Change	8
4.1	Multiparty Electoral Data	8
4.2	The Magnitude of National and Local Forces in Electoral Change . .	10
5	Results	13
5.1	High Nationalization: Venezuela and Mexico	13
5.2	Intermittent Nationalization: Argentina and Colombia	14
5.3	Low Nationalization: Brazil, Chile and the United States	16
6	Implications and Conclusion	17
A	Parties, Data Sources, and Notes	25

1 Introduction

Electoral outcomes often reflect much more than voters' long-standing allegiances to parties and ideologies. Political parties, vote-seeking candidates, pundits and academics, all spend a great deal of time trying to understand the forces that influence changes in constituency voting behavior. The literature on electoral politics has shown a long-standing interest in measuring and explaining patterns of electoral behavior over time across districts and regions in the United States (Schattschneider 1960, Stokes 1965, Sundquist 1973, Katz 1973, Sorauf 1980, Claggett, Flanigan & Zingale 1984, Brady 1985, Kawato 1987, Cox & McCubbins 1993, Bartels 1998, Brady, D'Onofrio & Fiorina 2000). A smaller set of works make comparative analyses of the degree of nationalization of partisan support across countries (Stokes 1967, Rose & Urwin 1975, Bawn, Cox & Rosenbluth 1999, Jones & Mainwaring 2003, Caramani 2004, Morgenstern & Potthoff 2005). Comparative nationalization interests scholars because it helps to distinguish party systems from one another in ways that have implications for governability and political representation.

Fluctuations in the partisan distribution of the vote, whether uniform or idiosyncratic across districts, affect constituent representation, partisan unity and government policy priorities. Elections that are decided on local issues tend to make congressional parties a mix of different parochial interests, and make harder the task of forming a legislative majority behind policy proposals that have a national scope. If district delegations (or individual candidates) are convinced that their electoral success depends primarily upon local issues unrelated to the fate of the party as a whole, weaker bonds will exist among members of the legislative party (Stokes 1967, Cox & McCubbins 1993). A nationalized electorate, in contrast, can strengthen partisan ties despite electoral rules that emphasize the "personal vote" or decentralized candidate nomination procedures.

The level of nationalization of electoral change can affect not only the unity of legislative parties, but also the influence of the executive. A nationalized electorate provides a favorable context for presidents that seek support by "going public." The nature of electoral change also influences presidential coalition building strategies through its effect on the priorities of legislators. It may create conditions favorable to the adoption of national policy programs or it may encourage the proliferation of targeted bills distributing particularistic goods.

Whether changes in voter support follow a common pattern or reflect, instead, idiosyncratic changes in different parts of the country has been of particular interests to scholars analyzing consolidation in new democracies. Latin Americanists, for instance, tend to associate lower levels of electoral volatility with more institutionalized party systems that, they argue, are better able to structure the political process and to provide citizens and organizations with predictable choices (Mainwaring & Scully 1995). Yet, studies of volatility at the national level can mask stability—or change—at the district level, where voters actually make such choices. Electoral volatility may vary across districts, and conflicting trends in different regions of the country may cancel each other out at the national level. Identifying patterns of electoral change at the sub-national level can help scholars better understand national electoral volatility, legislative party organization, and executive strategies.

In this paper we analyze continuity and change in voter support in six Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela—

and the United States. We take advantage of recent developments in the statistical analysis of multiparty electoral data to specify the degree of nationalization of electoral change in the seven countries under study. We use methods appropriate for analyzing compositional data (Katz & King 1999, Tomz, Tucker & Wittenberg 2002), to adapt Bartels’s (1998) model of electoral change to a multiparty framework to measure the relative strength of national and sub-national forces of electoral change across parties and elections.

The paper is divided into four main sections. Section 2 discusses the concept of a nationalized electorate, while Section 3 specifies our questions about electoral change specific to Latin America and its comparison to the United States. Section 4 describes the data that we use and explains the statistical model that we estimate. Section 5 discusses the results for each country. Finally, we conclude by highlighting our main findings and speculating about the effects of electoral change on legislative behavior and more generally on the countries’ party systems.

2 The Nationalization of Electoral Change

The notion of a nationalized electorate generally refers to the uniformity of political behavior—what (Schattschneider 1960, 93) called the “universality of political trends”—across the different districts or regions of a country. Although sometimes used ambiguously, it is meant to point to similarities in the aggregate voting behavior of the different sub-units within the nation. This broad definition has encompassed two main concepts of nationalization: (1) as convergence in the level of partisan support across the nation, and (2) as a uniform response of the different sub-units to political forces. This distinction is both substantively and empirically relevant; therefore it is important to clarify its use.

2.1 Partisan Configuration

Under the first conceptualization, a nationalized electorate is one that exhibits a *convergence* in the level of partisan strength across the nation, leading to a system in which parties receive a uniform level of support across sub-units of the electorate. Nationalization as convergence in party support focuses on the homogeneity of the electorate, where similar mixtures of political support replace distinctive regional issues. Over the long run, a nationalized electorate reflects a move away from politically salient regional cleavages to an alignment based on positions towards national political issues, with similar voter composition across districts. This view of a nationalized electorate is present in several influential works on U.S. politics, including those of (Schattschneider 1960) and (Sundquist 1973).

Also with a focus on the “territorial configuration of the vote,” Caramani (2004) reviews the applicability of various indicators offered in the literature to comparative analyses of nationalization, including the mean absolute deviation of a party’s district-level vote shares, the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean), Rose & Urwin’s (1975) Index of Cumulative Regional Inequality, among others. Applying these various indicators to long time-series of sub-national electoral data from across Western Europe, Caramani pays particular attention to the sensitivity of measurements to both the number of territorial units and to the relative size of political parties. Chhibber and Kollman (2004) . . .

Jones & Mainwaring (2003) employ an alternative measure of party and party system nationalization based on the Gini coefficient to examine the extent to which parties in the Americas receive similar levels of electoral support throughout the country. Their calculations show substantial variation in the convergence of partisan support across sub-national units, including those we study in this paper. In general, they find that the more fragmented party systems have lower nationalization scores, as do the federal countries. Nationalization of partisan support in the United States falls around the median level in their analysis.

2.2 Electoral Tides

The second conceptualization of a nationalized electorate focuses on the *common response* of voters in a given election. The **movement** of the electorate as opposed to its **configuration** is the key difference between the two definitions of nationalization. Within the common response framework, the degree of observed similarity in electoral change across sub-national units provides evidence of national trends in partisan attitudes, whereas the variance across units indicates the importance of constituency level influences. This means that a nationalized electorate responds in a similar fashion across the country (nationalized movement) even though we may see dissimilar absolute levels of partisan support across political sub-units. As others have emphasized, it is significantly different than the prior conceptualization since common (i.e., nationalized) response can occur despite wide differences in the level of party support within the country and highly idiosyncratic changes can occur across sub-units that have had relatively similar partisan configurations. The focus of this paper is on this second conceptualization, the nationalization of electoral *change*, which we examine on an election-by-election basis.

Donald Stokes' (1965, 1967) influential work on electoral change focused on nationalization as a uniform response to political "forces." His concern with popular influences on the cohesion of congressional parties led him to concentrate on the different forces affecting mass voting behavior. Stokes (1967) used congressional election returns from the United States and Britain to identify historical changes in partisan support and to examine the relative importance of national and local forces in voting behavior and electoral turnout. The model he proposed to measure these effects is a variance component model in which the congressional election outcome in each district in each state is thought of as the sum of three fixed effects and three random effects of local, state and national forces.¹ Since Stokes' original work, several authors have sought to improve the method used to measure the various components of electoral change.² Particularly relevant for our analysis is a recent article by Bartels (1998).

Bartels, in an essay honoring Stokes' work, introduces an alternative model to capture three distinct components which make up the U.S. presidential election outcome in each state in each election: "a partisan component reflecting standing loyalties carrying over from previous elections, an election-specific component reflecting the shifting tides of national electoral forces, and an idiosyncratic com-

¹Stokes' model is: $Y_{ijk} = \alpha + \beta_i + \gamma_{ij} + A_k + B_{ik} + C_{ijk}$, where i indexes the states, j indexes the districts, and k indexes the election years.

²See for instance (Claggett, Flanigan & Zingale 1984, Brady 1985, Kawato 1987, Cox & McCubbins 1993, Bawn, Cox & Rosenbluth 1999, Morgenstern & Potthoff 2005).

ponent reflecting new sub-national electoral forces at work in the specific state” (Bartels 1998, 303). The Republican margin over the Democrats in each district, weighted by the number of votes cast in each state, is regressed onto its lagged variables for a 12-year span. The linear model advanced by Bartels includes a constant that captures common response, a stochastic term that reflects state specific forces; a measure of stability in partisan loyalties calculated from the aggregate effect of prior elections (lagged variables); and an assessment of an election’s impact in future votes (from its lagged coefficients in the future elections).³ The model conveys a lot of information in a simple and elegant manner, however it is problematic for non-U.S. style party systems and electoral data. Later in the paper we explain how we modify this model so that we may apply it to multiparty systems and suggest an alternative approach to interpreting the same substantive quantities of interest in a multiparty context.

Modeling differences aside, Stokes (1965, 1967), Bartels (1998), and others (Claggett, Flanigan & Zingale 1984, Kawato 1987, Cox & McCubbins 1993, Bawn, Cox & Rosenbluth 1999, Morgenstern & Potthoff 2005), are all fundamentally interested in measuring the magnitude of sub-national electoral change in relation to national-level change.

3 National and Local Forces in Latin America and U.S.

In Latin America, just as in the United States, political scientists and political pundits often speculate about the influence of national political issues on the direction of electoral change. Politicians in both regions of the Americas are also concerned about this effect given that the electoral impact of partisan tides may jeopardize, or boost, their political careers. There is consensus in the U.S. literature that elections for the lower chamber of Congress are influenced mostly by district-specific issues and that national forces play a minor role. There is no such consensus about Latin American elections.

[INCOMPLETE: The literature on U.S. elections . . . Claggett et al (1984) . . . Kawato (1987) . . . Brady (1985) . . . Brady et al (2000) . . . Conventional wisdom for the US emphasizes strong local party organizations and highly independent incumbent vis-à-vis weak national parties. . . Even with highly decentralized party organizations, however, Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that the party label, understood as the central tendency in mass beliefs about actions and outcomes attributed to the national party, often changes in ways that affect the election probabilities of candidates in the same manner. They examine inter-election swing (i.e. the change in party vote shares from one election to the next) across the U.S. States and show that there is an important commonality in the electoral chances of incumbents of the same party. . .]

In Latin America the conventional wisdom assigns primacy to national political figures and a powerful executive, who is commonly portrayed as responsible for all major political initiatives. The national leadership of major parties usually explains

³Bartels’ model is: $R_{st} = \alpha_t + \beta_{1t}R_{st-1} + \beta_{2t}R_{st-2} + \beta_{3t}R_{st-3} + \epsilon_{st}$. The three lagged variables from prior elections, R_{st-1} , R_{st-2} , and R_{st-3} , measure electoral continuity at the state level. The constant term, α_t , captures election-specific forces at the national level. The stochastic term, reflecting state specific forces in each election, has a probability distribution with mean zero and election specific variance σ_{s2} .

electoral results in terms of a public referendum on national issues such as the government's economic or social policy, even when they refer to purely local (i.e. municipal) elections. For instance, the ability of Menem's government to control inflation in Argentina has been signaled as the most important element behind the impressive electoral performance of Peronist (PJ) candidates across the country during the first half of the 1990s; while the dismal presidency of De La Rúa has been blamed for having the opposite effect on radical (UCR) candidates after 2001. In Brazil, favorable electoral results for the presidential coalition have been linked to the success of the Real Plan in limiting high inflation. In accounts of recent Mexican elections, national events have also been said to drive voting behavior, like the "debt crisis" in the 1982 elections, the "political crisis" that fractured the PRI in the late 1980s, and the "security crisis" that in 1994 followed a guerrilla uprising and the killing of the PRI's presidential candidate. In Colombia, the state of the civil war and the popular image of the national leadership have been frequently linked to changes in electoral support. In Chile, changes in voting behavior are commonly associated with the government's economic performance and national events such as the jailing of Pinochet, the emergence of the popular opposition candidate Lavín, or the effectiveness of social policies. And in contemporary Venezuela, recent elections have been portrayed as a referendum on the role of president Chavez, a popular yet polarizing figure whose party is now present in all regions of the country.

Notwithstanding the relevance of national politics, diffusion of authority and regional concerns also suggest that partisan attitudes may fluctuate significantly within many Latin American nations. Regional politics often provide another set of prominent political actors that many times overshadow the national party structure. Regional party organizations have significant autonomy from the national party leadership in selecting candidates, and an ongoing process of political decentralization has assigned significant power to the respective local governments. Most Latin American countries have well-established local political organizations that, independently from the national leadership, exert control over important clientelistic networks. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia (after 1991) have directly elected governors with substantial influence over the political careers of members of congress and over large budgetary resources. Venezuela began in 1989 a process of political decentralization that included the direct elections of mayors and governors. Although Chile is a unitary country with fairly centralized parties, and comparatively smaller population, local politics have always played an important role. Valenzuela's (1977) analysis of Chile in the period prior to the 1973 coup highlights the political influence of local actors despite centralized government, and Eaton's (2004) work on post-1973 politics shows an institutional shift towards greater decentralization.

In short, . . .

In the next section, we turn to our analysis of sub-national electoral returns in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and the United States. We examine district-level data across a total of 60 elections for the lower chamber of Congress to assess the relative impact of national and local forces in voting behavior.

4 Modeling & Measuring the Nationalization of Electoral Change

With our empirical analysis we intend to survey the electoral landscapes and capture patterns of party competition in six Latin American countries and the United States. For each party in each election in each country, we look for a common movement in the electorate across the different sub-national units. We measure the shift in partisan support at the district level that can be attributed to national electoral forces, relative to the total change in support given to each party from one election to the next. Prior to the presentation of the empirical model, we briefly discuss methodological considerations related to the nature of the data used in estimating the model.

4.1 Multiparty Electoral Data

We base our analysis on the district or state/province level vote in lower chamber legislative elections during the current democratic period in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and the United States (see Appendix A for information on data and data sources). These seven countries have varying rules for the election of legislative representatives, and quite different party systems. The U.S. has single-member districts and Mexico use a segmented system (our data aggregate single-member results at the state level). Venezuela used proportional representation until it moved to mixed member elections in 1993 (after the change we use only list results). The other four countries use some variant of list PR. Districts in Argentina (provinces), Brazil (states) and Venezuela (states) have relatively large magnitudes, but in Brazil the voters select a candidate from a party list whereas in Argentina and Venezuela party lists are closed. The Chilean binominal system, in contrast, has 60 districts with a magnitude of two. In Colombia, parties can run multiple lists in a single district, but the votes received by each list are not pooled.

Our analysis is done at the party level, except in Chile where we use electoral lists (i.e., coalitions or pacts). The United States, Argentina and Colombia are predominantly two-party systems, although “other” parties have accounted for a considerable portion of the vote in both Argentina and Colombia in recent years. Mexico, Brazil and Chile, on the other hand, are clear cases of multiparty systems. In Chile, however, most parties group into one of two large, stable electoral alliances that coordinate coalition candidacies across districts.⁴ We analyze all parties that receive at least 5% of the vote nationally in at least two consecutive elections and group minor parties in an “others” category. In the United States and Colombia, this leaves us with 2 parties plus others; in Argentina 2 or 3 (depending on the election) plus others; in Mexico and Chile 3 plus others; in Venezuela between 3 and 5 plus others, and in Brazil 7 plus others.⁵

Multiparty electoral data require special methodological treatment.⁶ Since the

⁴Given our assumptions about parties that do not contest in every district, discussed below, it would not be appropriate to use parties as the unit of analysis in Chile.

⁵Although the PTB had only 4.5 and 4.6 percent of the national vote in 1986 and 2002, respectively, we make a minor exception and include the PTB in our analysis across all Brazilian elections.

⁶Recent work by political methodologists offers competing statistical models and techniques for

proportion of the vote cast for each party falls between 0 and 1, statistical models like OLS that assume a theoretically unbounded dependent variable require that votes must first be converted to an unbounded scale.⁷ To do this, we apply the multivariate logistic transformation, calculating the natural log of the ratio of each party’s vote share to that of a designated “base” party. For district i with J parties, we have a vector of $J-1$ log ratios:⁸

$$\mathbf{Y}_i = \left[\ln \left(\frac{v_{i1}}{v_{iJ}} \right), \ln \left(\frac{v_{i2}}{v_{iJ}} \right), \dots, \ln \left(\frac{v_{i(J-1)}}{v_{iJ}} \right) \right] \quad (1)$$

Since the data are expressed as log ratios, quantities of interest based on the parameter effects and standard errors cannot be interpreted directly from the model estimates. Instead, we calculate a set of “predicted” values of \mathbf{Y}_i (log odd ratios) based on a chosen value of x and then reverse the logistic transformation to convert these predicted \mathbf{Y}_i values back into predicted values of vote shares \mathbf{v}_i (Tomz, Tucker & Wittenberg 2002).⁹

In addition, multiparty data are a type of compositional data because the fraction of the vote for all parties must sum to 1. Therefore, we estimate our model using “seemingly unrelated regression” (SUR), a technique that provides separate regression equations for each party but allows error terms across the regression equations to be correlated. We expect error terms to be correlated across equations “because the dependent variable is constructed from vote shares, such that a higher log ratio for one party means a lower log ratio for the others” (Tomz, Tucker &

appropriately dealing with multiparty data (Katz & King 1999, Honaker, Katz & King 2002, Tomz, Tucker & Wittenberg 2002, Jackson 2002). Methodologists primarily disagree over whether the multivariate normal is a reasonable model or whether the additional flexibility provided by the multivariate t distribution provides less biased results, and over how best to deal with partially-contested districts. Here, we generally follow the model proposed by Tomz, Tucker & Wittenberg (2002), although we avoid the problem of partially-contested districts all together by assuming that had a party presented candidates in a particular district that they did not actually contest, they would have received virtually none (.001%) of the vote. Katz & King (1999) assume, instead, that if a non-contesting party had nominated candidates in a particular district, it would have received fewer votes than the parties that did nominate candidates. They then estimate the effective vote had all districts been fully contested rather than the actual vote. In Latin America, it is common to find several very small parties picking up a very small share of the vote. So even if we were to adopt a similar assumption to that used by Katz & King (1999), our results are unlikely to differ much for most countries in most years. In any case, this assumption mostly affects only the “others” category and a few small parties in a few districts, including ARI and UCD in Argentina, PTB in Brazil, the Communists in Chile and the Conservatives in recent Colombian elections. In the US, there are just a few states, like Vermont, where the entire state is one district and that seat was uncontested by one of the two major parties in a few years.

⁷One might minimize this concern, in a two-party setting, by looking at the margin of one party over the other, converting the DV to a scale of -100 to 100 where observations near those endpoints appear infrequently in the sample, as in Bartels (1998).

⁸We assume that these log ratios (\mathbf{Y}_i) are distributed multivariate normal with mean vector $\boldsymbol{\mu}_i$ and variance matrix $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$, and we model $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ as a linear function of explanatory variables, \mathbf{X} , and the slope coefficients, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$.

⁹Fortunately, all of this is automated in *Clarify*, a program that works in conjunction with *Stata* (Tomz, Wittenberg & King 2003). With the options `dfk` and `small`, we specify that *Stata* make small-sample adjustments. With the option `isure`, we specify that *Stata* estimation is done by iteration, which converges to the maximum likelihood results. Raw regression results of the parameter estimates for each of the two models are presented in Appendix II and Appendix III, respectively, which are available from the authors upon request. Due to space limitations, we report only the quantities of substantive interests, as described below.

Wittenberg 2002, 68). While separate regressions would yield the same coefficient and standard error estimates in this case (because each of the seemingly related regression equations includes the same right-hand-side variables), predicted values that account for fundamental variability, not just estimation uncertainty, will draw from the incorrect variance-covariance matrix and may give out-of-bounds predictions (like vote shares of -5% or 111%).

4.2 The Magnitude of National and Local Forces in Electoral Change

Scholars hypothesize that both national and local forces influence voting behavior in legislative elections. In our first model, we follow Bartels (1998) in using a weighted least-squares regression model to measure the magnitude of these components of electoral change. Bartels' model measures changes in the Republican vote margin across states, and whether those changes are uniform across states—that is, national shifts—or whether the party's electoral margin moved in uneven ways and opposing directions across states. Because he wants his analysis to reflect voting behavior in the national electorate, Bartels gives more weight in the regressions to the more populous states. In our model, we follow Bartels by weighting all of the data by the number of votes cast in each district in each election year.

Unlike the US case analyzed by Bartels, however, the Latin American cases we analyze are multiparty systems. As such, we have made several modifications to Bartels' model to accommodate the compositional voting data with which we must work. Additionally, with fewer lags our model is more sensitive to abnormal elections than is Bartels' but it is more applicable to the shorter periods of democratic electoral contestation in most Latin American countries. We also offer a somewhat different interpretation of our regression results adapted to a multiparty framework, although the quantities of interest we calculate are in the same spirit as those of Bartels (and Stokes (1967)). Even in a strict two-party setting, however, our method offers a slightly different measure of national forces than Bartels', one that we would argue better identifies the true level of nationalization across systems.

As discussed earlier, Bartels uses the intercept as a indicator of the magnitude of national forces. However, intercepts will be consistent for equal-sized shifts in Republican vote margin across different starting points (i.e. prior vote margins) *only if* the slopes on the prior vote margins are one. If the slope coefficients are different from one (and they often are) and holding the magnitude of sub-national variation constant, then a shift in the average vote margin from 10 to 0, for example, will produce a different intercept than will a shift from 0 to 10 or a shift from 10 to 20, since every regression line must go through the point (\bar{X}, \bar{Y}) . As a result, measures of nationalization will differ in each of these cases. The strict two-party analog to our measure of national forces would be the predicted mean shift in vote margin rather than the intercept. We would, therefore, indicate an equal shift of 10 points attributable to national forces in each of these three cases. Given the multiparty electoral settings of Latin America, however, we study the logged ratio of party vote shares rather than vote margins, and our measure of national forces is actually the predicted mean shift in those ratios from one election to the next.

The model is as follows:

$$(Y_{i1t}, Y_{i2t}, \dots, Y_{i(J-1)t}) \sim \tag{2}$$

$$N(y_{i1t}, y_{i2t}, \dots, y_{i(J-1)t} \mid \mu_{i1t}, \mu_{i2t}, \dots, \mu_{i(J-1)t}, \sigma_{1t}, \sigma_{2t}, \dots, \sigma_{(J-1)t})$$

where,

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{i1t} &= a_{1t} + y_{i1(t-1)}\beta_{1t} + y_{i2(t-1)}\beta_{2t} + \dots + y_{i(J-1)(t-1)}\beta_{(J-1)t} \\ \mu_{i2t} &= a_{2t} + y_{i1(t-1)}\beta_{1t} + y_{i2(t-1)}\beta_{2t} + \dots + y_{i(J-1)(t-1)}\beta_{(J-1)t} \\ &\vdots \\ \mu_{i(J-1)t} &= a_{(J-1)t} + y_{i1(t-1)}\beta_{1t} + y_{i2(t-1)}\beta_{2t} + \dots + y_{i(J-1)(t-1)}\beta_{(J-1)t} \end{aligned}$$

This notation emphasizes both the systematic (μ_{ij}) and stochastic components (σ_j) of the model. In this model, a party's log ratio at time t is modeled only as dependent on its log ratio in the prior election at time $t - 1$ plus the log ratios of all other parties at time $t - 1$. That is, we predict the log ratio for each party in the current election based on the partisan make-up of the district in the previous election. All other factors that might explain a party's vote share at the district level above and beyond the distribution of partisan support in the last election fall into the stochastic component.¹⁰ This is not to say that these other district level influences are random, rather for the purposes of this analysis we simply want to isolate the systematic shift from one election to the next, across all electoral districts, from the idiosyncratic movement that occurs at the sub-national level. For a given election, the systematic component of electoral change across districts reveals the extent of national forces at work whereas the idiosyncratic component of electoral change captures the magnitude of sub-national forces.

What is the magnitude of the national and sub-national components of the vote for each party in each year? To measure each component, we use an approach based on the technique of statistical simulation (King, Tomz & Wittenberg 2000). From the model estimates, we generate a distribution of predicted values in log ratio terms, \tilde{Y}_{jt} , based on a particular district-level electoral outcome in the prior election, and then reverse the logistic transformation to convert these values into predicted vote shares, $\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_{jt}$. In this case, we set the prior vote shares for all parties to their (weighted) average across the districts at time $t - 1$ when computing the predicted vote shares for party j in the current election at time t . These predicted vote shares indicate the entire distribution of possible district-level party vote shares in the current election for the *typical* district. This "typical" district can be thought of as the average district or as a hypothetical district which is a perfect microcosm of the nation as a whole. We assess the relative nationalization of party j in election t for the typical district by decomposing the distribution of predicted vote shares into a systematic and a random component.

First, we isolate electoral change from electoral continuity. To do so for the typical district, we subtract off the average vote share for party j in election $t - 1$ from its distribution of predicted vote shares in election t :

$$\tilde{\delta}_{jt} = \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_{jt} - \tilde{v}_{j(t-1)} \tag{3}$$

¹⁰Within the stochastic component, the variance for each party is assumed to be constant across all i districts, but not necessarily equal for all parties. The contemporaneous covariances are also assumed to be constant across all districts, but are not restricted to be equal to 0.

The difference, $\tilde{\delta}_{jt}$, represents the distribution of predicted electoral change for party j , both systematic and idiosyncratic, from the previous election.

In measuring the magnitude of the systematic component of electoral change in a typical district, we average over the variability in the predicted values—or the random component in $\tilde{\delta}_{jt}$ —to identify the typical shift to each party that is common across all districts. That is, we take the mean of $\tilde{\delta}_{jt}$ to represent the magnitude of the shift attributable to *national forces* for or against party j from election $t - 1$ to election t . The variation in the distribution of predicted values, on the other hand, indicates the idiosyncratic (or “random”) element of change in district-level electoral outcomes.¹¹ The standard deviation of $\tilde{\delta}_{jt}$, that is, represents the magnitude of the typical movements towards and away from party j in election t resulting from *sub-national forces*. The mean and standard deviation of $\tilde{\delta}_{jt}$ are measured in percentage point changes in the vote. We can therefore assess the relative magnitude of national forces, following Bartels (1998), by the ratio of national variance to national variance plus sub-national variance. National “variance” is measured as the square of the average national shift to make it in comparable units to sub-national variance. The relative nationalization, N , is calculated as follows:

$$N_{jt} = \frac{(\bar{\delta}_{jt})^2}{(\bar{\delta}_{jt})^2 + Var(\tilde{\delta}_{jt})} \quad (4)$$

If electoral change at the district level was completely random across districts, such that there was no common shift either for or against a party, then relative nationalization in this election would also be equal to 0. If, on the other hand, a party gained, or lost, exactly the same share of the vote in all districts from one election to the next, the relative nationalization score would be equal to 1. In actuality, district level electoral change falls to neither one of these extremes. In each election, parties experience some change in the vote share they receive in almost every district.¹² This change can be more or less idiosyncratic across districts and, hence, more or less nationalized. If national and sub-national forces are evenly balanced, then the relative nationalization score would be close to 0.5.

Table 1 presents the magnitudes of national and sub-national forces contributing to shifts in electoral support for each party, along with each party’s relative nationalization. Take the PRI in Mexico as an example. We see that in both 1994 and 1997, national forces were pulling support away from the PRI by about 9% over the previous district vote, while pushing support towards the PAN and PRD. In 2000, national forces were rather neutral towards the PRI (but contributed to significant positive gains for the PAN), and by 2003 the PRI saw a national shift that increased its district vote by about 6% over its 2000 performance. While the magnitude (and direction) of the nationalized shifts changed over time, idiosyncratic state-level shifts hovered around 4 to 6% across all four elections. As a result, shifts in voter support for the PRI in the later elections were less nationalized than shifts

¹¹Of course, part of this variance comes from normal estimation uncertainty. In general, however, the overall standard errors of the regressions are larger than the standard errors associated with each of the coefficient estimates.

¹²If there was absolutely no change in the level of support accorded to a party from one election to the following across any of the districts, showing that the vote in the prior election perfectly predicts the vote in the current election, then relative nationalization would be undefined. This is an unlikely scenario to say the least.

in the earlier elections, relative to the total change experienced in each election by all party candidates across Mexico's 32 states. The model shows that changes in voter support for the PRI followed highly nationalized patterns in 1994 and 1997 but attributes almost all of the electoral change in 2000 to sub-national forces. Results for the election of 2003 suggest an even balance between national and sub-national changes. We give further discussion to the results for each country below.

5 Results

We examine voting patterns in Argentine, Brazilian, Colombian, Chilean, Mexican and U.S. elections to show (i) the national component, in size and direction, of the change in the partisan composition of the district vote from election to election, and (ii) the extent to which electoral shifts experienced by the party at the district level can be attributed to specifically local factors and/or non-uniform responses across districts to national issues. The results of our analyses provide cross-country evidence of both national and sub-national forces at work on the electorate. Our findings illustrate the widespread influence of district-specific factors in electoral change, as well as the drastic impact that intermittent nationalized forces have on partisan support. The results, which measure the relative nationalization of electoral change for each party in each election, are presented in Table 1. We will review the most important results for each country before discussing their implications.

5.1 High Nationalization: Venezuela and Mexico

The analysis of *Venezuelan elections* over the last forty years shows electoral change to be highly nationalized. Between 1958 and 1988 the two major parties were Acción Democrática (AD) and the social-Christian COPEI. During those years nationalized shifts represented three-fourths of total electoral change for AD and two-thirds of total electoral change for COPEI. The largest party in contemporary Venezuela is President Hugo Chavez' MVR, which began to compete in the second half of the 1990s. Results from the last two elections show that national forces had a strong positive impact on the district vote for the MVR (about 21%) and represented a major part of total electoral change for the party (76% in 1998 and 59% in 2000).

For other smaller parties the national component of the change has also been important. The Unión Republicana Democrática (URD) received a substantial share of the vote until the late 1960s. Its decline in the four elections between 1963 and 1978 followed a highly nationalized pattern. The other two parties analyzed are the socialist MAS, which began competing in the early 1970s, and the recently created Proyecto Venezuela (PRVNZ). Both received between 5% and 10% of the total vote in the last two legislative elections. Electoral change in support for the MAS has followed a mostly idiosyncratic pattern over the last 30 years, having only one highly nationalized shift in the first election in which they competed. For the PRVNZ, its debut in the electoral arena came with a positive national shift (about 9% of the district vote) that accounted for three-fourths of total change in 1998, but subsequent change in support for this party lacked a common pattern across electoral districts.

For the major parties electoral support has shifted in a common fashion in almost every election since the first democratic election in 1958. The demise of the decades

old two-party system, which began in 1993, is reflected in the data. Results for the impact of national shifts and relative nationalization of electoral change show that both AD and COPEI have confronted adverse national shifts which eroded the tight control these parties had over all the electoral districts. AD was badly hit in 1993 and again in 2000, when voters uniformly withdrew support for what had been the largest Venezuelan party for almost 50 years. COPEI's debacle followed three straight losses that have left the party as a small minority in almost every district.

The examination of *Mexican elections* shows that changes in partisan support across Mexican states have followed a rather common trend. Although there are changes from election to election, for all three major parties, the major component of inter-election change in voter support is the national component, accounting for most of the inter-election change since 1991.

The PRI suffered sharp losses in the elections of 1994 and 1997, with the national component of the vote accounting for respectively 82% and 72% of total change. After the election of 1997, the PRI relinquished its majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time in over seven decades and in 2000 it lost the presidency. The PRI underwent another fairly nationalized shift in 2003 (52% of total change), but this time it worked to advantage the PRI across the different Mexican states, providing substantial gains after a period of decline.

The vote for the other two major parties, PAN and PRD, also tended to change in a uniform style across states. For instance, both benefited from very nationalized elections in 1994, which accounted for a national impact of 7 to 8 % of the district vote. The midterm election of 1997 benefited the PRD in a uniform fashion—it gained ground in 31 out of 32 states (59% relative nationalization)—but for the PAN, which experienced little change in overall levels of voter support, the shift across states was highly idiosyncratic (1% relative nationalization). However, the PAN was impacted by an impressive common shift in the following election of 2000, which coincided with its capture of the country's presidency. National forces subsequently punished the PAN in the midterm elections of 2003 (almost 7% of the district vote), when nationalized movement accounted for 60% of the change in voter support.

5.2 Intermittent Nationalization: Argentina and Colombia

Our examination of *Argentine elections* shows that although changes in support for both major parties, the Peronists (PJ) and the Radicals (UCR), has been frequently uneven across districts, it has been punctuated by fairly large nationalized shifts. Overall the national component has represented about 20% of electoral change for the PJ and 30% for the UCR. The UCR faced highly nationalized shifts in 1989, 1995 and 2001, whereas the PJ faced two somewhat nationalized shifts in 1985 and 1987.

For instance in 1985, soon after democratization, the Peronists suffered an important nationalized loss reflecting the bitter inner struggle between a growing renewal movement that presented dissident lists and the party's old guard, which still controlled the party label. Of the total change in support that the PJ experienced in this election 46% stems from a nationalized decrease seen across provinces. This change away from the PJ did not lead to a nationalized positive shift for the UCR, the other major party, as former Peronist voters switched their support to various dissident lists, provincial parties and others competing across the 24 Argentine

provinces. In the following election, after most of the inner-struggles of the party had been overcome, 54% of the change in support for the PJ was nationalized, and national forces provided a boost of about 15% of the provincial vote, which made up for most of the losses experienced in the prior election.

In 1989 and 2001 it was the UCR that suffered sharp nationalized drops in electoral support (8.47% and 22.17% of the district vote respectively) while the PJ experienced uneven gains across districts. The results for the 1989 election reflect a nationalized backlash against the UCR government, which in the context of a severe economic crisis and violent food riots would then proceed to rapidly transfer the presidency (prior to the constitutionally mandated term). The second and most dramatic national shift occurred in the midterm election of 2001, immediately preceding the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa and the subsequent economic collapse, when the UCR suffered major losses across the country (support picked up mostly by smaller provincial parties). In 1995, the nationalized shift for the UCR reflects a common move upwards after heavy losses in prior years. Overall, the data shows that in the twenty years since democratization the sub-national component of electoral change has been greater, however the sharp nationalized movements that occur in about a third of Argentine elections reveal the potential influence on district outcomes of a common partisan bond.

The results for *Colombian elections* are presented in two parts since voting districts were changed following the constitutional reform of the early 1990s. The split also reflects two periods in Colombian politics, the first competitive phase that followed the end of the National Front,¹³ and the subsequent volatile period of renewed civil conflict since the 1990s. These phases also differ in terms of the relative nationalization of electoral change. The first shows a common move away from the Conservatives, while the second shows that change in partisan support has been mostly district-specific.

The election of 1974 brought about a particularly sharp national swing across Colombian electoral districts, which reflects the substantial drop in support experienced by the Conservatives (which no longer benefited from an artificially high influence due to the consociational agreements of the National Front). This exodus, however, did not translate into an equal size nationalized shift towards their historic adversaries, the Liberals, but it also spilled to smaller parties and alternative alliances. After another nationalized shift in 1978, the Conservatives entered an era in which the national component has been very small, never passing 15% of total change. For the major party of Colombia, the Liberal Party, the nationalized component of electoral change during the last three decades has been around 17% of the total electoral movement. The greatest common shift for the Liberals immediately followed in the election of 1986 (56%), when the party suffered losses across the country despite having recently reunited behind the successful presidential candidacy of Virgilio Barco.¹⁴ In the last election the PL also experienced a loss in support that was moderately nationalized (25% of total change).

Although common movement still contributes to electoral change in Colombia,

¹³The National Front was a sixteen-year agreement between the Liberal and Conservative party following the civil war and subsequent military government of the late 1950s. It established a coalition government in which both parties divided all elected and administrative positions equally.

¹⁴Voters shifted support to smaller parties included in the "Others" category, including "Nuevo Liberalismo," "Unión Patrótica," and other regional parties and alliances.

the analysis shows that during the last thirty years Colombian voters have been increasingly influenced by district-specific factors. When one of the two major parties experiences a common loss across districts, related nationalized gains seem to go to small parties and alliances and not to the other major party.

5.3 Low Nationalization: Brazil, Chile and the United States

Our examination of *Brazilian elections* confirms the importance of regional forces in Brazilian politics. For most parties in most elections the greater component of electoral change is state-specific. Only three of the seven parties analyzed, the PMDB, PFL and PSDB, experienced one highly nationalized electoral shift since re-democratization; for all of them it was the election of 1990. This election shows a sharp nationalized change in voter support away from the PMDB (which suffered major defections) and the PFL, and towards the emerging PSDB (where many PMDB dissident went) and to a lower extent the PPB and PT. In the other three elections the national component of the change has been very small for most parties, never reaching 50%. For the leftist PT, the change in support from 1998 to 2002, the year in which it won the presidency, was moderately nationalized (44%). That year the PPB also faced a somewhat nationalized shift, but in other elections idiosyncratic changes predominate.

The examination of the four *Chilean elections* since re-democratization shows that changes in partisan support across districts have for the most part not followed nationalized patterns. Although absolute levels of support for the major electoral alliances have been relatively constant in most districts, the evidence suggests that those voters who switched their support reacted differently across districts. For the *Concertación*, the nationalized component has been 24% and 21% of the total electoral change it experienced in the last two elections, following a highly uneven swing in 1993. In a context that reflects fairly low levels of district electoral change, the rightist opposition *Alianza* has experienced mostly uneven movement in electoral support—the nationalized component only reaching 7% of the total change in 2001. The smaller Communist Party began to compete electorally in 1993. The relative nationalization of 29% reflects its emergence onto the field of electoral competition, but in the subsequent elections support for the communists changed in highly uneven ways across the different districts. The evidence for Chile suggests that since re-democratization swing voters have responded for the most part to district-specific characteristics, revealing the importance of sub-national forces within a centralized and unitary governmental structure.

Lastly, our analysis shows that electoral change in the *United States* over the thirty year period beginning in the early 1970s has not followed a nationalized pattern. When we compared changes in support for Democrats, Republicans and others, we found little commonality across the U.S. states. The national component of total electoral change has been very low for both parties (on average about 9% of total electoral change), a finding that concurs with prior historical analyses (Claggett, Flanigan & Zingale 1984, Kawato 1987). Our results are also consistent with findings from Brady, D’Onofrio & Fiorina (2000), which show that changes in the elections of 1994 and 1996 were the most nationalized in their sample, while the elections of 1986 to 1990 reflect the almost total lack of nationalized change. Our sample, which includes two more recent elections, show that in the election of 2000,

the Republican Party was impacted by a national shift of similar proportions to those experienced by both parties in the mid-1990s. The rise of the Republican majority in the House of Representatives is reflected in two relatively moderate shifts in 1992 and 1994. In the latter election the national impact reached over 6% of the district vote and represented 20% of total electoral change for the Republican Party. The results show that the relative nationalization of both major parties are not always identical; this is because our analysis, unlike prior analyses of nationalization in U.S. elections, incorporates the vote for “third-parties.”

6 Implications and Conclusion

INCOMPLETE

The analysis presented in this paper has implications for the electoral strategies of candidates, the cohesion of legislative parties, and the governmental priority given to national political issues vis-à-vis regional concerns. The presence, or absence, of common electoral tides linking party candidacies across the country affects the incentives vote-seeking candidates and local party leaders have to care about the fate of the party as a whole. As the literature has noted, if politicians believe that their electoral fortunes depend primarily upon local issues unrelated to the fate of the party as a whole, they will have fewer incentives to invest in protecting the national image of the party and greater incentives to pursue particularistic goods. Although national party leaders may have other mechanisms to foster party discipline and advance a national agenda, the primacy of sub-national forces fosters a membership of heterogeneous interests.

In this paper we developed a statistical model that revealed the relative contribution of national vs. sub-national forces to inter-election change in the support for 26 parties in 60 congressional elections held in seven countries in the Americas. The results analyzed show variations in electoral patterns of partisan support over time and across countries. Of the seven countries analyzed, Mexico and Venezuela are the only ones where national forces dominate. These nationalized patterns of electoral change contrast with the mostly district-specific change evident in the other countries. While the sub-national component of electoral change has been greater in both Argentina and Colombia, the nationalized shifts that have occurred demonstrate the underlying potential of a common partisan bond on district outcomes when swept by strong electoral tides.

A counterintuitive finding of this paper is the lower relative nationalization of electoral change in unitary Chile than in the federal countries of Argentina and Brazil. Chile is well known for having more ideological and faithful partisan voters than its larger South American neighbors; our analysis reveals that swing voters in Chile are an idiosyncratic bunch, seldom moving in a common fashion across districts. Although Chilean parties are highly centralized organizations and congressional leaders control several resources to foster unity, the lack of nationalized movement coupled with small district magnitude and open list electoral rules amplify incentives for individual legislators to pursue district-specific issues over national policy goals. The results confirm the importance of sub-national forces in Argentina and Brazil, both highly decentralized federal countries. However, our analysis shows that since re-democratization parties in Argentina and Brazil have

at times confronted electorally substantial nationalized shifts. In Brazil the perceived effects of common electoral fates by vote-seeking candidates (or their respective regional leaders) may work against some of the individualistic incentives of high magnitude open list electoral rules.

Midterm and non-concurrent elections . . .

[INCOMPLETE: U.S. in comparative perspective. . . Maybe link back to Stokes original comparison of US and UK. US looked diff from UK. Here we find US similar to other presidential systems . . . Despite different electoral rules for congressional elections across these various presidential systems . . .]

To conclude, the analysis presented in this paper has shed new light on patterns of electoral support in Latin America. We have proposed a means of measuring common partisan shifts in multiparty systems and applied it to the study of electoral behavior in six Latin American countries, and the United States. Our model provides intuitively appealing measures of change for individual parties over time. This paper complements Jones and Mainwaring's (2003) recent analyses of sub-national patterns of partisan configuration in Latin America, showing how the presence of nationalized change varies across parties, across elections, and across countries. At the same time, it takes a closer look at the "district-time effect" that Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) emphasize, by examining election-by-election changes with a model appropriate to Latin America's multiparty systems. Both the causes and consequences of nationalized patterns of electoral change certainly demand further scrutiny, but we believe that our model and empirical evidence reflect an important step forward in this research agenda.

Table 1: The Nationalization of Electoral Change

ARGENTINA		National Forces	Sub-National Forces	Relative Nationalization
1985	PJ	-13.22	14.32	0.46
	UCR	-4.71	8.49	0.24
	Other	17.93	18.32	0.49
1987	PJ	15.08	13.95	0.54
	UCR	-8.00	10.86	0.35
	UCD	12.05	20.84	0.25
	Other	-19.13	7.58	0.86
1989	PJ	2.58	7.15	0.12
	UCR	-8.47	4.93	0.75
	UCD	4.50	8.28	0.23
	Other	1.39	8.88	0.02
1991	PJ	-4.04	11.13	0.12
	UCR	-1.92	8.97	0.04
	UCD	-0.89	18.20	0.00
	Other	6.85	11.90	0.25
1993	PJ	2.64	5.89	0.17
	UCR	1.30	5.79	0.05
	Other	1.24	8.10	0.02
1995	PJ	1.58	9.16	0.03
	UCR	12.03	9.07	0.64
	Other	-13.62	10.36	0.63
1997	PJ	-7.77	10.49	0.35
	UCR	3.39	12.22	0.07
	Other	4.38	18.95	0.05
1999	PJ	-6.24	9.63	0.30
	UCR	-2.16	12.00	0.03
	Other	8.40	19.15	0.16
2001	PJ	-1.30	11.59	0.01
	UCR	-22.17	11.60	0.79
	ARI	12.93	27.78	0.18
	Other	10.54	15.66	0.31
2003	PJ	-0.60	21.44	0.00
	UCR	0.35	31.80	0.00
	ARI	7.60	20.24	0.12
	Other	-7.35	21.05	0.11

BRAZIL		National Forces	Sub-National Forces	Relative Nationalization
1990	PMDB	-29.57	8.79	0.92
	PFL	-9.09	3.47	0.87
	PPB	4.94	9.20	0.22
	PSDB	8.96	7.72	0.57
	PT	2.80	5.81	0.19
	PDT	1.73	7.96	0.04
	PTB	7.13	19.63	0.12
	Other	13.28	13.40	0.50
1994	PMDB	-0.94	9.99	0.01
	PFL	-0.30	12.80	0.00
	PPB	2.86	13.65	0.04
	PSDB	5.11	10.87	0.18
	PT	1.67	6.56	0.06
	PDT	-4.33	4.97	0.43
	PTB	3.23	14.91	0.04
	Other	-7.32	11.47	0.29
1998	PMDB	-4.24	13.19	0.09
	PFL	4.45	12.57	0.11
	PPB	-4.33	8.96	0.19
	PSDB	2.37	5.98	0.14
	PT	0.21	7.26	0.00
	PDT	-1.40	5.14	0.07
	PTB	2.08	10.43	0.04
	Other	0.86	5.80	0.02
2002	PMDB	-2.38	5.51	0.16
	PFL	-4.52	7.69	0.26
	PPB	-3.65	4.12	0.44
	PSDB	-1.33	11.83	0.01
	PT	4.96	5.65	0.44
	PDT	-0.63	2.97	0.04
	PTB	0.80	9.16	0.01
	Other	7.07	6.84	0.52

CHILE		National Forces	Sub-National Forces	Relative Nationalization
1993	CON	-0.23	14.73	0.00
	RIGHT	-0.60	10.12	0.00
	COM	9.60	15.01	0.29
	Other	-8.76	14.65	0.26
1997	CON	-5.11	8.99	0.24
	RIGHT	-0.71	8.55	0.01
	COM	0.73	3.11	0.05
	Other	5.09	8.90	0.25
2001	CON	-7.00	13.59	0.21
	RIGHT	3.31	11.77	0.07
	COM	2.39	17.34	0.02
	Other	1.30	17.99	0.01

COLOMBIA		National Forces	Sub-National Forces	Relative Nationalization
1974	PL	4.02	7.90	0.21
	PC	-17.11	6.01	0.89
	Other	13.09	8.74	0.69
1978	PL	-0.47	3.98	0.01
	PC	7.20	3.56	0.80
	Other	-6.73	5.53	0.60
1982	PL	1.64	4.75	0.11
	PC	0.72	2.95	0.06
	Other	-2.36	3.42	0.32
1986	PL	-8.09	8.96	0.45
	PC	-2.68	7.15	0.12
	Other	10.78	10.12	0.53
1990	PL	9.50	20.38	0.18
	PC	-8.31	19.45	0.15
	Other	-1.18	19.84	0.00

COLOMBIA		National Forces	Sub-National Forces	Relative Nationalization
1994	PL	1.91	12.15	0.02
	PC	7.27	17.48	0.15
	Other	-9.18	15.33	0.26
1998	PL	-6.78	16.51	0.14
	PC	0.18	25.53	0.00
	Other	6.60	18.32	0.11
2002	PL	-12.79	22.09	0.25
	PC	1.06	24.92	0.00
	Other	11.73	27.83	0.15

MEXICO		National Forces	Sub-National Forces	Relative Nationalization
1994	PRI	-9.79	4.58	0.82
	PAN	7.98	5.01	0.72
	PRD	7.02	5.00	0.66
	Other	-5.22	1.59	0.91
1997	PRI	-8.82	5.54	0.72
	PAN	0.57	6.10	0.01
	PRD	6.86	5.77	0.59
	Other	1.39	2.29	0.27
2000	PRI	-0.49	4.34	0.01
	PAN	13.09	6.10	0.82
	PRD	-7.82	5.65	0.66
	Other	-4.78	1.28	0.93
2003	PRI	5.85	5.65	0.52
	PAN	-6.83	5.62	0.60
	PRD	-3.48	6.29	0.23
	Other	4.46	3.13	0.67

VENEZUELA		National Forces	Sub-National Forces	Relative Nationalization
1963	AD	-14.99	6.00	0.86
	COPEI	5.00	4.18	0.59
	URD	-8.23	5.64	0.68
	Other	18.22	8.72	0.81
1968	AD	-6.36	5.72	0.55
	COPEI	2.19	4.83	0.17
	URD	-8.18	2.29	0.93
	Other	12.36	6.92	0.76
1973	AD	19.26	4.05	0.96
	COPEI	6.35	3.35	0.78
	URD	-6.86	0.99	0.98
	MAS	5.28	3.20	0.73
	Other	-24.03	3.63	0.98
1978	AD	-4.15	3.92	0.53
	COPEI	10.09	3.62	0.89
	URD	-1.78	0.64	0.89
	MAS	0.68	1.73	0.13
	Other	-4.84	2.94	0.73
1983	AD	10.17	3.34	0.90
	COPEI	-11.25	3.02	0.93
	URD	0.09	0.68	0.02
	MAS	-0.23	2.41	0.01
	Other	1.22	1.82	0.31
1988	AD	-5.63	2.76	0.81
	COPEI	2.53	3.12	0.40
	URD	-0.45	0.60	0.36
	MAS	3.61	4.41	0.40
	Other	-0.05	2.80	0.00
1993	AD	-22.42	8.87	0.86
	COPEI	-11.19	7.84	0.67
	MAS	7.82	25.47	0.09
	Other	27.32	15.36	0.76

1998	AD	-0.65	7.64	0.01
	COPEI	-11.19	7.71	0.68
	MAS	-0.82	7.02	0.01
	MVR	21.09	11.71	0.76
	PRVNZ	9.15	5.83	0.71
	Other	-17.58	10.04	0.75
2000	AD	-12.01	6.11	0.79
	COPEI	-5.78	11.17	0.21
	MAS	-0.05	16.22	0.00
	MVR	20.63	17.07	0.59
	PRVNZ	1.59	21.40	0.01
	Other	-4.38	13.47	0.10

UNITED STATES		National Forces	Sub-National Forces	Relative Nationalization
1976	DEM	-1.70	5.92	0.08
	REP	1.26	5.55	0.05
	Other	0.45	6.04	0.01
1978	DEM	-2.10	5.87	0.11
	REP	2.19	5.68	0.13
	Other	-0.09	4.79	0.00
1980	DEM	-4.67	14.17	0.10
	REP	2.12	13.54	0.02
	Other	2.55	11.68	0.05
1982	DEM	5.27	16.62	0.09
	REP	-5.71	16.86	0.10
	Other	0.44	6.39	0.00
1984	DEM	-3.46	7.86	0.16
	REP	3.13	7.47	0.15
	Other	0.33	6.88	0.00
1986	DEM	1.25	16.20	0.01
	REP	-1.90	16.05	0.01
	Other	0.65	5.48	0.01
1988	DEM	-0.83	9.02	0.01
	REP	-0.12	8.46	0.00
	Other	0.94	8.77	0.01
1990	DEM	-1.79	8.74	0.04
	REP	-1.14	7.59	0.02
	Other	2.92	12.04	0.06

1992	DEM	-0.27	4.61	0.00
	REP	2.08	4.59	0.17
	Other	-1.81	2.66	0.32
1994	DEM	-6.21	13.07	0.18
	REP	6.58	13.05	0.20
	Other	-0.37	0.27	0.66
1996	DEM	3.73	7.26	0.21
	REP	-3.50	7.26	0.19
	Other	-0.24	0.60	0.14
1998	DEM	-1.83	13.56	0.02
	REP	2.24	13.55	0.03
	Other	-0.41	0.02	1.00
2000	DEM	-1.21	8.81	0.02
	REP	-4.46	8.95	0.20
	Other	5.67	9.27	0.27
2002	DEM	-3.31	14.19	0.05
	REP	3.14	13.38	0.05
	Other	0.17	7.19	0.00

A Parties, Data Sources, and Notes

Argentina

Parties: P. Justicialista (PJ), Union Civica Radical (UCR), Union de Centro Democratico (UCD)

Data Source: 1983-2003 electoral returns are from the Direccin Nacional Electoral (Departamento Estadisticas), Ministerio del Interior.

Notes: In 1985, "UCD" was called Alianza del Centro. We include the Frepaso vote from 1995 to 2001 with the UCR vote. In 2001 in the province of San Luis, Frepaso runs with ARI instead of UCR. However, we compare UCR in 2001 in San Luis to Alianza (UCR and Frepaso) in 1999. In 2003, ARI does not run in San Luis and Frepaso had disappeared. In 1987, Tierra del Fuego did not renew deputies. We used results for the Provincial Deputy election instead. In 2003, in the Capital, we attribute to the PJ the entire vote for a coalition of parties, of which PJ was a partner. In 2003, in Corrientes, all national parties competed in coalition against a local party. We split the coalition vote equally between the PJ and the UCR and give .001% to the UCD.

Brazil

Parties: P. do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), P.da Frente Liberal (PFL), P. Populista Brasileiro (PPB), P. da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), P. dos Trabalhadores (PT), P. Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), P. Trablhista Brasileiro (PTB)

Data Source: Electoral data are from Jairo Nicolau (IUPERJ), "Brazilian Electoral Data (1982-2002)," available at <http://www.iuperj.br>.

Notes: In 1990, a new state, Tocantins, was created out of Goias. Given the substantial boundary changes, our analysis does not include electoral change from 1986 to 1990 in Goias. Vote figures for PPB in 1986, 1990 and 1994 include votes for its descendant parties.

Chile

Parties/Coalitions: Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (CON), Democracia y Progreso 1989/ Unión por el Progreso de Chile 1993/ Uni'on por Chile 1997/ Alianza por Chile 2001 (RIGHT), P. Comunista de Chile (COM)

Data Source: 1989-2003 electoral returns downloaded from the Chilean Ministerio del Interior at <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/indexf.html>

Colombia

Parties: P. Liberal, P. Conservador

Data Sources: Vote share data for 1970 and 1974 come from Jorge Mario Eastman (1982). Vote shares for 1974 through 1986 are from "Scott Morgenstern's District Level Data Electoral Data Website," available at <http://www.duke.edu/smorgens/componentsdata.html>. The total number of votes cast in each state for 1970-1982 come from Eastman (1982), except for the states of Atlantico and Bolivar in 1982 (which, according to Eastman's footnote, were still incomplete when his book was published). For 1982, vote totals for these 2 departments come from (Gómez Pineda 1994). We were not able to track down total votes cast in each state for 1986; therefore 1986 totals are the average of 1982 and 1990. We downloaded 1990 vote share data and total votes casts from Georgetown University's Political Database of the

Americas at <http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Col/Elecamara90.html>. Complete data for 1991-1994, come from the official publication of the Colombian Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil (1994). We downloaded data for 1998-2002 from the website of the Registraduria, at <http://www.registraduria.gov.co/>. We are missing vote share data for two small states, San Andrs and Guaviare, but given that all of the data are weighted by total votes cast the missing data should not affect our results much.

Notes: We split our analysis of Colombia into two periods because of the changes in state boundaries following the creation of seven new states in the 1991 Constitution. Colombia I includes elections from 1970 to 1990. We include the last election of the National Front for the purpose of measuring the extent of electoral change with the return to fully competitive elections. Colombia II includes legislative elections from 1991 to 2002.

Mexico

Parties: P. Revolucionario Institucionalista (PRI), P. Accion Nacional (PAN), P. Revolucionario Democratico (PRD)

Data Source: Data for 1991 through 2003 downloaded from the Mexican Instituto Federal Electoral, at <http://www.ife.org.mx/>. We include results from deputies elections by "relative majority" in single member districts, aggregated at the state level.

Notes: For 2000, we includes votes for Alianza por Cambio (PAN and P. Verde Ecologista de Mexico) in the PAN figures, and votes for Alianza por Mexico (PRD, PT, Convergencia, PAS, PSN) in the PRD figures. In 2003, we include votes for PV (P. Verde) and PRI-PV alliance in the PRI figures.

United States

Parties: Democratic P. (DEM), Republican P. (REP)

Data Source: Professor Jim Snyder (MIT)

Notes: Cross-filing allows individuals to run as the candidate for multiple parties in a single election. Multiple parties are listed for a single candidate in CT, NY, PA, SC, and VT. Where individual party subtotals are not given, we count the candidate's entire vote share towards the vote for their main party affiliation. We exclude four states from our analysis (AR, FL, LA, and OK) because votes were not recorded when candidates ran unopposed.

Venezuela

Parties: Accin Democrtica (AD), Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela (COPEI), Unión Republicana Democrática (URD), Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR), Proyecto Venezuela (PRVNZ)

Data Source:

Notes: In 1993, Venezuela switched from a proportional representation (PR) system to a mixed electoral system. We analyze party vote shares of PR votes only, such that our analysis is comparable across all elections in the current democratic period.

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