

THE COALITION MERCHANTS
Tracing the origins of Party Coalitions to their Roots in the Ideological Discourse¹

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The role of ideology in partisan politics cannot be explained without understanding the roots of ideology itself. I propose a path by which ideological divisions disrupted the party equilibrium of the 1950s and remade parties in ideological terms by the early 1990s. Testing this theory requires an understanding of ideology independent of partisan institutions. I apply an **item response model** to a sample of articles in leading ideological journals to extract a latent trait of ideology. A **hierarchical model of ideal points** takes advantage of the known relationship between writers for the same journal to overcome the lack of data on individual writers. The model is applied to data from 1990 and 1970. The space defined is strongly one dimensional, even in the absence of the agenda factors present in a legislature. Future work will extend the analysis back to 1870.

¹ Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 2 to Sept. 5, 2004, Chicago, Ill. For invaluable comments and assistance, I wish to thank Jeff Lewis, John Zaller, Kathleen Bawn, Simon Jackman, and participants at the Conference on Measurement Models in Political Science at Stanford University. Data was gathered by the author and by MacKenzie Canniff, Patricia Daza, Blake Holland, Jeff Hollis, Suneal Kolluri, Patrick Lam, Camilla Liou, Jessica MacKenzie, Daniel Miller, Shawna Spoor, Kevin Thelan, Mike Tiernay and Mike Wendland. Please contact the author before citing.

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In April 1947, the American Institute of Public Opinion Surveys asked a sample of voters a question it had been asking off and on for years: “It has been suggested that we give up the present Republican and Democratic parties and have two new parties—one for the Liberals and one for the Conservatives. Would you favor this idea?” Today, this question might seem absurd. For all practical purposes, the “present Republican and Democratic parties” *are* parties of conservatives and liberals. But in 1947, 72 percent of respondents said no (1993).

The road from 1947 has not been straight or simple. In the 1950s, political parties were the principal organizers of mass and elite politics. Evidence is that they are again today. But in the 1970s, parties were in decline as an organizing force. Ideology, however, has not followed this see-saw. In the 1950s, ideology was not at an organizing force at all, and today, ideology would seem to reinforce party.

I propose a process by which ideological divisions disrupted the party equilibrium of the 1950s and remade parties in ideological terms by the early 1990s. Testing this story, however, requires a measure of ideology that at present is not widely used. To understand ideology’s impact on party politics, we need a measure that is independent of political activity, or at least independent of political parties. In particular, I propose that we need to examine ideology as it manifests in the leading political thinkers of the day. Such a measure will not only help address the question of whether these thinkers influence or are influenced by politicians. It will also help us understand what we observe as ideology elsewhere. Unidimensional politics in Congress and the electorate may be the consequence of legislative or electoral rules. Those rules do not apply to the elites outside these institutions, at least not directly.

To develop such a measure, I apply an Item Response Model to a sample of articles written in leading ideological journals to extract a latent trait of ideology. I estimate the model using Bayesian methods, which allow valuable flexibility in specifying the space to be explored and the data-generating mechanism. In particular, I take advantage of the known relationship between writers for the same journal to overcome the lack of data on individual writers, while at the same time acknowledging that every writer for the same journal is not the same.

THE THEORY

Recent scholarship on the polarization and partisanship of the electorate has struggled to explain shifts in the last half century. Evidence of decline in partisanship was detected in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Broder 1972; Nie et al. 1976; Wattenberg 1984) leading many scholars to believe that parties played an increasingly insignificant role in the behavior of voters. At the same time, students of Congress were analyzing the legislature as though parties did not matter there either (e.g. Mayhew 1974). However,

evidence suggests that the obituaries of parties written in the 1980s were based on observing the low-water-mark of parties' significance, and that parties have rebounded as an important organizer of politics. The consensus on party in the legislature and in government has seen an almost complete reversal (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Sinclair 2000; Jacobson 2000, Bond and Fleisher 2000), and some studies have shown that party is playing an increasing role in voter behavior as well (Bartels 1998; Bartels 2000; Noel 2001).

There is little consensus on the explanations for this revival of party. For example, some claim that increasingly polarized congressional districts, possibly due to gerrymandering, lead to polarized members of Congress (e.g., Jacobson 2000). Or possibly variations in partisan conflict in Washington filter down to members of the public (e.g., Coleman 1996). Some have proposed a change in attitude among official party members (Layman et. al. 2003).

I believe the answer lies in the role of ideology. It is certainly possible to have strong partisan conflict without ideological division. This is the model of machine politics. Indeed, many scholars of the earlier period claimed that this was the case in the Untied States (Committee On Political Parties 1950; Schattschneider 1942; Smith and Davis 1947). For instance, E.E. Schattschneider writes in 1942:

Measured on a scale of radicalism and conservatism from Left to Right, both parties try more or less successfully to spread over the whole political rainbow from one extreme to the other. Specimens of nearly all shades of opinion are found in both parties; for strategic reasons, the parties need to be strong on both wings. (p.88)

Today, however, this description is completely inaccurate. Not only do the parties divide sharply on ideology, but the voters seem to do so as well (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998).

The Long Coalitions Model: The sharpening ideological divisions may be understood in terms of coalitions. Political parties are coalitions (Aldrich 1995, Schwartz 1989). Ideologies can also be thought of as defining coalitions (Bawn 1999). In particular, both are “long coalitions” defined over many, many issues (or votes).³

A long coalition is merely a coalition of actors (legislators for Aldrich and Schwartz, political activists for Bawn) who take the same stand on a number of issues. Doing so is an equilibrium, as each member is better off colluding with a consistent set of allies than hoping to build (or accidentally benefit from) a winning coalition on each bill. Not only are transaction costs reduced, but in some cases, a

³ The game theoretic properties of a long coalition in this context are described in Schwartz 1989. See also Aldrich (1995, Chapter 2), Bawn 1999 and Noel, n.d.

winning coalition may be impossible without the ability to commit to a logroll far in the future. A long coalition solves this problem.

It is sometimes difficult to think of ideology as a coalition, because we imagine coalitions as being made up of people with different interests, while people with the same ideology already have the same preferences. But ideologies, too, motivate people for different reasons. Some conservatives are conservative largely for economic reasons, while others are more moved by social issues. But committed ideologues believe (and thus act on) both together. The long coalitions model argues that even ideology is made up of people with different *ex ante* preferences, but they come to have common preferences because they enter the coalition. Generally, this occurs because they care deeply about some issues but not very strongly about others. Those that they don't care deeply about are ripe to change to align with the ideological coalition — in the same way that a legislator may trade a vote on a bill he doesn't care about for others' votes on one he does.

The major contribution of my approach is to consider ideology and party separately. Both are long coalitions, but they need not be the same long coalition. In the 1950s, the Democrats and the Republicans each constituted a coalition, but an ideological coalition existed as well. The “conservative coalition” in congressional voting was the manifestation of this separate coalition. Under this interpretation, when we say that the parties are more ideological than before, what we mean is that the party coalitions are closer to being the same as the ideological coalition. The ideological coalition defines the base or core of the party.

This framework casts light on *both* the decline in party identification in the 1970s and its rebound in the 1990s. If parties were not ideologically divided going into the 1970s, increasingly ideological activists and voters would have had trouble using party to help them choose among candidates. That is, following the ideological coalition would have undercut partisan voting. Even if only some of the public used ideology, the force of that ideological disruption would affect candidates. However, once parties began to sort themselves out ideologically – largely but not exclusively over race – ideology would serve to reinforce the party divisions. And party appeals that were not simply ideological would increase the sharpness that ideology creates.

This tack treats ideology as something independent of government institutions. Issue divisions between parties are organized not only by ideology, but also by the agenda and other concerns of political actors (Snyder 1992). Any institution with such an agenda is therefore suspect in presenting the true structure.

However, voters are also an unreliable place to find this structure. As Converse has demonstrated (1964), most voters do not use ideological terms when discussing politics. On a certain level, this is highly significant. We cannot fully understand *voting* behavior by looking only at ideology. On another level, however, the behavior of the mass of voters is not the whole story. Voters decide between the parties presented to them, but they do not determine the coalitions those parties will present. That decision is made by more sophisticated political players — what Mayhew called “relevant political actors.” And *they* are ideological. Activists play a large roll in funding campaigns, and more importantly, they make up the foot soldiers who fight them (Aldrich 1983; Masket 2002). And ideological elites play a key role in nominations (Masket 2002; Cohen et al. 2001, forthcoming). Political sophisticates are also the “opinion leaders” (e.g. Berelson et al. 1954) who are believed to shape much of mass opinion.

I call these ideological elites “coalition merchants” because of they market their coalition to the parties. Party leaders do not always care what coalition they have, just that it is a winning one. But ideologues do care. Ideologues build coalitions by developing a cohesive philosophy to justify a set of beliefs. They then “sell” that coalition to party leaders by promoting it as a viable winning coalition. Grover Norquist’s well-known weekly conservative strategy sessions are an overt example of this process. The entire process is beyond the scope of this paper, but the idea suggests that it is important to understand ideology independent of, or at least prior to, political institutions.

A MEASURE OF IDEOLOGY

The first step to understanding the dynamics outlined above is a solid measurement of the ideological side of the argument. Before we test whether these coalition merchants really can sell their ideological wares, we need to know what those wares are.

The measure I propose is spatial, although ideology is more complex a simple unidimensional model. Ideology does simplify and unify a diverse set of issues. In a spatial sense, the coalition that ideology creates is one of the ways in which myriad policy dimensions are reduced to few or even one. The model, then, is akin to that used to scale legislators (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1997). It assumes that pundits have ideal points in a low-dimensional space, and that they prefer policies that are closer to them in this space to alternatives that are further away.

The theory I advance about the role of ideology has several predictions for such a model. Most of these predictions can only be tested on a time series, while the present paper has data from two time periods, 1970 and 1990. But even with that limited sample, some inferences are possible.

Dimensionality: The widely used unidimensional metaphor has been (and should be) questioned for its incompleteness. That it is incomplete is trivially true — each issue of debate can be treated as its own dimension, often fruitfully by scholars. Much action in politics occurs because of its multidimensional character.

However, if these various issues tend to collapse to a single predictive vector, so that one's position on issue x_1 is highly predictive of one's position on all other issues, then we might reasonably say that a single dimension is highly explanatory. Taxation and abortion are completely distinct dimensions. But if an ideological dimension — liberal to conservative, say — predicts attitudes on both taxation and abortion (and most other political issues) the space is largely one-dimensional (Hinich and Munger 1994). As Poole and Rosenthal (1997) put it, dimensionality is a question of how “cigar-shaped” the world is. How well do different issues collapse, on balance, to one (or a small number) of dimensions? Poole and Rosenthal show that about 80 percent of all votes in Congress can be explained by a single dimension.

But institutional features may be behind this pattern. The agenda in Congress *may* be biased to produce a single dimension, and partisan influence may encourage members to vote in accordance with a partisan dimension (Snyder 1992; Sinclair 2000). The “true” space may be of higher dimension.

For instance, studying the mass public, Maddox and Lilie (1984) find that two dimensions are needed to explain political attitudes — what we might call a social dimension (freedom vs. order) and an economic dimension (freedom vs. equality). Maddox and Lilie also find that foreign policy tends to be distinct from those other dimensions. Scholars in other polities often measure up to seven major policy dimensions (Lijphart 1984; Sartori 1976). Possibly, then, the unidimensional nature of the Congress is an artifact.

However, if the theory of the coalition merchants is right, the dimensional reduction is not done by institutions in Congress but by ideological thinkers in the public sphere. Ordinary voters may be more disorganized, but what matters for legislators is the coalitions advanced by ideological thinkers and activists. If they are one-dimensional, Congress will be, too.

If ideologues *are* one-dimensional, this may tell us something about voting in Congress. Pundits are not under the agenda constraints of a legislature. To a great degree, they set their own agendas. And they are often the first to engage politically touchy subjects that politicians want to avoid discussing.

Continuum vs. clusters: Most conceptions of an ideological dimension imagine that it has adherents at nearly every point on the line. And in particular, many people are near the middle of this line. In surveys with ideological questions, the modal answer is moderate.

Congress, on the other hand, does not appear to have many members near the middle. Over the history of the U.S. Congress, there have been periods in which there is considerable overlap between the parties, but more often some sort of channel divides one side from the other. Poole and Rosenthal's estimates do not show a "cigar shaped" world, but rather two competing clusters of legislators. There are a variety of explanations for this, the most obvious being some sort of party pressure, which pulls apart members of the different parties.

A coalitional model of ideology, however, might also lead to clusters such as those found in Congress. The long coalitions model of ideology has a particular reason why a high-dimensional space might be reduced to lower dimensions. The model assumes that individuals have preferences on some issues and are indifferent (or care little) about others.

This is because the coalition approach suggests that ideology is about deciding to agree with others on a large number of issues. If they agree perfectly, they would appear to have the exact same ideal point. If there are two such groups, we have two points defining a line. If agreement is not perfect — if some people agree with the ideology most of the time, but sometimes go their own way — a one-dimensional model would still largely explain the variance. Deviations from the two ideal points of the two ideologies would turn up as noise, or possibly appear as moderation. In a two-dimensional model, deviations might begin to define a second dimension. If the deviations are not very systematic, that second dimension would be very noisy, but it might be there.

A more formal derivation of this prediction is in the works. But the intuition follows directly from the way in which scaling models work. They attempt to locate those with similar voting records in similar places. If a group of people are speaking together for strategic reasons rather than for preference reasons, they will artificially have more similar ideal points. A long-running coalition will drive the ideal points of all of its members toward a common ideal point.

As noted, institutional mechanisms in Congress might also lead to such a pattern. Not only do parties pressure members to vote together, but the agenda may not include many votes that would differentiate a moderate member from a more extreme one. However, those mechanisms should not apply to ideological pundits. If we get clusters among the pundits, it cannot be for these reasons.

Influence on Congress: If these pundits really are coalition merchants, as I argue, then the space they define will shape the space in Congress. The data in this present paper cannot speak to this question very well. I have data from only two time periods. However, to the extent that we observe change in the pundit time series (such as it is), it should predate change in the legislator time series. A longer and denser dataset is being gathered to test this hypothesis.

THE DATA

The data are the recorded positions of pundits in major political publications on the issues of the day. The data are thus analogous to legislative roll call data. This project analyses a set of pundits and issues from the calendar years 1970 and 1990. These samples are part of larger samples of articles gathered from four weekly ideological journals and three newspapers.⁴ The larger sample includes every political article from *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, *The National Review* and *Human Events*, and 80 editorials and op-eds from each month of *The New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal* and *The Washington Post*. The final sample included over 3,000 articles for 1990 and more than 2,000 for 1970.

For each article, the author, source and issue were recorded. (In many cases, complex articles were coded for more than one issue.) Articles include unsigned editorials for each publication, which are attributed to the “editorial board” of the publication. Then each article was coded for which position was taken on the issue (for or against). Issues are only informative if both sides are taken on the issue, and pundits are not very informative if they do not appear more than once. Thus cases that do not meet these standards are removed. The final position matrix for each case is 89 pundits by 94 issues in 1990, and 145 by 116 in 1970. Both matrices have about 10 percent of their cells filled.

As should be evident, these data differ from the data usually used to estimate ideal points in several ways. Several technical issues are described below.

First, defining the issue is tricky. On the one hand, overly general issues can mask significant differences from pundit to pundit. For instance, a liberal who is generally against tax cuts may still favor a cut in the Social Security payroll tax. On the other hand, overly specific issues generate too many different issues without enough responses on each. Effort was made to get as specific as possible while still maintaining a large number of responses on each issue. Decisions to change an issue from more to less specific were made in ignorance of the identity of the pundit. How to frame the issue is also important. Articles can be considered in terms of policy prescriptions, groups (or individuals) who are affected, or abstract principles that are invoked. Effort was made to avoid the last and focus on the first two, especially policy. Ideologues can apply principles in a variety of ways. We are not interested in who supports freedom of speech per se, but in who thinks freedom of speech should apply to offensive art and

⁴ The data in this paper are incomplete. More data has been and is being gathered, and this paper includes only what was ready for analysis at the time it was written. The 1990 sample is complete for all but the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. Only a small sample of the Wall Street Journal’s editorials and no articles from the Post were ready. The 1970 sample includes data from all seven sources, but from only about three-quarters of the year. This accounts for the different sizes of the two samples. Any inferences from these incomplete samples are, of course, tentative.

who thinks it should apply to hate speech. Solid policy prescriptions are thus better. However, pundits are not constrained to propose detailed policy options. Many writers take up groups, individuals and programs for praise or reproach. These too are informative. The implied “policy” is just that we should have more people or programs like this, or do what we can to support people or groups like this.

Second, many pundits address the same issue more than once. Usually, they take the same position. In the very few cases when they do not, usually this is because the issue has not been defined in a nuanced enough way. The issue in this case is redefined. In other cases, a better judgment can be made on the basis of the entire set of articles.

Third, the set of issues is not fixed for all pundits. In analyses of legislatures there may be some abstentions, but by and large, every legislator faces the same set of issues.

Even after restricting the data as above, the resulting matrices are “missing” about 90 percent of the possible observations (that is, compared to a scenario in which every pundit addressed every issue that had been raised in the year).

Finally, pundits are free to describe their ideal point on a given issue with more detail. Each article was thus originally coded on a five point scale: Solid support, lukewarm support, neutral, lukewarm opposition and solid opposition. (More nuanced coding would be possible on some issues, but that would require more careful investigation than is possible over a large number of issues.) However, for the analysis in this paper, the codes have been collapsed to a binary support/opposition. (Neutral is treated as abstention.) There are three reasons for this decision. 1. As an empirical matter, nearly all responses are at the extreme ends. Lukewarm positions are rare. 2. Coding the nuances is less reliable. It is usually easy to tell what “side” a writer is taking. Less easy is identifying how close she is to the “cut point.” 3. Writing styles can confuse the issue. Some writers take a more conciliatory tone, while others are more confrontational. Disentangling these idiosyncratic styles from the actual position is tricky. Thus for the present analysis, this characteristic of the data is not exploited. Future analyses will consider the problem.

THE MODEL

The model is an adaptation of a standard Item-Response Model. However, as noted above, the data has severe missingness.⁵ However, another feature of the data can be used to pry further information from the data. For each observation, we know not only who wrote the article, but also for which journal

⁵ Preliminary work attempting to find other ways to squeeze information from the data have been fruitful. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that the decision to address an issue in the first place may be an indicator of preference, in addition to the choice made on that issue (Noel 2004). This approach is not taken in this paper.

they wrote. I thus combine an Item-Response Model with a Hierarchical Model, in which each pundit's ideological position is a draw from a journal-specific distribution. The model is estimated using WinBUGS. The code for the model is in **Appendix 1**.

Part I: Item-Response Model: The paper adapts the Item-Response Model, as developed by Albert and Chib (1993; see also Baker 1992, Treier and Jackman 2002). I estimate both a one-dimensional and a two-dimensional model. The model is a variant of the common models used to estimate ideal points in legislatures (For a discussion of the relationship, see Poole 1999 and Londregan 2000). Responses to items – in this case issues in the public debate – are the dependent variable. They are predicted by the latent trait – in this case ideology – and parameters. More formally, each *ijth* article is a Bernoulli trial with a probability defined by parameters for the *jth* issue and the latent traits for the *ith* pundit:

$$y_{ij} \sim F_{\text{Bernoulli}}(\pi_{ij}) \quad [1]$$

where π is a function of the x 's, as follows:

$$\pi_{ij} = f_{\text{logit}}(\alpha_j + \beta_{j1}x_{i1} + \beta_{j2}x_{i2}) \quad [2]$$

and where π is the probability of a “1” response, x is a vector of respondent-specific ideology scores (for two dimensions), and α and β are item-specific parameters. (In the one-dimensional model, the $\beta_{j2}x_{i2}$ term is omitted.)

The α and β parameters can be manipulated and interpreted. By themselves, the β 's measure the contribution of the first and second dimension to the division on the issue. When β_1 is large relative to β_2 , the issue is a first-dimensional issue. Still more helpful, we can compute the cutting line for each issue. The cutting line divides those who take one position from those who take the other. (With stochastic error, some pundits will be on the wrong side of this line.) When the logit argument is equal to zero [Equation 3], the pundit is indifferent between the two alternatives. Manipulation gives Equation 3.1, which describes the cutting lines for each issue. (The arctangent of the slope also gives the *angle* of the cutting line).

$$0 = \alpha_j + \beta_{j1}x_{i1} + \beta_{j2}x_{i2} \quad [3]$$

$$x_{i2} = (-\alpha_j / \beta_{j2}) + (-\alpha_j / \beta_{j2}) x_{i1} \quad [3.1]$$

The model will thus estimate ideal points and cutting lines, which together will define the issue space.

Part II, A hierarchical model of ideology: Many of the *pundits* in the dataset address very few issues. However, each *publication* is represented on nearly every issue.

It would be possible to simply treat every article in a given journal as representing the same ideal point. But this is surely inaccurate. Even among ideological fellow travelers there can be disagreement. Some publication editors even take pride in this diversity of opinion presented. On the other hand, we would be ignoring useful information if we didn't account for the relationship between different pundits writing for the same journal.

A reasonable middle ground is a hierarchical model, in which each pundit's latent trait is a draw from a journal-specific distribution. (See Western 1998 for more on hierarchical models.) A hierarchical model does more than address the missingness problem. Even without severe missingness, the model is more efficient by borrowing strength across observations involving pundits writing for the same outlet.⁶ That is:

$$x_{i,1} \sim f_N(\mu_{\text{journal},1}, \tau_{\text{journal},1}) \quad [4]$$

where μ is the mean for the journal and τ is the journal's "precision," or $1/\sigma^2$. Both μ and τ are parameters to be estimated, for each dimension. This is a reasonable model of the actual process. Editors presumably have ideal points, but they are also willing to accept writing by pundits who deviate from them to some degree. And the editors probably differ in how much deviation they are willing to accept. *The New York Times* consciously wants to include a mix on its editorial page, so we would predict that its precision parameter would be smaller. Other publications have an agenda, and do not publish articles that deviate very much from it. The closer to the editors' preferences, the more likely the writer will choose to submit or work for the editor as well as be accepted or hired.

The model will estimate to what degree this happens. If the ideal points from the journal appear to be all over the map, the estimated τ will be small (and the variance large). On the other hand, an ideologically pure ship will have a larger τ . The model treats the "editorial board" itself as just another pundit in that mix, which has an ideal point of its own, also just drawn from the journal's distribution. Thus the hierarchical parameter measures the editors in their capacity as gatekeepers, while the edit board ideal point measures them in their capacity as opinion-holders.

⁶ This approach might be fruitful in the legislative setting as well. Each party or each state delegation could have its own distribution. Or ideal points might be more generally a function of other covariates.

Identification and estimation: The principal difficulty in using scaling models such as these is that the “space” in question is defined only relative to the various points estimated. It is much like astronomy, where the position of one heavenly body makes sense only when we decide to hold fixed one or more other bodies. Worse, in the ideal-point space, even the dimensionality and direction of the space are not known.

If a single, reasonably interpretable space is all that is required, any identifying restriction is acceptable, and identification is just a technical issue. One would typically identify the model by pinning down two ideal points in one dimension and three in two dimensions. The selection of which points is arbitrary, and the difference in different estimations would be in the orientation and scale of the space. This is typically referred to as the Kennedy-Helms restriction, meaning that we might fix Sen. Edward Kennedy as the probably most liberal senator and Sen. Jesse Helms as the probably most conservative one. (In the hierarchical model, it makes sense to impose this restriction at the higher level of the hierarchy, on the journal-specific means rather than on any particular ideal points.) Alternatively, we might identify the model with the issues, by fixing two cutting lines, as two lines will also form a plane. Rivers (2003) has shown that the required identifying restrictions are $n(n+1)$ independent restrictions for an n -dimensional model.⁷

However, I would like to the space I estimate for 1970 to be comparable to the space in 1990. In other contexts (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal 1997), comparability is achieved by simultaneous estimation, fixing the legislators’ ideal points in both periods, or allowing them to move but in some constrained manner. With only two periods, 20 years apart, that specific substantive restriction is not sensible.

The model is thus identified by fixing one issue, and one and a half ideal points. I constrain the “labor” issue (pro-labor vs. pro-management)⁸ to be a first-dimensional issue. I also constrain *The Nation* to be a liberal publication on that first dimension. I then constrain *The New York Times* to differ from *The Nation* on the second dimension, meaning that the direction of the second dimension will be defined by how *The Nation* and *The New York Times* differ, at the hierarchical level, on second-dimension issues. *The New York Times*’ first dimension parameter is unconstrained. (Specifically, the restriction is that $\alpha_{\text{labor}} = 0$, $\beta_{1,\text{labor}} = -3$, $\beta_{2,\text{labor}} = 0.001$, $\mu_{1,\text{Nation}} = -1$, $\mu_{2,\text{Nation}} = 0$ and $\mu_{2,\text{NYT}} = 1$.) These substantive restrictions are suitably believable to apply to both 1970 and 1990. Thus any changes we observe between 1970 and 1990 can be interpreted relative to these fixed stars. If an issue becomes more associated with the first

⁷ It is also possible, in a Bayesian model such as this one, to identify through informative priors. For the reasons given by Rivers (2003), I have not taken this approach.

⁸ This issue is for general op-eds and editorials on organized labor in general. Specific pieces about specific strikes, labor actions or policies were treated separately.

dimension, it can be said to be more associated with the traditional left-right dimension, since labor is a natural indicator for the economic liberal-conservative division in the United States. If a publication moves to the left or the right, it has moved relative to *The Nation*, which is plausibly the most liberal in the space.

These assumptions can be at least somewhat confirmed by the estimation. If other left-right issues do not tend to cut the same way as labor, then we know that labor is not the best candidate for defining the first dimension. If *The Nation* does not turn out to be the most liberal publication, the model will estimate another as more liberal. Choosing this restriction merely means that these are the fixed points which orient references to “the first dimension” or “the left.”⁹ However, too much should not be made of this restriction’s usefulness. It is still true that only a small number of strands are holding the two spaces together. Moreover, as the pool of issues and pundits changes, so too must the space. This latter problem also plagues estimation of legislative ideal points. Indeed, this project can help get a handle on that problem by allowing us to compare the agendas as well as the spaces generated by this set of decision makers with those of Congress.

The model is estimated using WinBUGS, which explores the parameter space using a Markov-Chain Monte Carlo algorithm. Posterior means are reported, based on about 10,000 iterations after at least 20,000-iteration burn-in. The first-dimensional parameters converged very quickly, but I have attempted overkill to ensure that the second-dimensional parameters were also properly estimated. Standard diagnostics suggest that the posterior distribution has been explored.

RESULTS

Understanding the estimated space requires exploring a range of estimates, including the cutting lines, the ideal point estimates and the prediction accuracy. In the section that follows, I will present all of these results first, and then turn to interpretation and analysis of them. Complete results are presented for both the 1970 and 1990 estimates. Figures and tables are all thus parallel, with a version for each year. There is thus a Figure 1(70) and a Figure 1(90), etc.

The spaces estimated by the model are depicted in **Figure 1**. The estimates used to create this and other figures are in **Tables 1 (ideal points) 2 (issue parameters), and 3 (hierarchical parameters)**. Ideal points in Figure 1 are in journal-specific colors, and all cutting lines are depicted. The most obvious lesson from Figure 1 is that the space is, band large, defined by the first dimension. The majority of

⁹ Further experimentation with other restrictions is also helpful in choosing a substantively meaningful one. Using other issues and other journals gives substantively similar results.

cutting lines are between the liberal journals (*The New Republic* and *The Nation*) on the left and the conservative journals (*Human Events*, *The National Review*, and the *Wall Street Journal's* editorial page) on the right. The majority of the cutting lines in both figures are nearly vertical, that is, orthogonal to the first dimension. They define the first dimension. However, several issues do cut in other ways. Some lines split *The Nation* from *The New Republic*. *The New York Times* — which we might expect to represent a wider perspective — in fact does. While few of its writers are as conservative as the *National Review*, many are to the right of the main liberal journals.

Most of the cutting lines appear to be vertical. **Figure 2** verifies this impression, with a histogram of the angle of the cutting lines. The majority are at or near 90 degrees, especially in 1970. These are the lines that separate the left from the right. Many do seem to be just slightly less than 90 degrees in 1970, and there is some dispersion in both directions in 1990. Possibly then the labor issue is not a perfect indicator of the left-right dimension, but it is very close.

Figure 3 identifies a few of the trees in this ideological forest. They, too, conform to expectations. In 1990, many pundits for *The New Republic* that we consider conservative today (Andrew Sullivan, Fred Barnes) were still taking more liberal positions. 1990 falls early in the shift of *The New Republic* rightward. Writers like Alexander Cockburn and Ralph Nader, on the other hand, are solidly liberal. The second dimension becomes especially salient when we look at these names. Something must be differentiating William F. Buckley and Patrick Buchanan. I will return to this question shortly.

However, many of the posterior distributions these estimates are based on have large variances. **Figure 4** includes 90% confidence ellipses around each ideal point. It is now obvious that the individual pundit estimates are not very meaningful, with only a few exceptions. Now the striking second-dimension differences are brought into context.

We usually cannot say that any given writer does not share an ideal point with another writer for the same publications. However, we can generally say that the left pundits are clearly to the left of the right pundits.¹⁰ **Figure 5** includes only the estimates for the editorial boards (that is, the unsigned editorials), which are the most common pundits in the dataset. And **Figure 6** shows the estimated journal-specific means. Here the differences are much more apparent.

If there is error in the ideal point estimates, there is also error in the issue parameters. **Table 2** shows the standard deviations of the posterior distributions for the issue parameters. It is clear from Table

¹⁰ Figure 4 does not reflect that the ideal point estimates are also correlated. For instance the right-most estimates for *The Nation* would not tend to correspond with the left-most estimates for the *National Review*. The overlaps in the confidence ellipses are thus misleadingly large.

2 that there is considerable error around the issue parameters, as well. However, much of the error is correlated with errors in pundits. If several pundits are estimated to be further to the right, then the cutting line also can be further to the right. A useful measure is how often “votes” on each issue are correctly predicted by the model. That is, given the cutting line and the ideal points, do pundits take the correct position? Global estimates of this measure are in **Table 4**. The two-dimensional model correctly predicts 91.6% of all issue positions in 1970 and 91.2% in 1990. This compares with estimates of around 88% for Congress.

We can see how well individual issues are classified. There is not much variation in classification from issue to issue, but **Figure 7** plots this variation against the angle of the cutting line. Not surprisingly, the first-dimension cutting lines do the best job classifying the issues. These lines cut between the two main clouds of points.

Dimensionality: As noted, these results suggest that one dimension adequately describes both spaces. Most cutting lines are on the first dimension, and the ideal points are separated into a left and right cloud. The confidence ellipses in Figure 4 are generally larger in the second dimension, because the model cannot say much about the second dimension. We can confidently say that the writers for the left journals are to the left of those for the right journals, but we can say little about whether any writer is high or low on the second dimension.

And adding a dimension does not help the model classify the issue positions. A one-dimensional model classifies 88.6% of the positions in 1970 and 86.6% in 1990. So there is very little value-added in going to a second dimension. The only real reason to estimate and study a two-dimensional model is to confirm that the second dimension does not provide much information.

It is notable that this space is one-dimensional despite the lack of any agenda-setting institutions. Whatever is driving the space to be one-dimensional is something the actors themselves are doing.

The differences are slight, but the space is also more one-dimensional in 1970 than in 1990. This is slightly counter-intuitive; since evidence is that the country has been becoming more polarized in the past several decades. However, 1970 was at the highpoint of ideological discourse. The conflict of the late 1960s had clearly sharpened. By 1990, liberals had begun to embrace some aspects of free markets. *The New Republic* famously supported the 1990 Gulf War. (They also supported the second invasion in 2003.) The increased complexity in 1990, I believe, is due to increased division on the left.

How should we interpret this primary dimension? The model was identified with the intention of making the first dimension be the traditional left-right cleavage, and this orientation makes sense. Most of the major liberal-conservative issues have cutting line angles at or near 90 degrees. These include, in both

periods, taxes, defense spending, gun control, funding for the arts, abortion and others. Also on the first dimension are procedural issues that aid ideological goals. The seniority system and Congress' war powers are both on this dimension in the 1970s. This is a time when newly elected liberal Democrats in Congress were attempting to wrest control of the institution from their more senior but conservative Democratic leadership (Rohde 1991). These pundits wrote about this procedural issue in principled terms, but they come down on the side that supports their coalition.

Since the second dimension is so noisy, it is hard to characterize which issues are on it. They do not form a conceptually neat package. The issues in 1970 that load the most on the second dimension include farm subsidies, population growth, social spending, free trade, the 18-year-old vote, "extremism" and foreign aid. So, not surprisingly, foreign policy is hard to categorize, as are a number of politically crosscutting issues. Conservatives from farm states nevertheless want government spending on agriculture. And everyone wants to distance themselves from "extremists" of even their own stripe.

In 1990, the most second-dimensional issues include Daniel Patrick Moynihan's proposal to cut the Social Security payroll tax, the reunification of Germany, campaign finance reform, the rights of criminals, drug legalization and free trade. Again, these are important crosscutting issues. Campaign finance reform probably might divide the groups more cleanly if it were disaggregated into the various proposals that help or hurt specific causes. It is interesting that the "rights of the accused and of criminals" issue has become less loaded on the first dimension.

In 1992, Bill Clinton ran on a law and order platform, and many commentators thought this would be a losing issue for a Democrat. But according to this analysis, law and order was already crosscutting the liberal coalition.

Continuum vs. Clusters: That the pundits fall into two camps is further suggestive. While the cutting lines suggest that the first dimension is primary, the world is not, in Poole and Rosenthal's words, "cigar-shaped." While one dimension explains most of the variation, this is not because a single, pre-existing continuum linearly predicts all other issues. This is evidence for the coalitional model. The equilibrium in the coalitional model is that actors with diverse preferences nevertheless support a common agenda. They would thus appear to have the same ideal point. However, to the extent that some coalition members sometimes defect, they would appear to be close but not exactly on that ideal point. Thus you would get a cluster around the coalition's ideal point. In particular, the second dimension reflects the noisy deviations away from the coalition's ideal point, but not toward the other coalition.

However, the hierarchical model is responsible for much of this impression. The model shrinks the preferences of different writers back toward the center. Thus those writers who appear infrequently in

the data will be shrunk toward each other. Still, writers who appear frequently are generally estimated some distance from the hierarchical mean. In fact, some op-ed writers are estimated on the other side of the space from their parent publication. The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times both carry columnists of the other ideological stripe. If we look just at the frequent contributors, clustering still occurs. Note that the editorial boards in Figure 5 — the most frequent writers — still form clusters.

But these clusters are not the same. Both groups are cross-cut by a variety of cutting lines. But in both periods, the liberal writers are more dispersed, compared to the conservatives. This is evidence for the characterization that, at least of late, the right is far more “disciplined” ideologically than the left is. The right is especially cohesive in 1970. Few cutting lines differentiate between writers on the right, but many do on the left. *The National Review* and *Human Events* are separated to some degree, but within each journal they are much more tightly clustered. The estimated means as well as the estimated precisions (τ or $1/\sigma^2$) for each journal are in Table 3, which supports that conclusion. In both periods, the precisions for *Human Events* and *The National Review* are larger than for *The Nation* and *The New Republic*. The lowest precisions are for the newspapers, which we expected would be more inclusive in the opinions they published.

Much of the within-journal dispersion is in the second dimension. It may be that the difficulty in estimating the second dimension comes from the fact that what accounts for the second dimension is different for the left than for the right. On the left, for instance, the second dimension might often be about the tolerance of radical protest. But on the right, it might often be about foreign policy. If we attempt to estimate both as the same dimension — especially with not a lot of data — the results may not be very interpretable.

Influence on Congress: Very little can be said from only two time periods about how the pundit-space influences the space in the legislature. I have noted that several issues that are more procedural than principled do align on the first dimension. This pundit space is thus not ignorant of issues in practical politics. But the relationship could go either way. Ideology might be nothing more than a rationalization of political coalitions (Mannheim 1955; see also Downs 1957, pp. 96-7), in which case the coalition-building needs of policy-makers are just echoed in the data here. Alternatively, these thinkers could be working to define the coalitions that legislators then work for. A few isolated examples emerge from the data.

I noted above that the rights of criminals were already breaking down as a liberal-conservative issue among elite thinkers before Clinton triangulated on it in 1992. Another important example is abortion. Today, abortion is among the most ideologically charged issues, and it separates the parties as

well. In the 1970s, however, Democrats were not firmly pro-choice. Adams (1997) has documented the issue evolution of abortion in Congress. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) also show that the issue did not divide congressional voting very well in this period. It wasn't until the late 1980s that the parties clearly divided on this issue. The same is true of voters, who did not divide on abortion until almost 1990.

But in 1970, the pundits were divided on abortion. The cutting line has an angle of 55.1 degrees, which is not 90 degrees but it still mostly on the first dimension. The cutting line is thus one of a small handful that still cut between the left and right clouds but are not so nearly vertical. Indeed, there are no left journal writers who are pro-life, and no right journal writers who are pro-choice. Thus they are now the first group documented to divide on this issue.

If it were true that the pundits shape the ideological divisions in the electorate and in Congress, we would expect to find more such examples when the data become available.

DISCUSSION

The evidence here should not be overstated. First, as noted, the estimates are not especially stable. Second, while most issues are on the first dimension, a second, not well-defined dimension does exist for some issues. Nevertheless, the pundits, like politicians, fall into two clear camps.

This is suggestive for the relationship between pundits and politicians. Theories for the spatial structure of politics often stress institutional factors. And surely those institutions matter for politicians. But ideologues do not face those same institutions, and yet they, too, divide into two camps -- although not perfectly. This suggests a dynamic between the two sets of actors that has not been adequately explored.

Finally, the clustering here, reminiscent of that in NOMINATE scores, does not actually fit the general interpretation of the one-dimensional model. That it appears here also suggests considering a common model to explain both Congress and the punditocracy (and possibly also voters and other actors). The long coalition model might do just that.

The problem of missingness is also significant. Use of the hierarchical model has helped to some degree, but the problem is not solved. However, missing data ought to be a bigger concern for ideal point estimation. Even when missingness is not severe, it maybe systematic. The strategies used here could also apply to estimation in Congress or other settings. Legislators from the same party or from the same state or region might be thought of as drawn from the same distribution.

APPENDIX 1: THE HIERARCHICAL ITEM RESPONSE MODEL

```

#### journals
####
#### Model for estimating the ideological space of the punditry
####
####
#### This model estimates a two-dimensional space
#### This model dichotomizes issue positions (0,1)
####
#### List of all nodes: (parameters and variables)
####
#### n = number of pundits (DATA)
#### k = number of issues (DATA)
#### m = index for magazines. n-vector. maps pundits to magazine index (DATA)
#### nofm = number of magazines (DATA)
#### y = n x k matrix of issue positions (0,1) (DATA)
#### x = n-vector of ideological positions for each pundit (P)
#### alpha, beta = k-vector and k x 2 matrix of parameters for PART I (P)
#### py = probability of a positive issue position (P)
#### mu_journal = the mean for each journal's distribution of x's (P)
#### tau_journal = the precision for each journal's distribution of x's (P)
####
####
model{

  ## MODEL FOR ISSUE POSITION (PART I)
  for (j in 1:k){ #### Loop over k issues
    for (i in 1:n){ #### Loop over n pundits
      ## These lines are for a 1 dimensional model
      ## Draw y from bernoulli
      ## y[i,j] ~ dbern(py[i,j])
      ## logit(py[i,j]) <- discrim[j]*(x[i] - cutpoint[j])
      # Replaces the above for a 2 dimensional model
      y[i,j] ~ dbern(py[i,j])
      logit(py[i,j]) <- (beta[j,1]*x[i,1]+beta[j,2]*x[i,2]+alpha[j])
      # Is the vote correctly classified?
      class.v[i,j] <- round(y[i,j]*py[i,j] + (1-y[i,j])*(1-py[i,j]) )
    }
    # What % of each issue's positions were correctly classified?
    class.issue[j] <- mean(class.v[1:n,j])
  }

  # What % of all positions does the model correctly classify?
  class <- mean(class.v[1:n,1:k])

  ## HIERARCHICAL MODEL FOR X'S (PART II)
  ## x's are a draw from means for each journal

  for (i in 1:n){
    x[i,1] ~ dnorm(mu_journal[m[i],1],tau_journal[m[i],1])|(-3,3)
    x[i,2] ~ dnorm(mu_journal[m[i],2],tau_journal[m[i],2])|(-3,3)
  }
}

```

```

## PRIORS AND IDENTIFICATION

## Identify model with one issue (labor)
## and one and a half journal means (The Nation, NYT )
mu_journal[1,1] <- -1.0 ## The Nation on the first dimension
mu_journal[1,2] <- 0.0 ## The Nation on the second dimension
mu_journal[5,2] <- 0.5 ## The NYT on the second dimension
mu_journal[5,1] ~ dnorm(0,0.9)|(-4,4)

## priors for magazine parameters
for(ii in 2:4){ mu_journal[ii,1] ~ dnorm(0,0.9)|(-4,4) } ## All other journals
for(ii in 2:4){ mu_journal[ii,2] ~ dnorm(0,0.9)|(-4,4) }
mu_journal[6,1] ~ dnorm(0,0.9)|(-4,4)
mu_journal[6,2] ~ dnorm(0,0.9)|(-4,4)

## priors for journal precisions
for(ii in 1:nofm){ tau_journal[ii,1] ~ dgamma(.05,1)|(-5,5) }
for(ii in 1:nofm){ tau_journal[ii,2] ~ dgamma(.05,1)|(-5,5) }

## priors for issue parameters
for(jj in 1:88){
  alpha[jj] ~ dnorm(0.0,0.1)|(-8,8)
  beta[jj,1] ~ dnorm(0.0,0.1)|(-8,8)
  beta[jj,2] ~ dnorm(0.0,0.1)|(-8,8)
}

# Constrain "Labor" to be at 90 degrees
alpha[89] <- 0.0
beta[89,1] <- -3.0
beta[89,2] <- 0.001
for(jj in 90:k){
  alpha[jj] ~ dnorm(0.0,0.1)|(-8,8)
  beta[jj,1] ~ dnorm(0.0,0.1)|(-8,8)
  beta[jj,2] ~ dnorm(0.0,0.1)|(-8,8)
}
}


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
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FIGURE 1(70): All Ideal Points and Cutting Lines, 1970



- Human Events
- The Nation
- The National Review
- The New Republic
- The New York Times
- The Wall Street Journal
- The Washington Post

FIGURE 1(90): All Ideal Points and Cutting Lines, 1990



Human Events
The Nation
The National Review
The New Republic
The New York Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Washington Post

FIGURE 2(70): Distribution of Cutting Lines, 1970




FIGURE 2(90): Distribution of Cutting Lines, 1990




FIGURE 3(70): Ideal Points of Selected Pundits, 1970




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




FIGURE 4(70): Confidence Ellipses for all Ideal Points, 1970




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- The New Republic
- The New York Times
- The Wall Street Journal
- The Washington Post

FIGURE 4(90): Confidence Ellipses for all Ideal Points, 1990




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- The New Republic
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- The Wall Street Journal
- The Washington Post

FIGURE 5(70): Confidence Ellipses for Edit Board Ideal Points, 1970




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- The Washington Post

FIGURE 5(90): Confidence Ellipses for Edit Board Ideal Points, 1990




- Human Events
- The Nation
- The National Review
- The New Republic
- The New York Times
- The Wall Street Journal
- The Washington Post

FIGURE 6(70): Confidence Ellipses for Hierarchical Journal Means, 1970



- Human Events
- The Nation
- The National Review
- The New Republic
- The New York Times
- The Wall Street Journal
- The Washington Post

FIGURE 6(90): Confidence Ellipses for Hierarchical Journal Means, 1990



- Human Events
- The Nation
- The National Review
- The New Republic
- The New York Times
- The Wall Street Journal
- The Washington Post

FIGURE 7(70): Classification Accuracy and Cutting Line Angles, 1970




FIGURE 7(90): Classification Accuracy and Cutting Line Angles, 1990




Table 1(70): Ideal Point Parameters for 1970 (page 1 of 3)

Name	Journal	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
		mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Abbot, William L.	Nation	-1.09	0.70	-2.50	-1.09	0.29	0.11	0.86	-1.63	0.10	1.87
Alexander, Holmes	HE	1.91	0.59	0.64	1.95	2.88	-0.82	1.04	-2.60	-0.91	1.42
Allen Goldsmith Report	HE	2.03	0.52	0.93	2.07	2.92	-0.71	1.03	-2.50	-0.80	1.49
Anderson, Fred	TNR	-1.36	0.77	-2.70	-1.40	0.26	-0.34	1.09	-2.36	-0.37	1.92
Ashbrook, John, Rep.	HE	1.79	0.63	0.45	1.85	2.87	-0.91	0.99	-2.62	-1.01	1.22
Baker, Russel	NYT	-1.08	0.97	-2.78	-1.11	0.92	1.12	0.94	-0.94	1.18	2.77
Baldwin, Frank	TNR	-1.55	0.68	-2.80	-1.57	-0.14	-0.52	1.06	-2.49	-0.56	1.69
Barnes, Peter	TNR	-1.39	0.74	-2.73	-1.42	0.18	-0.30	1.09	-2.34	-0.33	1.94
Barnet, Richard J.	Nation	-1.22	0.65	-2.54	-1.21	0.01	0.18	0.83	-1.49	0.16	1.87
Barrett, Larry	Nation	-1.10	0.70	-2.48	-1.09	0.29	0.12	0.87	-1.60	0.13	1.88
Bartley, Robert L.	WSJ	-0.91	1.18	-2.85	-0.97	1.62	0.13	1.44	-2.65	0.16	2.72
Bass, Jack	TNR	-1.40	0.73	-2.72	-1.43	0.14	-0.29	1.10	-2.35	-0.33	1.98
Birnbaum, Norman	Nation	-1.24	0.67	-2.58	-1.23	0.09	-0.20	0.90	-2.01	-0.19	1.65
Blackburn, Dan	Nation	-0.50	0.63	-1.78	-0.49	0.73	0.29	0.89	-1.54	0.30	2.09
Bonafede, Dom	Nation	-0.86	0.70	-2.30	-0.84	0.43	0.26	0.88	-1.44	0.23	2.12
Bongartz, Roy	Nation	-1.12	0.69	-2.53	-1.11	0.25	0.08	0.86	-1.66	0.08	1.86
Boyle, Kay	TNR	-1.42	0.73	-2.74	-1.45	0.10	-0.25	1.09	-2.30	-0.28	2.01
Broder, David S.	Post	-0.91	1.06	-2.76	-0.96	1.35	0.33	1.27	-2.32	0.38	2.63
Buckley, William F., Jr.	Review	1.98	0.57	0.83	2.01	2.93	-0.56	1.04	-2.47	-0.63	1.68
Burnham, James	Review	1.56	0.68	0.23	1.56	2.82	-1.13	0.99	-2.80	-1.19	0.99
Carper, Jean	Nation	-1.11	0.68	-2.49	-1.09	0.22	0.08	0.86	-1.64	0.07	1.83
Carroll, John S.	TNR	-1.37	0.75	-2.73	-1.39	0.19	-0.32	1.11	-2.36	-0.37	1.97
Chalmers, Robert M.	Post	-0.32	1.25	-2.58	-0.37	2.28	0.12	1.31	-2.50	0.15	2.57
Chamberlain, John	HE	2.00	0.52	0.93	2.03	2.89	-0.61	1.06	-2.47	-0.71	1.62
Chambers, Whittaker	Review	1.49	0.86	-0.47	1.58	2.85	-1.18	1.06	-2.83	-1.30	1.37
Clark, Mark W.	NYT	0.40	0.99	-1.53	0.37	2.47	1.17	0.86	-0.64	1.18	2.74
Cleghorn, Reese	Nation	-1.22	0.63	-2.52	-1.19	-0.03	0.12	0.85	-1.58	0.11	1.85
Coffey, Raymond R.	Nation	-1.04	0.70	-2.47	-1.02	0.30	0.03	0.87	-1.74	0.03	1.79
Copp, DeWitt S.	HE	1.83	0.63	0.48	1.88	2.88	-0.69	1.06	-2.51	-0.78	1.54
Cover, Robert	Nation	-1.00	0.74	-2.46	-1.00	0.50	0.00	0.88	-1.81	0.00	1.76
Cuneo, Ernest	HE	1.88	0.61	0.56	1.93	2.88	-0.83	1.06	-2.65	-0.92	1.52
Dale Jr., Edwin L.	TNR	-1.09	0.80	-2.60	-1.11	0.54	-0.73	1.11	-2.62	-0.82	1.83
Davis, Wayne H.	TNR	-1.35	0.76	-2.71	-1.40	0.25	-0.33	1.08	-2.38	-0.37	1.89
Dickson, Paul	Nation	-1.31	0.61	-2.56	-1.29	-0.17	-0.06	0.84	-1.76	-0.07	1.67
Donovan, Brian	TNR	-1.43	0.74	-2.77	-1.45	0.11	-0.50	1.04	-2.45	-0.53	1.66
Duchess of Medina Sidonia	Nation	-0.99	0.73	-2.43	-0.99	0.48	0.01	0.89	-1.78	0.02	1.81
Edelman, Marian Wright	TNR	-1.34	0.77	-2.71	-1.39	0.32	-0.36	1.09	-2.37	-0.41	1.91
Edwards, Jack, Rep.	HE	1.83	0.61	0.51	1.87	2.87	-0.71	1.08	-2.55	-0.80	1.64
Emmet, Christopher	Review	1.61	0.74	0.06	1.65	2.86	-0.64	1.11	-2.62	-0.70	1.78
Evans, M. Stanton	Review	1.45	0.78	-0.16	1.48	2.84	-0.52	0.99	-2.37	-0.56	1.57
Evans, Rowland	Post	-0.78	1.14	-2.74	-0.87	1.74	0.22	1.30	-2.41	0.26	2.65
Fairbank, John	NYT	0.18	1.04	-1.81	0.15	2.33	1.02	0.93	-0.97	1.06	2.71
Fisher, O.C. (Rep)	HE	1.84	0.62	0.51	1.90	2.87	-0.72	1.08	-2.56	-0.83	1.61
Flacks, Richard	Nation	-1.18	0.65	-2.52	-1.16	0.07	0.36	0.80	-1.22	0.34	2.03
Flores, Edmundo	Nation	-1.00	0.73	-2.45	-1.00	0.47	0.16	0.86	-1.55	0.15	1.93
Freeman III, A. Myrick	TNR	-1.42	0.74	-2.75	-1.44	0.10	-0.34	1.10	-2.37	-0.39	1.94
Freeman Jr., Gaylord A.	WSJ	0.37	1.50	-2.64	0.50	2.80	-0.38	1.38	-2.77	-0.46	2.46
Friedman, David	HE	1.83	0.62	0.48	1.89	2.86	-0.72	1.07	-2.58	-0.82	1.62
Friedman, Ralph	Nation	-1.10	0.69	-2.47	-1.09	0.27	0.07	0.87	-1.74	0.08	1.84

Table 1(70): Ideal Point Parameters for 1970 (page 2 of 3)

Name	Journal	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
		mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Geltman, Max	HE	1.84	0.63	0.50	1.88	2.87	-0.61	1.08	-2.47	-0.72	1.73
Gilluly, Richard H.	TNR	-1.36	0.76	-2.72	-1.40	0.23	-0.34	1.08	-2.34	-0.39	1.94
Hausman, Leonard	TNR	-1.42	0.74	-2.76	-1.45	0.11	-0.29	1.09	-2.34	-0.33	1.94
Hay, John	NYT	-0.61	1.02	-2.59	-0.60	1.45	0.94	0.94	-1.08	1.00	2.67
Healy, Timothy S.	TNR	-1.36	0.77	-2.73	-1.38	0.29	-0.34	1.10	-2.35	-0.40	1.95
Hess, David	Nation	-1.19	0.65	-2.52	-1.16	0.01	0.13	0.85	-1.58	0.13	1.88
Hoffman, Paul	Nation	-1.12	0.68	-2.48	-1.10	0.18	0.05	0.89	-1.73	0.04	1.87
Human Events Editors	HE	2.47	0.35	1.69	2.52	2.97	-0.75	1.02	-2.51	-0.85	1.40
Johnson, Gilbert	TNR	-1.39	0.74	-2.74	-1.42	0.16	-0.27	1.09	-2.31	-0.31	2.00
Johnson, Nicholas	Nation	-1.13	0.68	-2.52	-1.12	0.19	0.03	0.87	-1.77	0.02	1.80
Jones, Robert A.	Nation	-1.05	0.70	-2.46	-1.04	0.31	0.04	0.87	-1.72	0.04	1.84
Kasper, Hirschel	TNR	-1.40	0.73	-2.73	-1.42	0.10	-0.29	1.09	-2.37	-0.31	1.92
Kaufman, Arnold S.	TNR	-1.46	0.75	-2.76	-1.50	0.09	-0.52	1.08	-2.49	-0.58	1.78
Kaufman, Richard F.	Nation	-1.28	0.63	-2.56	-1.26	-0.10	0.19	0.82	-1.44	0.18	1.88
Keller, George C.	Nation	-1.10	0.69	-2.49	-1.10	0.25	0.09	0.86	-1.65	0.09	1.84
Kilpatrick, James J.	HE	1.98	0.54	0.87	2.01	2.91	-0.90	1.00	-2.59	-1.00	1.31
Kimble, Joseph Paul	Nation	-1.12	0.68	-2.50	-1.10	0.21	0.10	0.86	-1.63	0.09	1.85
King, Edward L.	TNR	-1.39	0.74	-2.75	-1.42	0.16	-0.29	1.10	-2.32	-0.33	1.96
Kirk, Gerry	Review	1.51	0.79	-0.18	1.56	2.85	-0.48	1.16	-2.58	-0.55	2.01
Kirk, Russel	HE	1.97	0.55	0.82	2.00	2.89	-0.77	1.04	-2.55	-0.88	1.50
Kleiman, Robert	NYT	-0.49	1.09	-2.55	-0.51	1.81	1.01	0.90	-0.85	1.04	2.68
Kogan, Michael S.	Review	1.48	0.85	-0.40	1.55	2.84	-0.37	1.14	-2.43	-0.43	2.09
Kraft, Joseph	Post	-0.07	0.96	-1.97	-0.08	1.97	0.14	1.37	-2.55	0.16	2.65
Lane, Thomas A	HE	1.98	0.54	0.83	2.01	2.89	-0.73	1.04	-2.50	-0.83	1.49
Lapp, Ralph E.	TNR	-1.49	0.70	-2.78	-1.52	-0.04	-0.30	1.00	-2.23	-0.31	1.72
Levine, Herbert S.	Nation	-1.19	0.67	-2.55	-1.19	0.09	-0.37	0.79	-2.02	-0.33	1.13
Lewin, Nathan	TNR	-1.48	0.72	-2.76	-1.51	0.05	-0.48	1.09	-2.48	-0.54	1.78
Lewis, Anthony	NYT	0.36	0.68	-0.79	0.29	1.96	1.13	0.92	-0.95	1.19	2.75
Lukens, Buz (Rep)	HE	1.85	0.62	0.50	1.90	2.87	-0.74	1.07	-2.56	-0.84	1.57
Lundy, Joseph R.	Nation	-1.01	0.73	-2.45	-1.00	0.50	0.01	0.87	-1.76	0.01	1.76
Mankoff, Milton	Nation	-1.21	0.65	-2.54	-1.19	0.03	0.35	0.81	-1.25	0.32	2.06
Margolin, Malcolm	Nation	-1.05	0.70	-2.45	-1.04	0.32	0.03	0.88	-1.72	0.01	1.86
Marine, Gene	Nation	-1.04	0.70	-2.48	-1.03	0.33	0.04	0.88	-1.70	0.04	1.85
Mason, Linda	Nation	-1.11	0.70	-2.51	-1.11	0.26	0.06	0.87	-1.71	0.06	1.86
Meyer, Frank S.	Review	1.70	0.68	0.31	1.72	2.87	-0.51	1.12	-2.51	-0.58	1.88
Miller, Margaret	Nation	-1.12	0.69	-2.51	-1.11	0.26	0.05	0.86	-1.69	0.04	1.79
Mowbray, A.Q.	Nation	-1.04	0.68	-2.40	-1.04	0.28	0.03	0.88	-1.71	0.02	1.81
Moynihan, Daniel P.	TNR	-1.41	0.74	-2.74	-1.42	0.10	-0.29	1.11	-2.36	-0.33	1.99
Muhlen, Norbert	Review	1.53	0.82	-0.34	1.61	2.84	-0.64	1.15	-2.66	-0.72	1.92
Murton, Tom	Nation	-0.99	0.73	-2.40	-1.01	0.52	0.00	0.88	-1.80	0.00	1.78
Nachman, David Larry	Nation	-1.19	0.66	-2.53	-1.19	0.12	0.10	0.85	-1.64	0.10	1.83
Nader, Ralph	Nation	-1.15	0.65	-2.53	-1.12	0.07	-0.01	0.88	-1.78	0.00	1.81
National Review Editors	Review	1.97	0.50	0.99	1.96	2.89	-0.21	1.01	-2.06	-0.27	1.99
Nelson, Frederic	HE	1.92	0.56	0.74	1.96	2.87	-0.84	1.02	-2.60	-0.94	1.37
Nelson, Frederick	HE	1.84	0.62	0.52	1.89	2.87	-0.68	1.08	-2.54	-0.78	1.59
Neuhaus, Richard John	Nation	-1.34	0.61	-2.61	-1.32	-0.17	-0.28	0.84	-2.02	-0.25	1.42
Novak, Robert	Post	-0.79	1.13	-2.74	-0.86	1.73	0.23	1.29	-2.38	0.26	2.61
Novitski, Joseph	NYT	-0.63	1.02	-2.62	-0.61	1.44	0.94	0.94	-1.10	0.99	2.67
Osborne, John	TNR	-1.05	0.80	-2.57	-1.06	0.55	-1.25	0.88	-2.75	-1.30	0.90

Table 1(70): Ideal Point Parameters for 1970 (page 3 of 3)

Name	Journal	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
		mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Owen, Henry	Post	-1.17	0.97	-2.81	-1.23	0.99	-0.26	1.29	-2.64	-0.28	2.31
Pace, Eric	NYT	-0.62	1.01	-2.60	-0.60	1.39	0.95	0.95	-1.09	0.98	2.68
Packer, Herbert L.	TNR	-0.93	0.88	-2.56	-0.96	0.91	-0.90	0.96	-2.61	-0.95	1.26
Pelly, Tom	HE	1.84	0.61	0.52	1.89	2.87	-0.77	1.06	-2.55	-0.87	1.62
Phillips, Keven P.	HE	1.96	0.55	0.79	2.00	2.88	-0.75	1.05	-2.56	-0.84	1.47
Pillai, K.G.J.	Nation	-1.11	0.68	-2.49	-1.11	0.22	0.08	0.86	-1.66	0.07	1.84
Radosh, Ronald	Nation	-1.08	0.69	-2.44	-1.07	0.26	0.08	0.87	-1.64	0.08	1.87
Rechy, John	Nation	-1.10	0.69	-2.48	-1.09	0.26	0.07	0.86	-1.69	0.06	1.84
Reston, James	NYT	-0.21	0.92	-2.10	-0.18	1.69	0.78	0.90	-0.91	0.75	2.58
Riesel, Victor	HE	1.91	0.57	0.73	1.95	2.89	-0.84	1.05	-2.62	-0.94	1.47
Rilling, Paul M.	TNR	-1.40	0.74	-2.76	-1.42	0.13	-0.29	1.10	-2.34	-0.32	1.93
Rodgers, William H.	Nation	-1.13	0.69	-2.48	-1.12	0.24	0.00	0.86	-1.77	0.00	1.76
Ross, Leonard	TNR	-1.43	0.72	-2.75	-1.44	0.02	-0.35	1.09	-2.39	-0.39	1.89
Rostow, W. W.	HE	1.83	0.61	0.53	1.88	2.87	-0.68	1.08	-2.55	-0.78	1.63
Ryskind, Morrie	HE	1.99	0.53	0.89	2.02	2.90	-0.65	1.06	-2.48	-0.74	1.59
Schechter, Mal	TNR	-1.35	0.78	-2.72	-1.39	0.28	-0.34	1.09	-2.37	-0.38	1.89
Schurmann, Franz	Nation	-1.08	0.69	-2.46	-1.07	0.29	0.06	0.87	-1.65	0.05	1.85
Scott, Paul	HE	1.90	0.58	0.67	1.94	2.89	-0.73	1.06	-2.55	-0.83	1.52
Sherrill, Robert	Nation	-1.05	0.67	-2.44	-1.03	0.21	0.08	0.92	-1.76	0.08	1.91
Silver, George A., M.D.	Nation	-1.04	0.70	-2.43	-1.04	0.35	0.00	0.88	-1.79	0.00	1.77
Singer, Daniel	Nation	-1.11	0.69	-2.48	-1.10	0.22	0.08	0.87	-1.63	0.07	1.92
Spriggs, P. Kent	TNR	-1.34	0.78	-2.72	-1.39	0.30	-0.35	1.09	-2.40	-0.40	1.89
Sterling, Claire	Post	-1.12	0.97	-2.83	-1.14	0.93	0.47	1.29	-2.28	0.54	2.71
Stevens, Ted, Sen.	HE	1.82	0.63	0.46	1.87	2.86	-0.80	1.04	-2.60	-0.90	1.44
Sulzberger, C. L.	NYT	0.34	0.84	-1.25	0.28	2.22	1.09	0.84	-0.57	1.08	2.70
Teladano, Ralph de	HE	1.82	0.63	0.49	1.87	2.88	-0.74	1.06	-2.59	-0.84	1.50
Teller, Edward	NYT	-0.49	1.12	-2.58	-0.50	1.84	1.01	0.90	-0.87	1.03	2.70
The Nation Editors	Nation	-2.13	0.44	-2.92	-2.13	-1.29	0.18	0.77	-1.41	0.22	1.63
The New Republic Editors	TNR	-1.93	0.47	-2.86	-1.92	-1.07	0.10	0.78	-1.49	0.11	1.56
The New York Times Editors	NYT	-0.84	0.69	-2.46	-0.73	0.30	1.78	0.58	0.66	1.77	2.86
The Richmond News Leader	HE	1.60	0.59	0.47	1.60	2.74	-0.73	1.06	-2.56	-0.81	1.54
The Wall Street Journal Editors	WSJ	1.82	0.61	0.69	1.80	2.91	0.46	1.02	-1.48	0.38	2.61
The Washington Post Editors	Post	-1.41	0.82	-2.85	-1.43	0.23	0.42	1.22	-2.08	0.46	2.65
Thomson, John R.	Review	1.48	0.85	-0.40	1.55	2.84	-0.66	1.13	-2.67	-0.72	1.79
Thurmond, Strom	HE	1.95	0.57	0.75	1.98	2.89	-0.81	1.05	-2.58	-0.91	1.48
Trister, Michael B.	TNR	-1.35	0.78	-2.71	-1.39	0.32	-0.34	1.10	-2.39	-0.38	1.94
Uhler, Lewis K.	HE	1.85	0.61	0.55	1.89	2.88	-0.64	1.08	-2.49	-0.74	1.71
Ulmer, Melville	TNR	-1.56	0.68	-2.79	-1.58	-0.15	-0.03	1.05	-2.10	-0.02	2.08
walz, jay	NYT	-0.61	1.03	-2.63	-0.60	1.40	0.95	0.94	-1.07	1.00	2.68
Wattenberg, Ben	TNR	-1.10	0.88	-2.66	-1.16	0.79	-0.80	1.02	-2.62	-0.88	1.60
Wicker, Tom	NYT	-1.71	0.67	-2.89	-1.70	-0.39	0.85	0.81	-0.83	0.85	2.47
Wieck, Paul R.	TNR	-1.40	0.75	-2.74	-1.44	0.17	-0.21	1.10	-2.28	-0.24	2.09
Williams, C. Dickerman	Review	1.56	0.79	-0.14	1.62	2.86	-0.64	1.12	-2.60	-0.72	1.81
Witcover, Jules	Nation	-1.18	0.70	-2.57	-1.18	0.22	-0.25	0.86	-2.03	-0.23	1.50
Wolfe, Alan	Nation	-1.09	0.69	-2.50	-1.08	0.24	0.07	0.86	-1.74	0.08	1.79
Zion, Roger H., Rep.	HE	1.85	0.62	0.48	1.90	2.87	-0.60	1.07	-2.44	-0.69	1.71
Zwerdling, Daniel	TNR	-1.36	0.77	-2.73	-1.39	0.29	-0.28	1.09	-2.35	-0.31	1.92

Table 2(70): Issue Parameters for 1970 (page 1 of 5)

issue name	alpha					beta1				
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%
18-Year-Old Vote	1.07	2.65	-4.14	1.09	6.20	-0.44	2.15	-4.67	-0.47	3.96
Abortion	0.52	2.49	-4.45	0.55	5.41	-2.76	2.11	-6.94	-2.70	1.27
Academia	1.64	2.24	-2.85	1.61	6.17	-3.43	1.87	-7.26	-3.36	-0.06
Accused/Criminal Rights	4.34	1.77	1.00	4.31	7.59	-1.00	1.76	-5.01	-0.85	2.08
ACLU	0.05	2.66	-5.13	0.03	5.27	-2.28	2.39	-6.93	-2.27	2.58
Agnew, Spiro	-3.35	1.86	-7.15	-3.25	0.09	1.58	1.37	-0.87	1.49	4.55
Anti-Discrimination Laws	1.38	2.32	-3.20	1.37	5.98	-3.06	1.96	-7.09	-2.99	0.69
Anti-War Movement	1.54	2.29	-2.99	1.53	6.11	-3.05	1.91	-7.03	-2.94	0.37
Arms control	2.71	1.81	-0.57	2.58	6.55	-2.27	1.53	-5.59	-2.17	0.52
arts funding	0.14	2.62	-5.06	0.09	5.37	-2.86	1.97	-7.00	-2.74	0.81
Birth Control	0.04	2.67	-5.21	0.05	5.26	-2.48	2.25	-6.94	-2.46	2.13
Black Panthers	-1.39	2.07	-5.64	-1.34	2.60	-3.41	1.73	-7.08	-3.30	-0.40
black politicians	0.19	2.78	-5.31	0.19	5.72	-2.42	2.09	-6.66	-2.33	1.57
Bruce, David	0.97	2.58	-4.13	1.01	6.06	-1.98	2.26	-6.57	-1.93	2.44
Byrd, Harry, Sen.	0.08	2.57	-5.11	0.10	5.09	3.03	1.93	-0.52	2.93	7.01
Cambodia Invasion	1.22	2.07	-2.73	1.16	5.44	2.81	1.81	-0.49	2.69	6.64
Campaign / Equal TV access	2.75	2.41	-2.25	2.84	7.16	-2.11	2.20	-6.71	-1.99	1.87
Carswell, Harold	-1.48	2.14	-5.79	-1.45	2.75	3.29	1.78	0.05	3.17	7.04
Chicago 7	-1.18	2.23	-5.74	-1.11	3.11	-3.25	1.72	-6.92	-3.12	-0.28
China	-1.14	2.49	-6.01	-1.15	3.88	-2.96	2.13	-7.11	-2.95	1.30
Civil Rights Movement	-0.40	2.09	-4.58	-0.36	3.69	-4.03	1.72	-7.41	-3.95	-0.88
Cold War	-0.59	2.24	-5.12	-0.58	3.68	2.79	2.02	-0.94	2.69	6.97
Communism	0.79	2.36	-3.96	0.76	5.58	-3.40	1.87	-7.15	-3.30	0.03
Consumers	0.91	2.38	-3.87	0.89	5.64	-3.23	1.92	-7.08	-3.12	0.28
Cooper-Church Amendment	-0.22	2.47	-5.08	-0.25	4.77	-3.28	1.85	-7.06	-3.19	0.11
Corporations	0.19	2.64	-5.08	0.20	5.35	1.05	2.99	-5.15	1.22	6.54
Counterculture	-1.12	2.07	-5.33	-1.07	2.91	-3.26	1.77	-6.99	-3.13	-0.18
Crime Bills	-0.40	2.42	-5.18	-0.41	4.43	3.23	1.92	-0.44	3.17	7.12
Cuba	1.01	2.85	-4.57	1.01	6.48	-2.02	2.27	-6.64	-1.95	2.24
Davis, Angela	-1.50	2.21	-5.99	-1.46	2.83	-2.76	1.87	-6.71	-2.64	0.71
Defense Spending	0.65	1.90	-3.21	0.66	4.54	3.81	1.78	0.63	3.72	7.35
Desegregation	3.27	1.71	0.32	3.14	6.86	-2.62	1.43	-5.97	-2.43	-0.29
Desegregation -- schools	1.31	2.06	-2.71	1.29	5.54	-3.97	1.69	-7.43	-3.86	-0.98
Douglas, William O.	-0.05	2.51	-4.90	-0.09	4.93	-3.28	1.84	-7.12	-3.15	0.08
Draft Dodgers	-0.69	2.11	-5.00	-0.66	3.51	-3.20	1.77	-6.98	-3.07	-0.07
Education spending	1.33	2.26	-3.17	1.30	5.88	-3.46	1.86	-7.20	-3.35	-0.11
Electoral College	0.99	2.86	-4.77	1.06	6.50	1.86	2.39	-2.85	1.82	6.63
Environmentalism	3.02	1.73	-0.18	2.94	6.67	-3.93	1.58	-7.27	-3.77	-1.23
Extremism	2.34	2.06	-1.75	2.30	6.50	-0.60	1.99	-4.91	-0.47	3.11
Family Assistance Plan	1.31	2.29	-3.35	1.28	5.82	-3.58	1.75	-7.23	-3.44	-0.54
Farm subsidies	-2.59	1.91	-6.64	-2.48	0.90	-0.85	1.58	-4.05	-0.82	2.37
Finch, Robert	-1.53	1.93	-5.61	-1.42	2.00	-0.16	1.63	-3.41	-0.20	3.24
Foreign Aid	-2.33	1.99	-6.46	-2.24	1.34	0.21	1.91	-3.45	0.14	4.29
Free Trade	2.94	1.99	-0.82	2.86	6.94	-0.91	1.53	-4.02	-0.90	2.21
Galbraith, John Kenneth	0.03	2.63	-5.15	0.05	5.29	-2.84	1.99	-6.95	-2.71	0.77
Greece	1.41	2.77	-4.11	1.45	6.69	2.51	2.18	-1.55	2.43	6.90
Gun Control	0.06	2.61	-5.04	0.07	5.22	-2.88	1.97	-6.94	-2.76	0.75
Haynesworth, Clement	-0.01	2.60	-5.16	-0.02	5.15	2.93	1.99	-0.75	2.83	7.05

Table 2(70): Issue Parameters for 1970 (page 2 of 5)

issue name	alpha					beta1				
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%
HEW	0.10	2.66	-5.13	0.12	5.50	-2.78	1.96	-6.80	-2.67	0.89
Hoffman, Julius (Chicago 7 trial)	0.00	2.78	-5.47	0.00	5.60	1.83	2.37	-3.08	1.88	6.44
Income floors	0.23	2.61	-5.04	0.25	5.41	-2.50	2.25	-6.84	-2.48	2.05
Intervention -- Middle East	0.01	2.61	-5.12	0.01	5.25	2.80	1.96	-0.75	2.69	6.89
Israel	2.24	1.28	0.05	2.11	5.16	1.11	1.22	-0.87	0.92	3.96
Labor	0.00					-3.00				
Labor Arbitration	0.05	2.69	-5.28	0.05	5.27	-2.73	2.16	-6.91	-2.71	1.67
Land reform	1.94	2.56	-3.14	1.96	6.81	-1.50	2.70	-6.71	-1.51	3.97
Laos Invasion	-2.32	1.94	-6.35	-2.22	1.22	2.02	1.62	-1.01	1.93	5.49
Legal aid -- Poor	1.06	2.50	-3.94	1.06	5.98	-2.96	1.99	-7.02	-2.88	0.81
Media -- Liberal	0.62	2.11	-3.52	0.58	4.85	-4.07	1.67	-7.38	-3.97	-1.06
Mexico	0.99	2.86	-4.68	1.01	6.47	1.86	2.37	-2.84	1.87	6.55
Military	0.04	2.70	-5.25	0.07	5.40	2.25	2.02	-1.54	2.18	6.47
Military research / academia	-0.54	2.52	-5.56	-0.53	4.47	3.02	1.98	-0.57	2.92	7.11
Military spending	-0.66	2.47	-5.53	-0.64	4.27	3.21	1.91	-0.28	3.12	7.12
National debt	-0.04	2.56	-5.12	-0.03	5.01	-2.86	1.97	-6.91	-2.75	0.78
National Health Care	2.84	2.31	-1.80	2.84	7.21	-2.64	2.13	-6.99	-2.56	1.20
Native Americans	1.08	2.26	-3.42	1.08	5.53	-3.52	1.83	-7.20	-3.44	-0.11
New Left	-1.90	2.00	-6.02	-1.83	1.95	-3.06	1.84	-6.97	-2.94	0.14
Nixon	-2.83	1.62	-6.50	-2.67	-0.14	-0.15	1.35	-2.87	-0.12	2.62
Nixon -- race	-0.23	2.56	-5.36	-0.22	4.80	1.77	2.14	-2.28	1.66	6.23
Penn Transportation Company	-0.72	2.65	-5.92	-0.77	4.56	-1.19	2.18	-5.67	-1.13	3.08
Pesticides	1.02	2.86	-4.72	1.05	6.44	1.81	2.40	-2.94	1.81	6.56
Police	0.30	2.11	-4.03	0.31	4.51	2.17	2.07	-1.77	2.05	6.46
police powers	-1.19	2.43	-5.97	-1.20	3.61	3.05	1.93	-0.47	2.92	7.04
Pollution control	0.64	2.45	-4.21	0.63	5.51	-3.15	1.88	-6.99	-3.05	0.28
Population growth	0.02	2.65	-5.33	0.06	5.12	1.31	2.22	-2.88	1.20	5.99
Pornography	-0.93	2.25	-5.51	-0.88	3.45	-2.64	1.94	-6.76	-2.50	0.76
post office	0.11	2.69	-5.28	0.08	5.52	-2.78	1.95	-6.84	-2.66	0.83
Postal Union	0.70	2.54	-4.29	0.69	5.80	-2.86	1.98	-6.92	-2.75	0.74
Poverty reduction programs	1.30	2.27	-3.17	1.25	5.92	-3.21	1.87	-7.02	-3.11	0.27
preventative detention	-0.13	2.61	-5.23	-0.13	5.02	2.59	2.22	-1.80	2.51	7.01
Price controls	-0.21	1.98	-4.23	-0.20	3.77	-2.11	1.87	-6.22	-1.95	1.25
Privatization	1.91	2.16	-2.26	1.86	6.31	3.00	1.76	0.01	2.84	6.77
Protesters	-0.23	2.53	-5.12	-0.27	4.92	-1.64	2.26	-6.25	-1.56	2.64
public employees	1.38	2.41	-3.39	1.36	6.14	-3.12	1.94	-7.10	-3.01	0.37
public works	0.12	2.56	-4.91	0.11	5.23	-2.74	2.08	-6.88	-2.70	1.32
Railpax	1.07	2.85	-4.62	1.13	6.51	-0.75	2.91	-6.36	-0.78	5.06
Regulations	1.02	2.21	-3.35	1.00	5.36	-3.83	1.72	-7.32	-3.72	-0.80
Rhodesia	-0.46	2.50	-5.33	-0.52	4.62	2.41	2.24	-2.01	2.43	6.83
Rockefeller, Nelson	-0.08	2.66	-5.40	-0.06	5.20	2.16	2.43	-2.88	2.21	6.79
ROTC	-0.04	2.66	-5.30	-0.08	5.16	2.82	1.95	-0.72	2.69	6.94
School Vouchers	0.44	2.57	-4.65	0.43	5.51	3.09	1.92	-0.46	2.98	7.09
Seniority system -- Congress	-0.14	2.55	-5.16	-0.17	4.97	3.10	1.89	-0.36	3.02	6.94
Social Security	0.24	2.69	-5.03	0.23	5.55	-2.29	2.27	-6.79	-2.26	2.19
social spending	1.04	2.84	-4.56	1.10	6.44	-0.85	2.91	-6.39	-0.89	5.05
Soldier freedoms	1.61	2.25	-2.84	1.57	6.18	-3.48	1.83	-7.21	-3.38	-0.24
Soviet dissenters	2.20	2.54	-3.06	2.29	6.97	1.24	2.32	-3.08	1.10	6.13

Table 2(70): Issue Parameters for 1970 (page 3 of 5)

issue name	alpha					beta1				
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%
space program	-0.38	2.72	-5.82	-0.38	4.91	2.34	2.10	-1.76	2.31	6.60
States Rights	-0.10	2.60	-5.30	-0.09	5.00	2.57	2.23	-1.91	2.56	6.95
strict constructionism	-0.72	2.56	-5.74	-0.70	4.45	2.84	1.99	-0.97	2.72	6.96
student protests	1.21	2.23	-3.09	1.16	5.76	-3.65	1.79	-7.28	-3.53	-0.36
Subversive Activites Control Board	-0.33	2.60	-5.56	-0.34	4.92	3.00	1.90	-0.44	2.88	6.93
Supersonic Transport	0.03	2.64	-5.17	0.04	5.29	2.74	2.05	-1.19	2.68	6.90
Taiwan	0.02	2.63	-5.19	0.01	5.24	2.85	1.94	-0.67	2.74	6.90
Taxes	0.49	2.31	-4.09	0.48	5.03	-3.85	1.71	-7.30	-3.75	-0.84
Technology	-0.21	2.62	-5.28	-0.23	5.02	2.75	2.14	-1.36	2.67	6.96
Thurmond, Strom, Sen.	-0.01	2.58	-5.17	0.06	5.01	2.86	2.04	-1.06	2.79	6.97
United Nations	-1.13	2.24	-5.65	-1.14	3.33	-2.77	2.18	-7.00	-2.74	1.63
Vietnam War	1.84	1.71	-1.40	1.76	5.43	3.87	1.58	1.14	3.75	7.21
Vietnam War -- de-escalate	-0.70	2.66	-5.84	-0.73	4.71	-1.00	3.05	-6.62	-1.12	5.25
Vietnam War -- My Lai	0.26	2.57	-4.91	0.26	5.32	3.03	1.93	-0.46	2.93	7.04
Vietnam War -- Vietnamization	2.00	2.05	-1.91	1.94	6.18	3.26	1.70	0.29	3.14	6.89
Vietnam War -- Withdrawal	-1.27	2.00	-5.33	-1.24	2.56	-3.25	1.78	-6.97	-3.14	-0.07
Voting Rights Act of 1965	0.05	2.63	-5.10	0.01	5.21	-2.84	2.01	-6.96	-2.75	0.99
War Powers -- Congress	0.37	2.63	-4.80	0.37	5.63	-3.00	1.91	-7.01	-2.90	0.47
Welfare	0.96	2.14	-3.34	0.94	5.26	-3.95	1.69	-7.32	-3.87	-0.92
Youth	0.89	2.20	-3.42	0.87	5.29	-3.63	1.77	-7.30	-3.51	-0.45

issue name	beta2					classification				
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd	Slope	Intercept	Angle
18-Year-Old Vote	2.80	2.36	-2.34	2.89	7.08	0.90	0.06	0.16	-0.38	9.00
Abortion	1.93	2.44	-2.90	1.91	6.65	0.92	0.06	1.43	-0.27	55.07
Academia	0.97	2.38	-3.58	0.88	5.97	0.94	0.05	3.52	-1.68	74.13
Accused/Criminal Rights	-0.08	1.97	-3.92	-0.15	4.12	0.94	0.05	-11.85	51.33	-85.18
ACLU	1.94	2.48	-3.11	2.00	6.78	0.92	0.06	1.18	-0.02	49.73
Agnew, Spiro	-0.81	2.14	-5.33	-0.73	3.43	0.90	0.06	1.96	-4.14	62.98
Anti-Discrimination Laws	1.25	2.48	-3.50	1.15	6.29	0.93	0.05	2.45	-1.11	67.82
Anti-War Movement	0.71	2.76	-4.92	0.75	6.07	0.93	0.05	4.29	-2.16	76.87
Arms control	2.62	2.17	-1.66	2.61	6.89	0.93	0.04	0.86	-1.03	40.81
arts funding	0.44	3.01	-5.55	0.47	6.21	0.91	0.06	6.44	-0.31	81.17
Birth Control	1.76	2.47	-3.16	1.78	6.61	0.92	0.06	1.41	-0.02	54.69
Black Panthers	-2.18	2.08	-6.57	-2.08	1.65	0.91	0.05	-1.56	-0.64	-57.41
black politicians	-2.23	2.19	-6.58	-2.19	2.10	0.90	0.06	-1.08	0.08	-47.28
Bruce, David	2.40	2.38	-2.49	2.45	6.89	0.92	0.06	0.83	-0.40	39.59
Byrd, Harry, Sen.	-0.58	2.91	-6.18	-0.65	5.24	0.92	0.05	5.22	0.14	79.15
Cambodia Invasion	-2.95	2.17	-7.09	-2.93	1.36	0.91	0.05	0.95	0.41	43.62
Campaign / Equal TV access	0.89	2.32	-3.46	0.75	5.88	0.93	0.05	2.38	-3.10	67.19
Carswell, Harold	-2.10	2.32	-6.72	-2.05	2.49	0.94	0.04	1.57	-0.70	57.46
Chicago 7	-1.88	2.21	-6.48	-1.78	2.39	0.91	0.05	-1.72	-0.62	-59.88
China	0.86	2.38	-3.86	0.86	5.62	0.91	0.06	3.46	1.34	73.87
Civil Rights Movement	0.47	2.16	-3.63	0.37	5.18	0.93	0.05	8.50	0.85	83.29
Cold War	-2.14	2.58	-6.82	-2.23	3.40	0.92	0.05	1.30	-0.28	52.52
Communism	0.94	2.68	-4.52	0.97	6.19	0.93	0.05	3.62	-0.83	74.55

Table 2(70): Issue Parameters for 1970 (page 4 of 5)

issue name	beta2					classification		Slope	Intercept	Angle
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd			
Consumers	0.61	2.77	-4.89	0.61	6.04	0.93	0.05	5.27	-1.49	79.26
Cooper-Church Amendment	0.77	2.86	-5.04	0.80	6.31	0.92	0.05	4.27	0.29	76.81
Corporations	-2.04	2.44	-6.75	-2.06	3.00	0.91	0.06	0.52	0.10	27.27
Counterculture	-2.32	2.05	-6.65	-2.20	1.56	0.91	0.05	-1.40	-0.48	-54.54
Crime Bills	-1.73	2.49	-6.67	-1.70	3.18	0.93	0.05	1.86	-0.23	61.78
Cuba	0.15	3.07	-5.79	0.16	6.10	0.91	0.06	13.42	-6.68	85.74
Davis, Angela	-2.22	2.11	-6.57	-2.15	1.85	0.90	0.06	-1.24	-0.68	-51.22
Defense Spending	-0.54	2.29	-5.40	-0.46	3.89	0.92	0.05	7.08	1.20	81.96
Desegregation	-0.44	2.13	-4.58	-0.54	4.30	0.92	0.04	-5.89	7.35	-80.36
Desegregation -- schools	1.10	2.27	-3.35	1.06	5.85	0.95	0.03	3.60	-1.19	74.46
Douglas, William O.	0.68	2.87	-5.08	0.73	6.29	0.92	0.05	4.84	0.08	78.33
Draft Dodgers	-2.52	2.05	-6.78	-2.42	1.27	0.91	0.05	-1.27	-0.27	-51.74
Education spending	1.32	2.42	-3.36	1.24	6.18	0.94	0.04	2.63	-1.01	69.15
Electoral College	-0.52	3.01	-6.39	-0.57	5.57	0.91	0.06	3.55	1.89	74.29
Enviromentalism	1.02	2.01	-2.95	0.94	5.22	0.96	0.03	3.87	-2.98	75.51
Extremism	-3.09	1.86	-6.98	-2.98	0.28	0.90	0.06	-0.20	0.76	-11.06
Family Assistance Plan	0.83	2.41	-3.78	0.73	5.74	0.94	0.05	4.33	-1.58	76.98
Farm subsidies	1.69	2.65	-4.28	1.90	6.60	0.88	0.07	0.50	1.53	26.70
Finch, Robert	3.15	2.02	-0.58	3.08	7.11	0.87	0.07	0.05	0.49	3.00
Foreign Aid	3.22	1.86	-0.12	3.13	7.12	0.90	0.06	-0.06	0.72	-3.70
Free Trade	2.07	2.39	-2.60	2.04	6.92	0.89	0.06	0.44	-1.42	23.74
Galbraith, John Kenneth	0.54	2.97	-5.37	0.59	6.29	0.91	0.06	5.25	-0.06	79.21
Greece	-0.22	2.81	-5.78	-0.18	5.34	0.92	0.06	11.47	6.45	85.02
Gun Control	0.45	2.98	-5.62	0.49	6.25	0.91	0.06	6.46	-0.13	81.20
Haynesworth, Clement	-0.24	3.02	-6.05	-0.29	5.65	0.91	0.06	12.11	-0.04	85.28
HEW	0.53	3.01	-5.46	0.58	6.35	0.91	0.06	5.29	-0.19	79.29
Hoffman, Julius (Chicago 7 trial)	1.86	2.30	-2.82	1.86	6.41	0.89	0.06	-0.98	0.00	-44.53
Income floors	-0.09	3.06	-6.07	-0.11	5.85	0.91	0.06	-27.06	2.51	-87.88
Intervention -- Middle East	-0.33	3.05	-6.20	-0.35	5.74	0.91	0.06	8.41	0.02	83.22
Israel	1.81	1.88	-1.35	1.60	6.06	0.85	0.07	-0.61	-1.24	-31.42
Labor	0.001					0.93	0.02	3000	0.00	89.98
Labor Arbitration	1.40	2.52	-3.55	1.36	6.41	0.92	0.06	1.95	-0.04	62.89
Land reform	1.46	2.43	-3.21	1.38	6.45	0.92	0.06	1.03	-1.33	45.72
Laos Invasion	-2.72	2.30	-7.09	-2.75	2.04	0.92	0.05	0.74	-0.85	36.55
Legal aid -- Poor	1.33	2.46	-3.43	1.30	6.39	0.92	0.06	2.22	-0.80	65.76
Media -- Liberal	0.76	2.47	-4.21	0.72	5.75	0.94	0.04	5.33	-0.81	79.37
Mexico	-0.49	2.97	-6.21	-0.52	5.51	0.91	0.06	3.82	2.02	75.31
Military	2.56	2.16	-1.80	2.54	6.90	0.90	0.06	-0.88	-0.01	-41.30
Military research / academia	-1.53	2.52	-6.56	-1.50	3.49	0.92	0.05	1.97	-0.35	63.14
Military spending	-0.60	2.90	-6.19	-0.61	5.23	0.92	0.05	5.38	-1.11	79.46
National debt	-0.21	3.00	-5.95	-0.23	5.75	0.91	0.06	-13.87	-0.21	-85.88
National Health Care	0.23	2.11	-3.81	0.16	4.74	0.94	0.04	11.33	-12.17	84.96
Native Americans	1.17	2.38	-3.51	1.11	6.01	0.94	0.05	3.00	-0.92	71.56
New Left	-1.69	2.05	-5.91	-1.60	2.23	0.90	0.06	-1.81	-1.13	-61.10
Nixon	-2.48	2.03	-6.44	-2.46	1.83	0.86	0.07	-0.06	-1.14	-3.45
Nixon -- race	-2.94	2.14	-7.02	-2.94	1.40	0.90	0.06	0.60	-0.08	31.03
Penn Transportation Company	0.02	3.33	-6.20	0.00	6.39	0.88	0.07	66.08	40.18	89.13
Pesticides	-0.53	2.97	-6.30	-0.57	5.35	0.91	0.06	3.41	1.92	73.66
Police	-2.88	2.21	-7.08	-2.86	1.64	0.90	0.06	0.76	0.10	37.06

Table 2(70): Issue Parameters for 1970 (page 5 of 5)

issue name	beta2					classification		Slope	Intercept	Angle
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd			
police powers	-1.46	2.49	-6.41	-1.45	3.55	0.93	0.05	2.08	-0.81	64.35
Pollution control	0.16	2.90	-5.64	0.19	5.75	0.92	0.05	20.17	-4.08	87.16
Population growth	-2.66	2.29	-6.98	-2.67	2.04	0.89	0.06	0.49	0.01	26.16
Pornography	-2.37	2.16	-6.74	-2.28	1.87	0.89	0.06	-1.11	-0.39	-48.09
post office	0.52	2.96	-5.44	0.55	6.23	0.91	0.06	5.38	-0.22	79.48
Postal Union	1.63	2.47	-3.31	1.61	6.53	0.92	0.05	1.75	-0.43	60.29
Poverty reduction programs	0.89	2.82	-4.88	0.93	6.35	0.93	0.05	3.61	-1.47	74.53
preventative detention	-1.28	2.84	-6.53	-1.38	4.62	0.91	0.06	2.03	-0.10	63.72
Price controls	2.08	2.90	-4.71	2.42	6.97	0.89	0.07	1.01	0.10	45.34
Privatization	1.85	2.16	-2.18	1.76	6.31	0.90	0.05	-1.62	-1.03	-58.31
Protesters	-0.15	3.30	-6.22	-0.25	6.31	0.89	0.06	-10.78	-1.49	-84.70
public employees	1.33	2.45	-3.41	1.25	6.25	0.93	0.05	2.36	-1.04	67.02
public works	-0.21	3.04	-6.04	-0.23	5.70	0.91	0.06	-12.95	0.58	-85.58
Railpax	1.80	2.45	-3.03	1.76	6.69	0.91	0.06	0.42	-0.59	22.78
Regulations	1.07	2.38	-3.51	0.99	6.04	0.94	0.04	3.58	-0.95	74.40
Rhodesia	-2.61	2.34	-7.02	-2.68	2.28	0.93	0.05	0.92	-0.18	42.72
Rockefeller, Nelson	-2.07	2.43	-6.73	-2.11	2.86	0.92	0.06	1.04	-0.04	46.22
ROTC	-0.53	2.99	-6.23	-0.59	5.51	0.91	0.06	5.34	-0.08	79.39
School Vouchers	-0.82	2.86	-6.36	-0.88	4.95	0.92	0.05	3.79	0.54	75.20
Seniority system -- Congress	0.09	2.99	-5.87	0.10	5.95	0.92	0.05	-32.81	1.48	-88.25
Social Security	1.91	2.47	-2.97	1.91	6.66	0.92	0.06	1.20	-0.12	50.28
social spending	1.79	2.41	-2.94	1.77	6.61	0.91	0.06	0.47	-0.58	25.34
Soldier freedoms	0.81	2.37	-3.89	0.73	5.73	0.94	0.04	4.32	-1.99	76.96
Soviet dissenters	-0.06	2.99	-5.93	-0.01	5.73	0.91	0.06	20.28	35.98	87.18
space program	2.74	2.08	-1.23	2.67	6.87	0.91	0.05	-0.85	0.14	-40.45
States Rights	-0.84	2.95	-6.40	-0.96	5.26	0.91	0.06	3.05	-0.11	71.83
strict constructionism	-1.69	2.51	-6.59	-1.69	3.41	0.92	0.05	1.68	-0.43	59.24
student protests	1.33	2.39	-3.37	1.29	6.21	0.94	0.04	2.74	-0.91	69.94
Subversive Activites Control Board	-0.47	3.00	-6.31	-0.48	5.53	0.92	0.05	6.38	-0.71	81.09
Supersonic Transport	-1.01	2.86	-6.38	-1.10	4.85	0.91	0.06	2.71	0.03	69.76
Taiwan	-0.24	3.02	-6.02	-0.27	5.81	0.91	0.06	11.89	0.07	85.19
Taxes	-0.16	2.59	-5.44	-0.16	5.11	0.94	0.04	-24.03	3.04	-87.62
Technology	-0.75	2.83	-6.14	-0.81	5.09	0.92	0.06	3.68	-0.29	74.80
Thurmond, Strom, Sen.	-0.89	2.89	-6.37	-0.95	4.88	0.92	0.05	3.23	-0.01	72.80
United Nations	1.18	2.50	-3.74	1.11	6.25	0.91	0.06	2.34	0.95	66.86
Vietnam War	1.41	2.28	-3.17	1.37	6.05	0.92	0.04	-2.75	-1.31	-70.01
Vietnam War -- de-escalate	1.26	2.52	-3.80	1.28	6.21	0.90	0.07	0.79	0.55	38.33
Vietnam War -- My Lai	-0.53	2.92	-6.14	-0.59	5.27	0.92	0.05	5.76	0.50	80.14
Vietnam War -- Vietnamization	2.14	2.07	-1.69	2.04	6.48	0.91	0.05	-1.52	-0.94	-56.73
Vietnam War -- Withdrawal	-2.16	2.02	-6.45	-2.02	1.54	0.91	0.05	-1.50	-0.59	-56.37
Voting Rights Act of 1965	0.63	2.96	-5.35	0.68	6.31	0.91	0.06	4.47	-0.07	77.40
War Powers -- Congress	0.44	2.98	-5.59	0.47	6.24	0.92	0.05	6.75	-0.84	81.58
Welfare	0.99	2.32	-3.49	0.92	5.83	0.95	0.04	3.97	-0.96	75.85
Youth	1.30	2.59	-4.04	1.31	6.33	0.94	0.04	2.80	-0.68	70.36

Table 3(70): Hierarchical Parameters for 1970

Journal	Journal Means									
	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Human Events	1.88	0.27	1.30	1.90	2.34	-0.73	0.78	-1.92	-0.86	0.95
The Nation	-1.00					0.00				
The National Review	1.52	0.43	0.60	1.55	2.28	-0.58	0.72	-1.83	-0.65	0.93
The New Republic	-1.36	0.35	-2.00	-1.37	-0.64	-0.38	0.59	-1.50	-0.39	0.79
The New York Times	-0.40	0.52	-1.40	-0.40	0.66	1.00				
The Wall Street Journal	0.21	0.86	-1.57	0.23	1.84	0.04	0.84	-1.61	0.03	1.69
The Washington Post	-0.70	0.62	-1.84	-0.72	0.58	0.18	0.75	-1.29	0.18	1.59

Journal	Journal Precisions									
	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Human Events	2.76	0.98	1.12	2.67	4.74	2.01	0.96	0.61	1.84	4.28
The Nation	2.01	0.81	0.88	1.84	4.10	1.56	0.85	0.51	1.35	3.83
The National Review	1.68	0.94	0.39	1.49	4.05	1.28	0.82	0.28	1.07	3.46
The New Republic	2.08	0.94	0.72	1.92	4.35	1.32	0.75	0.42	1.12	3.35
The New York Times	0.98	0.63	0.24	0.82	2.66	1.24	0.74	0.32	1.06	3.17
The Wall Street Journal	0.40	0.46	0.02	0.25	1.72	0.59	0.63	0.03	0.38	2.40
The Washington Post	0.92	0.69	0.15	0.73	2.79	0.84	0.69	0.13	0.63	2.71

Table 3(90): Hierarchical Parameters for 1990

Journal	Journal Means									
	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Human Events	-1.00					0.00				
The Nation	1.79	0.28	1.20	1.80	2.31	0.38	0.64	-0.98	0.43	1.52
The National Review	-0.11	0.42	-0.92	-0.11	0.71	-0.34	0.48	-1.25	-0.34	0.62
The New Republic	1.70	0.37	0.94	1.72	2.36	-0.46	0.63	-1.66	-0.46	0.76
The New York Times	-0.23	0.56	-1.30	-0.24	0.91	1.00				
The Wall Street Journal	0.30	1.03	-1.75	0.31	2.26	-0.01	0.96	-1.90	-0.01	1.86

Journal	Journal Precisions									
	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Human Events	2.59	0.97	1.01	2.48	4.63	1.40	0.80	0.40	1.21	3.53
The Nation	1.51	0.73	0.54	1.35	3.45	0.81	0.45	0.28	0.70	2.00
The National Review	2.06	0.99	0.56	1.90	4.34	1.00	0.66	0.25	0.83	2.77
The New Republic	1.18	0.74	0.30	0.99	3.25	0.99	0.66	0.26	0.81	2.81
The New York Times	0.50	0.33	0.11	0.42	1.34	0.88	0.59	0.20	0.73	2.44
The Wall Street Journal	0.27	0.45	0.00	0.10	1.60	0.38	0.55	0.00	0.17	1.98

Table 1(90): Ideal Point Parameters for 1990 (page 1 of 2)

Name	Journal	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
		mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Abrams, Elliott	Review	1.80	0.62	0.53	1.83	2.87	-0.71	99.2%	-2.63	-70.5%	1.244
Anderson, Martin	NYT	0.71	1.06	-1.37	0.70	2.75	1.06	0.95	-0.89	1.10	2.781
Baker, Russell	NYT	0.38	1.22	-2.07	0.38	2.69	0.39	1.09	-1.97	0.46	2.428
Barnes, Fred	TNR	0.13	0.40	-0.63	0.12	0.96	-0.10	0.55	-1.27	-0.08	0.9396
Besharov, Douglas J.	Review	1.52	0.88	-0.55	1.64	2.87	-0.32	1.38	-2.69	-0.41	2.409
Black, George	Nation	-1.29	0.71	-2.67	-1.27	0.08	0.00	1.11	-2.19	0.00	2.245
Blumenthal, Sidney	TNR	-0.64	1.01	-2.56	-0.65	1.46	-0.64	1.18	-2.67	-0.76	2.016
Bookchin, Debbie	Nation	-1.36	0.68	-2.70	-1.35	-0.04	-0.21	0.94	-2.17	-0.20	1.667
Brenner, Lenni	Nation	-1.14	0.79	-2.64	-1.17	0.50	0.36	1.08	-1.88	0.37	2.471
Brookes, Warren T.	HE	1.95	0.55	0.81	1.97	2.88	0.65	1.02	-1.44	0.67	2.571
Brownfeld, Allan C.	NYT	1.83	0.59	0.59	1.86	2.86	0.28	1.07	-1.97	0.32	2.297
Buchanan, Patrick	HE	1.70	0.60	0.52	1.71	2.81	1.19	0.86	-0.62	1.22	2.746
Buckley, Jr, William F.	Review	1.72	0.62	0.48	1.74	2.84	-1.66	0.68	-2.88	-1.67	-0.32
Cato	Review	2.04	0.53	0.94	2.07	2.92	-0.20	1.04	-2.23	-0.20	1.878
Chomsky, Noam	Nation	-0.89	0.72	-2.37	-0.86	0.47	0.34	1.06	-1.87	0.36	2.396
Cockburn, Alexander	Nation	-0.93	0.58	-2.19	-0.89	0.12	1.95	0.57	0.82	1.97	2.922
Corn, David	Nation	-1.45	0.57	-2.68	-1.41	-0.46	-0.99	0.75	-2.57	-0.96	0.4147
Cunningham, Marc	Review	1.65	0.75	0.01	1.72	2.86	-0.87	1.00	-2.67	-0.92	1.261
Easterbrook, Gregg	TNR	-0.71	0.91	-2.57	-0.69	1.08	-0.65	1.03	-2.63	-0.64	1.408
Evans, M. Stanton	HE	1.93	0.51	0.94	1.94	2.87	0.07	0.85	-1.63	0.08	1.75
Feder, Don	Review	1.88	0.57	0.69	1.90	2.87	0.24	1.05	-1.93	0.27	2.253
Fuentes, Carlos	Nation	-1.13	0.80	-2.64	-1.14	0.50	0.49	0.99	-1.47	0.47	2.496
Goulden, Joseph C.	HE	1.81	0.60	0.56	1.85	2.85	0.40	1.07	-1.89	0.43	2.422
Green, Mark	Nation	-1.52	0.63	-2.77	-1.50	-0.34	-0.45	0.85	-2.25	-0.41	1.212
Hart, Jeffrey	HE	1.86	0.59	0.64	1.89	2.88	0.14	1.05	-2.08	0.17	2.113
Hertzberg, Hendrik	TNR	0.51	0.93	-1.28	0.49	2.40	-0.51	1.07	-2.56	-0.52	1.624
Hitchens, Christopher	Nation	-1.50	0.55	-2.67	-1.46	-0.54	0.14	0.85	-1.51	0.11	1.945
Horowitz, David	Review	1.73	0.70	0.24	1.78	2.87	-0.27	1.20	-2.48	-0.31	2.228
Human Events Editors	HE	1.94	0.49	1.01	1.93	2.86	0.47	0.81	-1.09	0.49	2.08
Kaus, Mickey	TNR	-0.54	1.00	-2.47	-0.54	1.56	0.42	0.98	-1.56	0.42	2.412
Kehler, Randy	Nation	-1.15	0.77	-2.65	-1.15	0.34	-0.47	0.92	-2.36	-0.44	1.331
Kilpatrick, James J.	HE	1.93	0.54	0.82	1.95	2.89	0.53	0.98	-1.51	0.54	2.388
Kincaid, Cliff	HE	1.85	0.59	0.62	1.88	2.86	0.45	1.01	-1.63	0.49	2.371
Kirkpatrick, Jeane	HE	1.90	0.56	0.73	1.92	2.88	0.14	1.01	-1.95	0.17	2.099
Kinsley, Michael	TNR	-1.31	0.69	-2.66	-1.29	0.01	-0.13	1.05	-2.26	-0.11	1.999
Klare, Michael	Nation	-0.33	0.89	-2.19	-0.31	1.41	-1.45	0.86	-2.87	-1.51	0.4738
Kondracke, Morton	TNR	0.12	1.01	-1.84	0.09	2.28	-0.49	1.06	-2.56	-0.49	1.692
Kosova, Weston	TNR	-0.11	1.08	-2.27	-0.11	2.06	-0.54	1.06	-2.59	-0.55	1.686
Kramer, Martin	TNR	0.50	1.00	-1.63	0.52	2.47	-0.23	1.24	-2.54	-0.27	2.295
Leach, Rodney	Review	1.67	0.74	0.04	1.74	2.87	-0.58	1.15	-2.64	-0.65	1.861
Kuttner, Robert	TNR	-0.67	0.98	-2.58	-0.68	1.38	1.45	0.78	-0.11	1.47	2.849
Lewis, Anthony	NYT	-1.09	1.10	-2.85	-1.19	1.44	1.06	0.99	-1.09	1.11	2.792
Lewis, Flora	NYT	1.76	0.66	0.34	1.80	2.86	0.88	0.94	-1.12	0.91	2.626
MacShane, Denis	Nation	-1.13	0.74	-2.61	-1.11	0.30	-0.26	0.98	-2.31	-0.23	1.674

Table 1(90): Ideal Point Parameters for 1990 (page 2 of 2)

Name	Journal	First Dimension (x1)					Second Dimension (x2)				
		mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%	mean	sd	2.5%	median	97.5%
Liedl, Mark	HE	1.75	0.73	0.10	1.83	2.89	-1.23	0.95	-2.79	-1.30	0.8488
McGurn, William	Review	0.90	0.65	-0.29	0.85	2.35	0.27	0.98	-1.71	0.25	2.299
Miner, Brad	Review	1.85	0.62	0.55	1.88	2.89	0.03	1.11	-2.09	0.02	2.302
Mohr, Henry	HE	1.61	0.69	0.15	1.66	2.82	-0.12	1.30	-2.47	-0.21	2.459
Muravchik, Joshua	NYT	-0.32	0.92	-2.16	-0.35	1.58	-0.39	1.20	-2.61	-0.42	2.126
Murchison, William	HE	1.73	0.64	0.39	1.76	2.84	0.18	1.07	-1.99	0.20	2.27
Nader, Ralph	Nation	-1.54	0.62	-2.79	-1.51	-0.39	-0.27	0.93	-2.18	-0.26	1.582
National Review Editors	Review	1.95	0.48	1.03	1.94	2.87	0.43	0.82	-1.21	0.44	2.059
Neier, Aryeh	Nation	-1.04	0.83	-2.64	-1.04	0.66	-0.85	1.08	-2.70	-0.94	1.671
NYT Editors	NYT	-1.70	0.52	-2.81	-1.65	-0.82	-0.64	0.69	-2.07	-0.62	0.6649
O'Sullivan, John	Review	1.64	0.71	0.13	1.68	2.85	-0.43	1.09	-2.52	-0.44	1.847
Peretz, Martin	TNR	-0.11	0.91	-1.90	-0.13	1.84	-0.58	0.90	-2.47	-0.55	1.205
Quindlen, Anna	NYT	-1.08	1.05	-2.85	-1.12	1.14	1.37	0.93	-0.80	1.45	2.833
Reese, Charley	HE	1.79	0.60	0.57	1.81	2.85	-0.14	1.00	-2.15	-0.12	1.846
Rivlin, Alice M.	NYT	-0.46	0.90	-2.40	-0.42	1.23	0.80	1.10	-1.67	0.88	2.716
Roberts, Paul Craig	HE	1.83	0.59	0.60	1.86	2.86	0.50	1.04	-1.63	0.53	2.47
Roche, John	Review	1.84	0.64	0.49	1.88	2.90	-0.55	1.15	-2.58	-0.63	1.998
Rosenthal, A.M.	NYT	1.20	0.88	-0.44	1.19	2.83	0.99	0.77	-0.48	0.96	2.542
Rubenstein, Ed	Review	1.77	0.66	0.36	1.81	2.87	-0.29	1.16	-2.47	-0.31	2.111
Rukeyer, Louis	HE	1.84	0.58	0.65	1.86	2.87	0.40	1.08	-1.83	0.41	2.465
Rusher, William A.	HE	1.76	0.64	0.40	1.80	2.86	0.76	1.08	-1.63	0.85	2.635
Safire, William	NYT	1.55	0.76	0.14	1.53	2.89	0.57	0.80	-1.04	0.56	2.21
Schiff, Lawrence	Review	1.79	0.66	0.38	1.83	2.88	-0.31	1.19	-2.51	-0.35	2.147
Schwartz, Herman	Nation	-0.85	0.84	-2.50	-0.86	0.84	-0.68	1.02	-2.59	-0.71	1.484
Sciaroni, Bretton G.	HE	1.90	0.56	0.77	1.92	2.88	0.23	1.05	-1.97	0.26	2.247
Shapiro, Bruce	Nation	-1.08	0.74	-2.63	-1.06	0.28	-0.01	1.17	-2.37	0.02	2.265
Singer, Daniel	Nation	-1.45	0.60	-2.70	-1.42	-0.36	0.46	0.96	-1.67	0.51	2.27
Sullivan, Andrew	TNR	0.29	0.79	-1.24	0.26	2.00	-0.45	1.11	-2.60	-0.43	1.772
The Nation Editors	Nation	-2.16	0.48	-2.94	-2.19	-1.17	0.99	0.81	-0.56	0.95	2.668
TNR Editors	TNR	-0.32	0.26	-0.86	-0.31	0.17	-0.37	0.39	-1.24	-0.34	0.3272
Thomas, Cal	HE	1.82	0.58	0.66	1.84	2.86	0.42	1.02	-1.72	0.45	2.349
Thompson, E.P.	Nation	-1.67	0.66	-2.86	-1.68	-0.32	-0.12	1.12	-2.33	-0.13	2.16
Trillin, Calvin	Nation	-0.75	0.76	-2.28	-0.75	0.75	-0.01	1.13	-2.25	-0.01	2.248
Vidal, Gore	Nation	-1.52	0.67	-2.80	-1.51	-0.21	-0.23	0.95	-2.23	-0.18	1.608
Wauck, John	Review	1.71	0.68	0.27	1.75	2.86	-0.42	1.19	-2.55	-0.49	2.088
Weisberg, Jacob	TNR	-0.19	0.89	-2.05	-0.18	1.64	-0.77	1.04	-2.66	-0.81	1.468
Wicker, Tom	NYT	-1.60	0.71	-2.89	-1.59	-0.22	0.82	0.88	-0.95	0.79	2.595
Wiener, Jon	Nation	-0.83	0.76	-2.40	-0.81	0.60	0.32	1.17	-2.14	0.37	2.522
Williams, Walter E.	HE	1.74	0.66	0.35	1.78	2.86	0.37	1.10	-1.92	0.40	2.486
Williamson, Richard S.	HE	1.73	0.64	0.41	1.76	2.85	0.57	1.00	-1.49	0.60	2.457
Wright, Robert	TNR	-1.00	0.90	-2.70	-1.01	0.83	0.66	0.95	-1.25	0.65	2.541
WSJ Editors	WSJ	1.92	0.62	0.73	1.94	2.94	-0.05	1.00	-2.08	-0.05	1.969

Table 2(90): Issue Parameters for 1990 (page 1 of 4)

issue name	alpha					beta1				
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%
Abortion	1.10	1.93	-2.65	1.03	5.09	-4.24	1.62	-7.49	-4.15	-1.38
Abortion -- parental notification	-0.64	2.71	-5.82	-0.72	4.96	-1.16	2.33	-5.92	-1.13	3.38
Affirmative Action	-2.52	1.75	-6.25	-2.41	0.67	-3.65	1.63	-7.15	-3.50	-0.88
African National Congress	-2.21	1.79	-6.02	-2.11	1.07	-3.57	1.66	-7.08	-3.43	-0.72
AIDS	-1.80	2.02	-6.02	-1.71	2.01	-2.56	2.00	-6.70	-2.48	1.20
AIDS research	0.95	2.25	-3.33	0.88	5.57	-2.67	2.16	-7.01	-2.62	1.41
Allies in Gulf	-0.70	2.19	-5.10	-0.68	3.58	-2.50	2.20	-6.82	-2.48	2.04
Animal Rights	-1.45	2.08	-5.74	-1.39	2.63	-3.24	1.94	-7.19	-3.15	0.36
Anti-Communism (HUAC, etc.)	-2.87	1.93	-6.89	-2.77	0.64	0.78	1.75	-2.78	0.76	4.32
Anti-Discrimination Laws	-0.13	2.35	-4.79	-0.15	4.65	-3.40	1.90	-7.24	-3.28	0.10
Armenian Genocide	-1.12	2.20	-5.63	-1.07	3.11	2.91	2.10	-1.21	2.88	6.99
Arms control	1.18	2.07	-2.70	1.10	5.51	-3.81	1.75	-7.36	-3.71	-0.74
Beggars' rights	-0.26	2.68	-5.49	-0.23	5.02	-3.15	2.01	-7.20	-3.08	0.73
Buchanan, Pat	-0.44	2.55	-5.51	-0.49	4.67	2.16	2.27	-2.32	2.14	6.64
Campaign Finance Reform	1.71	1.35	-0.68	1.60	4.68	-0.42	1.34	-3.44	-0.35	2.19
Castro, Fidel	-0.46	2.41	-5.23	-0.47	4.35	-3.50	1.86	-7.24	-3.42	-0.05
China -- MFN	0.07	2.58	-4.98	0.04	5.22	-2.93	1.99	-6.98	-2.84	0.88
Civil Rights Act of 1990	-2.25	1.81	-6.03	-2.16	1.19	-3.44	1.69	-7.03	-3.32	-0.47
Clean Air Act	0.15	2.37	-4.54	0.15	4.90	-3.53	1.83	-7.17	-3.46	-0.14
Cold War	2.61	1.60	-0.06	2.45	6.20	2.18	1.27	0.14	2.02	5.10
Cold War's End	-0.64	1.69	-4.19	-0.56	2.55	-2.86	1.84	-6.83	-2.67	0.26
Communism	-2.79	1.89	-6.67	-2.72	0.88	-2.65	1.73	-6.51	-2.46	0.21
Conservatism	-0.71	2.47	-5.57	-0.70	4.25	2.89	2.10	-1.24	2.83	7.01
Contraception	0.11	2.56	-4.97	0.12	5.20	-2.76	2.10	-6.95	-2.68	1.35
Criminal Rights	-2.10	2.17	-6.43	-2.04	2.11	-0.02	2.11	-4.62	0.08	3.87
Cuomo, Mario	-0.25	2.49	-5.17	-0.26	4.72	-3.14	1.90	-7.07	-3.05	0.37
D.C. Statehood	0.88	2.13	-3.25	0.82	5.23	-3.00	2.08	-7.10	-2.94	1.07
Death penalty	-0.81	2.34	-5.39	-0.83	3.91	3.61	1.75	0.50	3.49	7.20
Defense Spending	0.06	1.54	-3.02	0.05	3.18	3.97	1.59	1.26	3.85	7.33
Deregulation	-0.31	2.31	-4.92	-0.28	4.34	3.91	1.69	0.92	3.80	7.31
Draft	1.39	2.67	-4.00	1.45	6.59	-0.53	2.91	-6.11	-0.58	5.31
Drug Legalization	-0.35	2.77	-5.78	-0.33	4.96	-1.09	2.08	-5.39	-1.05	2.89
Drug Use	-2.10	2.40	-6.89	-2.08	2.51	1.68	2.47	-3.02	1.60	6.60
Eastern Eurpoe -- Capitalism	-0.14	2.56	-5.26	-0.14	4.95	2.96	1.95	-0.65	2.87	6.93
Education spending	0.72	2.39	-4.00	0.71	5.58	-3.25	1.89	-7.09	-3.15	0.25
El Salvador	-0.79	2.08	-5.04	-0.75	3.29	3.52	1.88	-0.02	3.45	7.24
Environmentalism	1.26	1.55	-1.62	1.18	4.54	-3.02	1.55	-6.53	-2.83	-0.55
Ethnic identity	-0.10	2.66	-5.35	-0.10	5.20	2.65	2.18	-1.76	2.60	6.91
Euthanasia	0.92	2.25	-3.54	0.91	5.50	-2.19	1.76	-5.96	-2.09	1.21
Executive	-1.23	2.29	-6.02	-1.13	3.09	1.48	1.98	-2.38	1.43	5.49
Family and Medical Leave Act	0.82	2.11	-3.18	0.76	5.09	-3.33	1.93	-7.18	-3.24	0.30
Feminism	1.51	1.87	-1.92	1.39	5.53	-0.10	1.79	-3.99	-0.01	3.43
Flag burning amendment	-2.30	2.00	-6.31	-2.26	1.68	2.98	1.66	0.22	2.80	6.76
Foreign Aid	1.43	2.27	-3.02	1.41	6.02	-1.48	2.51	-6.48	-1.40	3.26
Foreign Aid -- Soviet Union	0.36	2.81	-5.27	0.44	5.79	-0.83	2.11	-5.11	-0.83	3.29
Free markets	-1.41	2.04	-5.50	-1.40	2.69	4.26	1.62	1.38	4.17	7.48
Free Trade	3.23	1.74	0.09	3.13	6.85	1.16	1.73	-2.18	1.10	4.83
Gay Rights	-0.17	1.80	-3.75	-0.22	3.47	-3.83	1.76	-7.38	-3.73	-0.77

Table 2(90): Issue Parameters for 1990 (page 2 of 4)

issue name	alpha					beta1				
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%
German Reunification	2.61	1.56	0.02	2.42	6.19	-0.41	1.25	-3.03	-0.35	2.08
Global warming	-2.08	2.05	-6.47	-1.98	1.70	0.86	1.76	-2.71	0.85	4.45
Gorbachev, Mikhail	-1.96	1.38	-5.15	-1.80	0.34	-0.91	1.48	-4.19	-0.79	1.94
Government spending	-2.91	1.86	-6.78	-2.85	0.58	-3.25	1.70	-6.94	-3.07	-0.37
Guatemala -- Elections	0.90	2.15	-3.28	0.87	5.31	-3.32	1.89	-7.15	-3.25	0.17
Hate crimes laws	-1.36	2.23	-5.91	-1.29	3.01	-2.01	2.02	-6.31	-1.89	1.78
Health Care -- Universal	0.71	2.32	-3.96	0.74	5.31	-3.46	1.84	-7.20	-3.37	-0.15
Homeless aid	-0.37	2.47	-5.22	-0.39	4.53	-3.17	1.93	-7.05	-3.08	0.38
Intervention -- Cambodia	0.42	2.79	-5.12	0.47	5.88	0.17	2.08	-4.12	0.20	4.22
Intervention -- Eastern Europe	-2.30	2.01	-6.35	-2.26	1.65	-2.87	1.75	-6.56	-2.77	0.33
Intervention -- Latin America	-1.03	2.14	-5.36	-1.01	3.12	4.13	1.66	1.18	4.04	7.44
Intervention -- Soviet Union	1.32	2.45	-3.57	1.34	6.12	-0.63	2.01	-4.60	-0.67	3.60
Invasion of Panama	0.15	1.33	-2.39	0.10	2.96	2.18	1.53	-0.29	1.96	5.73
Iran-Contra	-1.01	2.27	-5.53	-0.96	3.44	3.91	1.69	1.00	3.77	7.31
Iraq - Sanctions	2.48	1.88	-0.92	2.32	6.53	-0.13	1.61	-3.53	-0.09	2.99
Israel	0.26	0.99	-1.88	0.29	2.13	1.61	1.12	-0.09	1.42	4.37
Jackson, Jesse	-0.98	2.42	-5.73	-0.97	3.83	-3.39	1.81	-7.15	-3.25	-0.20
Judicial activism	-0.79	2.52	-5.77	-0.74	4.16	-3.41	1.91	-7.23	-3.34	0.21
Labor	0.00					-3.00				
Liberalism	0.26	2.58	-4.93	0.29	5.38	-2.56	2.25	-6.94	-2.51	1.89
Low-income housing	1.08	2.40	-3.81	1.06	5.82	-3.43	1.87	-7.17	-3.34	0.04
Media -- ethics	-0.60	2.17	-5.00	-0.58	3.65	-0.29	2.07	-4.37	-0.34	4.02
Motor Voter	2.33	1.82	-0.84	2.16	6.38	-1.92	1.37	-5.02	-1.77	0.38
multiculturalism	1.52	2.17	-2.77	1.49	5.87	-3.03	1.88	-6.98	-2.90	0.45
Nuclear Weapons	-2.16	2.12	-6.51	-2.11	1.91	0.58	1.75	-2.99	0.60	4.20
Offensive Art/Music (NEA)	0.60	1.89	-2.89	0.54	4.51	-4.37	1.61	-7.52	-4.28	-1.52
Oil Industry	-1.36	2.38	-6.07	-1.37	3.45	3.39	1.86	-0.01	3.28	7.16
Perestroika	-2.91	1.88	-6.80	-2.83	0.54	-1.54	1.81	-5.32	-1.47	2.01
Police	-0.27	2.70	-5.47	-0.33	5.24	-0.93	2.39	-5.79	-0.87	3.64
Political Correctness	-3.36	1.56	-6.70	-3.22	-0.69	-2.41	1.45	-5.64	-2.28	0.13
Privatizing Social Security	0.03	2.63	-5.21	0.06	5.17	3.19	1.92	-0.35	3.11	7.04
Puerto Rican Statehood	0.87	2.25	-3.49	0.82	5.50	-2.24	2.46	-6.85	-2.27	2.82
Sandinistas	-3.17	1.70	-6.78	-3.06	-0.08	-2.03	1.53	-5.36	-1.95	0.77
Social Security	0.10	2.57	-4.98	0.11	5.26	-2.77	2.04	-6.90	-2.71	1.09
Socialism	-0.71	2.36	-5.42	-0.69	3.95	-3.60	1.81	-7.29	-3.52	-0.31
South Africa -- Power sharing	-1.41	2.68	-6.47	-1.47	4.01	0.19	3.05	-5.85	0.21	6.02
Soviet Union	-2.96	1.71	-6.63	-2.80	-0.02	-2.06	1.53	-5.55	-1.89	0.47
Soviet Union -- dissolution	3.12	1.61	0.28	3.01	6.58	3.15	1.59	0.51	3.00	6.62
Taxes	1.54	1.64	-1.53	1.43	5.07	-4.44	1.55	-7.47	-4.35	-1.65
Taxes -- capital gains	-0.55	1.69	-3.92	-0.54	2.78	-3.88	1.70	-7.33	-3.76	-0.89
Taxes -- progressive	1.24	2.19	-3.19	1.26	5.57	-3.02	2.11	-7.11	-2.97	1.21
Taxes -- FICA	-3.82	1.65	-7.22	-3.72	-0.88	0.72	1.32	-1.93	0.72	3.36
Term Limits	0.40	2.32	-4.29	0.40	5.11	3.39	1.84	0.13	3.29	7.19
Tobacco	-0.40	2.50	-5.28	-0.43	4.60	3.00	2.02	-0.80	2.91	7.07
War with Iraq	1.56	1.38	-0.76	1.43	4.73	1.74	1.37	-0.56	1.59	4.83
Welfare	1.27	2.30	-3.21	1.21	5.93	-2.58	2.33	-7.00	-2.57	2.15

Table 2(90): Issue Parameters for 1990 (page 3 of 4)

issue name	beta2					classification		Slope	Intercept	Angle
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd			
Abortion	0.45	2.22	-3.96	0.40	5.00	0.94	0.04	9.48	-2.45	83.98
Abortion -- parental notification	2.01	2.84	-4.47	2.27	6.94	0.90	0.06	0.58	0.32	30.00
Affirmative Action	0.37	2.34	-4.32	0.35	5.01	0.93	0.04	9.93	6.86	84.25
African National Congress	0.26	2.46	-4.68	0.23	5.21	0.93	0.04	13.95	8.63	85.90
AIDS	-0.16	3.00	-6.01	-0.19	5.88	0.91	0.06	-15.81	-11.07	-86.38
AIDS research	-1.07	2.89	-6.51	-1.18	4.90	0.91	0.06	-2.50	0.89	-68.19
Allies in Gulf	1.27	2.69	-4.44	1.31	6.43	0.91	0.06	1.97	0.55	63.08
Animal Rights	0.82	2.69	-4.91	0.91	5.95	0.93	0.05	3.97	1.78	75.85
Anti-Communism (HUAC, etc.)	-2.86	1.96	-6.84	-2.78	0.81	0.89	0.06	0.27	-1.00	15.15
Anti-Discrimination Laws	-1.08	2.72	-6.34	-1.07	4.38	0.93	0.05	-3.16	-0.12	-72.44
Armenian Genocide	1.22	2.87	-4.57	1.27	6.54	0.92	0.06	-2.40	0.92	-67.35
Arms control	-0.11	2.58	-5.25	-0.13	5.06	0.93	0.05	-35.98	11.15	-88.41
Beggars' rights	1.37	2.37	-3.30	1.34	6.17	0.92	0.05	2.29	0.19	66.41
Buchanan, Pat	1.32	2.93	-4.89	1.50	6.56	0.91	0.06	-1.64	0.33	-58.64
Campaign Finance Reform	-3.25	2.08	-7.24	-3.22	0.83	0.86	0.07	-0.13	0.53	-7.37
Castro, Fidel	-0.35	2.76	-5.98	-0.34	5.21	0.93	0.05	-10.04	-1.33	-84.31
China -- MFN	-0.41	2.97	-6.02	-0.47	5.60	0.92	0.06	-7.12	0.16	-82.01
Civil Rights Act of 1990	0.52	2.62	-4.82	0.48	5.77	0.93	0.04	6.61	4.32	81.40
Clean Air Act	-0.90	2.71	-6.18	-0.94	4.69	0.93	0.05	-3.91	0.17	-75.66
Cold War	-1.23	2.03	-5.60	-1.08	2.55	0.89	0.06	1.78	2.13	60.63
Cold War's End	-0.39	2.62	-5.63	-0.44	4.98	0.90	0.06	-7.37	-1.66	-82.27
Communism	0.70	2.67	-4.78	0.79	5.86	0.92	0.05	3.77	3.98	75.13
Conservatism	0.84	2.81	-4.77	0.84	6.29	0.92	0.06	-3.42	0.84	-73.70
Contraception	-0.97	2.87	-6.42	-1.04	4.82	0.92	0.06	-2.84	0.11	-70.60
Criminal Rights	0.06	3.36	-6.08	-0.09	6.46	0.89	0.07	0.28	36.08	15.43
Cuomo, Mario	-0.43	2.90	-6.08	-0.41	5.29	0.92	0.05	-7.30	-0.57	-82.20
D.C. Statehood	-1.65	2.66	-6.65	-1.71	3.80	0.92	0.05	-1.81	0.53	-61.12
Death penalty	-0.95	2.50	-6.12	-0.93	4.11	0.93	0.05	3.79	-0.85	75.21
Defense Spending	2.46	1.68	-0.48	2.33	6.27	0.94	0.04	-1.61	-0.02	-58.21
Deregulation	0.39	2.65	-4.94	0.38	5.65	0.94	0.04	-9.94	0.78	-84.26
Draft	0.49	2.95	-5.46	0.54	6.15	0.91	0.06	1.09	-2.86	47.50
Drug Legalization	-3.19	2.03	-7.25	-3.12	0.68	0.90	0.06	-0.34	-0.11	-18.88
Drug Use	0.87	2.90	-4.97	0.91	6.50	0.92	0.06	-1.93	2.42	-62.58
Eastern Eurpoe -- Capitalism	-0.13	2.94	-5.95	-0.15	5.66	0.92	0.06	22.52	-1.06	87.46
Education spending	-0.77	2.84	-6.18	-0.82	5.01	0.92	0.05	-4.22	0.93	-76.66
El Salvador	1.23	2.66	-4.19	1.22	6.45	0.93	0.05	-2.86	0.65	-70.74
Environmentalism	-3.38	1.73	-7.06	-3.22	-0.42	0.92	0.05	-0.89	0.37	-41.80
Ethnic identity	-0.95	2.82	-6.35	-1.03	4.82	0.91	0.06	2.80	-0.11	70.33
Euthanasia	-3.26	1.91	-7.10	-3.16	0.20	0.91	0.06	-0.67	0.28	-33.93
Executive	3.15	2.08	-0.90	3.13	7.14	0.89	0.06	-0.47	0.39	-25.16
Family and Medical Leave Act	-1.19	2.85	-6.70	-1.25	4.63	0.93	0.05	-2.79	0.68	-70.27
Feminism	-2.32	2.66	-6.87	-2.54	4.29	0.87	0.08	-0.04	0.65	-2.42
Flag burning amendment	0.20	2.84	-5.59	0.30	5.60	0.91	0.06	-15.18	11.70	-86.23
Foreign Aid	2.21	2.38	-2.97	2.26	6.73	0.90	0.06	0.67	-0.65	33.92
Foreign Aid -- Soviet Union	1.80	2.84	-4.66	2.02	6.86	0.87	0.07	0.46	-0.20	24.77
Free markets	-0.74	2.09	-5.21	-0.65	3.28	0.94	0.04	5.73	-1.90	80.09
Free Trade	-3.07	1.73	-6.81	-2.89	-0.14	0.91	0.05	0.38	1.05	20.69
Gay Rights	-0.50	2.54	-5.70	-0.50	4.55	0.93	0.05	-7.71	-0.35	-82.61

Table 2(90): Issue Parameters for 1990 (page 4 of 4)

issue name	beta2					classification		Slope	Intercept	Angle
	mean	sd	2.50%	median	97.50%	mean	sd			
German Reunification	-2.85	1.77	-6.74	-2.65	0.14	0.87	0.07	-0.14	0.92	-8.22
Global warming	0.67	3.24	-5.75	0.87	6.55	0.87	0.07	-1.29	3.12	-52.19
Gorbachev, Mikhail	-1.34	3.07	-6.72	-1.68	5.39	0.88	0.07	-0.67	-1.46	-33.96
Government spending	-1.19	2.18	-5.52	-1.20	3.32	0.93	0.04	-2.72	-2.44	-69.81
Guatemala -- Elections	-0.87	2.83	-6.42	-0.85	4.84	0.92	0.05	-3.81	1.03	-75.29
Hate crimes laws	-1.36	3.15	-6.81	-1.66	5.28	0.91	0.06	-1.47	-0.99	-55.81
Health Care -- Universal	-0.86	2.75	-6.31	-0.85	4.69	0.93	0.05	-4.01	0.82	-75.99
Homeless aid	-0.54	2.82	-6.13	-0.55	5.00	0.92	0.05	-5.82	-0.67	-80.26
Intervention -- Cambodia	-2.84	2.32	-7.18	-2.85	1.93	0.90	0.07	0.06	0.15	3.35
Intervention -- Eastern Europe	-1.49	1.85	-5.56	-1.34	1.82	0.91	0.06	-1.93	-1.55	-62.62
Intervention -- Latin America	-0.87	2.11	-5.37	-0.78	3.14	0.94	0.04	4.74	-1.18	78.08
Intervention -- Soviet Union	1.97	2.95	-4.69	2.31	6.92	0.88	0.07	0.32	-0.67	17.66
Invasion of Panama	-3.18	1.95	-7.10	-3.08	0.34	0.89	0.07	0.69	0.05	34.44
Iran-Contra	-0.55	2.21	-5.14	-0.48	3.74	0.93	0.05	7.07	-1.82	81.95
Iraq - Sanctions	2.38	2.21	-2.05	2.34	6.79	0.88	0.07	0.06	-1.04	3.17
Israel	-1.65	1.52	-5.51	-1.35	0.59	0.84	0.07	0.97	0.16	44.17
Jackson, Jesse	-0.06	2.74	-5.50	-0.08	5.43	0.93	0.05	-56.51	-16.31	-88.99
Judicial activism	1.47	2.16	-2.65	1.40	5.97	0.93	0.05	2.32	0.54	66.71
Labor	0.001							3000	0.00	89.98
Liberalism	2.06	2.40	-2.66	2.01	6.76	0.93	0.03	1.24	-0.13	51.22
Low-income housing	0.96	2.32	-3.57	0.84	5.82	0.91	0.06	3.56	-1.12	74.31
Media -- ethics	3.28	1.98	-0.41	3.21	7.21	0.92	0.05	0.09	0.18	5.02
Motor Voter	0.74	2.73	-4.96	0.80	6.00	0.89	0.07	2.60	-3.16	68.97
multiculturalism	-1.04	2.82	-6.42	-1.11	4.71	0.87	0.07	-2.92	1.47	-71.10
Nuclear Weapons	-3.26	2.01	-7.24	-3.18	0.50	0.92	0.05	0.18	-0.66	10.16
Offensive Art/Music (NEA)	-0.25	2.27	-4.74	-0.30	4.45	0.89	0.06	-17.31	2.36	-86.69
Oil Industry	-0.74	2.35	-5.68	-0.57	3.57	0.95	0.04	4.61	-1.84	77.77
Perestroika	0.68	2.75	-4.75	0.67	6.12	0.92	0.06	2.27	4.29	66.25
Police	-0.83	3.25	-6.61	-1.07	5.67	0.91	0.06	-1.12	-0.33	-48.18
Political Correctness	2.52	1.63	-0.29	2.40	6.16	0.90	0.07	0.96	1.33	43.70
Privatizing Social Security	-0.83	2.59	-5.96	-0.79	4.32	0.92	0.04	3.82	0.04	75.34
Puerto Rican Statehood	-1.74	2.72	-6.81	-1.83	3.94	0.92	0.06	-1.29	0.50	-52.16
Sandinistas	2.90	1.76	-0.14	2.77	6.74	0.91	0.06	0.70	1.09	34.93
Social Security	-0.82	2.94	-6.43	-0.90	5.19	0.92	0.04	-3.36	0.12	-73.44
Socialism	0.58	2.48	-4.31	0.55	5.70	0.92	0.06	6.17	1.21	80.80
South Africa -- Power sharing	0.85	2.89	-5.04	0.96	6.26	0.93	0.05	-0.23	1.66	-12.91
Soviet Union	-1.48	2.32	-5.63	-1.64	4.26	0.91	0.06	-1.40	-2.01	-54.38
Soviet Union -- dissolution	1.71	1.75	-1.38	1.58	5.52	0.90	0.06	-1.84	-1.83	-61.49
Taxes	-0.48	2.26	-5.03	-0.45	4.01	0.93	0.04	-9.26	3.21	-83.84
Taxes -- capital gains	-1.31	2.44	-6.09	-1.31	3.75	0.95	0.03	-2.97	-0.42	-71.39
Taxes -- progressive	-0.09	2.73	-5.71	0.03	5.21	0.94	0.04	-32.63	13.37	-88.24
Taxes -- FICA	-2.83	1.69	-6.49	-2.71	0.16	0.92	0.05	0.26	-1.35	14.35
Term Limits	-0.76	2.71	-6.09	-0.78	4.86	0.90	0.05	4.48	0.53	77.41
Tobacco	1.11	2.85	-4.61	1.16	6.56	0.92	0.05	-2.70	0.36	-69.66
War with Iraq	-3.14	1.78	-6.99	-2.97	-0.21	0.92	0.05	0.55	0.50	29.02
Welfare	1.04	2.67	-4.31	1.05	6.20	0.88	0.06	2.48	-1.22	68.00

Table 4: Percent Correctly Classified, 1970 and 1990

Percent of all issue positions (or votes) correctly predicted by the model.

	1970	1990
1 Dimensional Model	88.6%	86.6%
2 Dimensional Model	91.6%	91.2%
U.S. House of Representatives 2 Dimensional NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997)	86.1%	88.2%

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MCMC Parameter Estimates

Tables 1 through 3 report parameter estimates from the MCMC estimation of the item response model. Bayesian estimation generates a posterior distribution for all parameters. The mean of these distributions are used here as the best point estimate. Also reported are the standard deviation of the posterior, the 2.5% and 97.5% fences for a 95% interval, and the median of the distribution. Figures 1 through 7 are based on means and standard deviations.

Key to abbreviations

Human Events	HE
The National Review	Review
The New Republic	TNR
The Wall Street Journal	WSJ
The New York Times	NYT
The Washington Post	Post
The Nation	Nation