Testing Institutional and Intergovernmental Theories of Power at Europe’s Intergovernmental Conferences

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Draft April 18, 2006

Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2006

Word count: 9,578

Abstract:
The design of political institutions has extraordinary consequences for policy-making. However, political scientists lack a clear understanding of how actors collectively reach decisions about institutions. I examine how member states design political institutions in the European Union (EU), where key institutional changes are decided at the Union's intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). Using data from the IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, I test competing bargaining theories, institutionalism and intergovernmentalism, against each other, and present strong evidence that institutionalism better captures negotiations at IGCs compared to intergovernmentalism. To do so, I present a formal model to discern between these competing theories of bargaining power, derive a statistical model directly from this formal model, and then I use data from EU’s Treaty of Amsterdam to test these theories and corresponding power sources. Veto power associated with institutional models better explains IGC outcomes compared to power from size and economic might, often associated with intergovernmental analyses.
1. Introduction

Debates over the design of political institutions have extraordinary consequences for policy-making. However, political scientists lack a clear understanding of how actors collectively reach decisions about institutions. Because they are difficult to change, decisions to alter institutions have lasting impacts, and losing on a key issue of institutional design can disadvantage an actor in countless future negotiations. Nowhere is this truer than in the European Union (EU), where key institutional changes historically have been decided at the Union's intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). Ever since the founding treaties of Rome, the EU’s most important institutional changes have come at IGCs, including the reform of legislative procedures (Crombez 1996, Garrett 1992, Moser 1996, Tsebelis 1994, 1996), changes to Council’s weighted voting system (Hosli 1993, Tsebelis and Yataganas 2002) and the creation of an investiture process for the European Commission (Hix 2002). Despite the tremendous significance of IGC negotiations, scholarship on the EU has lagged behind in its efforts to understand IGC bargaining. I explain how IGC bargaining works in the EU by examining which member states get what they want in negotiations with their fellow member states and why.

There are two main competing theories about the power available to actors in EU negotiations- institutional theory, which relies on spatial analyses and stresses veto power (Tsebelis 2002), and intergovernmental theory (Moravscik 1993, 1998), which focuses on resources and economic power. Institutional theory suggests that because all states must assent to and ratify any EU treaty before it comes into force, member states with a preference for the status quo can threaten to veto any treaty which pushes integration too far. Thus, the right to veto is a source of power for those member states with a preference
for the status quo. Intergovernmentalists, on the other hand, argue that member state size and resources, not veto rights, provide the primary source of power to member states at IGCs. In this model, member states with larger populations and economies (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) shape bargaining outcomes because they can force their preferences onto smaller member states. I formalize these two approaches, demonstrate that they offer competing theories of bargaining power, and then test these theories against one another using data from the negotiations leading to the EU’s 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. This approach will provide answers to several important puzzles that plague traditional analyses of IGC bargaining, such as what leads member states to choose one set of institutional arrangements over another when multiple institutional arrangements could promote integration? And when and how can small states get what they want in negotiations with larger states? Moreover, this approach can provide insights into bargaining over the design of other federal institutions, such as the United States’ Constitution, and international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization or the United Nations, which have been plagued by conflicts between large and small member states.

I first review the current state of the literature on bargaining in the European Union. Next, I formally demonstrate when institutional and intergovernmental sources of power make competing predictions about IGC bargaining outcomes, and present a statistical model to discern which type of power is more important at international treaty negotiations. Using data on member state preferences from the EU’s 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, my findings suggest that veto rights are a much more important source of
power than resources, confirming institutional theory while casting doubt on intergovernmentalism.

2. EU integration and intergovernmental conferences

Studies of EU integration have historically employed one of three competing theories, intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and institutionalism. Of these theories, however, only intergovernmentalism and institutionalism are applicable to the study of intergovernmental conferences. Neofunctionalism fails to make predictions about IGC bargaining because it seeks to explain EU integration by examining the creeping competences of EU institutions. Studies in this tradition focus on daily politics in the EU while ignoring bargaining at IGCs (Haas 1958, Burley and Mattli 1993, Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996, Sandholtz and Sweet 1997).

Studies in the intergovernmental tradition, on the other hand, focus almost exclusively on IGCs, but pay significantly less attention to the role of EU institutions in daily politics. Instead, they explain EU integration on basis of “grand bargains” between the largest, and supposedly, by virtue of their size, most powerful, member states (Magnette and Nicolaidis 2004, Moravcsik 1993, 1998, Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999). These studies tend to focus on substantive, non-institutional IGC bargains, such as decisions over monetary union, and view the EU’s institutions a method for credibly committing to EU integration (Moravcsik 1998) or as agents of member states (Pollack 2003). Intergovernmentalism often overlooks the fact that there are any number of

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1 Other studies in the intergovernmentalist tradition have examined the legislative decision making process in the EU, but instead of analyzing the interaction between EU institutions, they focus on the EU Council of Ministers and make prediction based on power indices (Brams and Affuso 1985, Hosli 1993, Widgren 1994). This approach has been subject to trenchant critiques by institutionalists (e.g. Garrett and Tsebelis 1996).
institutional arrangements which could create credible commitments, and that the precise choices that member states make on institutional issues, such as how to weight votes in the Council of Ministers, empower some member states and supranational actors relative to others (Rodden 2002). Lastly, by ignoring debates over institutions, intergovernmentalists overlook some of the most controversial and important decisions reached at IGCs, such as the revision of legislative decision-making rules (Garrett 1992).

Institutionalist scholars, who analyze EU politics as a function of actors’ preferences and institutional constraints, offer strong critiques of both neofunctional and intergovernmental approaches. Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) argue that neofunctionalism focuses on institutions as actors who drive integration forward, but fails to examine institutional constraints, which, along with actors’ strategies, lead to equilibrium outcomes. In addition, neofunctionalism, precisely because it is unconcerned with institutional constraints, fails to examine IGC bargaining where the member states negotiate these constraints. Likewise, intergovernmentalism, by discounting the role of institutions, misses key aspects of IGCs, at which some of the most important and contentious arguments arise over issues of institutional design. Moreover, because they ignore institutional constraints, most intergovernmental studies fail to capture important sources of power addressed in spatial bargaining models such as distance to the status quo and veto power.

the one hand, such a move is laudable. As Tsebelis and Garrett write, “it is simply impossible to analyze institutional choice without first understanding institutional consequences” (2001, p386). On the other hand, this has left a sizeable gap in the literature. Although we now have a good understanding of how institutions in the EU work, there is significantly less theorizing about how member states choose these institutions.

Outside the EU, international relations literature has recently moved beyond simply explaining the existence of international organizations (e.g. Alexrod 1984, Keohane 1984, Oye 1986) to examine how rational member states make collective choices about the institutional rules which govern international organizations (Bräuninger and König 1999, Koremenos 2005, 2001, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). These studies find that there is a rational basis for the rules which govern international organizations. Likewise, work on IGCs has begun to study how member states make choices over the rules which govern the EU. These studies tend to examine which member states perform well at the bargaining table and which perform worse (Hosli 2000, Hug and König 2002, König and Hug 2000, König and Slapin 2004, Magnette and Nicolaidis 2004, Moravscik 1998, Moravscik and Nicolaidis 1999, Schneider and Cederman 1994, Slapin 2006). Much of this literature has been based on spatial models, while other studies have drawn on the intergovernmentalist tradition, but there have been very few serious efforts to test these approaches against one another (see Slapin 2006). In this paper, I present a method for extending institutional analyses beyond daily EU politics to IGCs. I test these institutional predictions about the design of EU institutions against intergovernmental predictions. In doing so, I also present methods for formalizing
intergovernmental arguments about IGCs, which, to date, have not been formalized. In addition, my analysis adds to the growing literature on the rational design of international organizations by identifying the relevant sources of bargaining power for member states designing international organizations.

3. A spatial model of bargaining

Although institutionalism and intergovernmentalism often make competing predictions about IGC outcomes, these approaches are best understood as special cases of one general spatial model. When member state preferences are sufficiently close to one another and sufficiently far from the status quo, the predictions of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism are likely to be indistinguishable, at least on the non-institutional issues discussed by both theories. However, when one or more member states lie close to the status quo relative to the other member states, the predictions made by the two models diverge.

Figure 1 portrays a one dimensional space where three actors, A, B, and C, are bargaining over how to alter the status quo. I present two preference configurations to demonstrate when intergovernmentalism and institutional theory make different predictions. In scenario 1 of figure 1, assume \( 2^*|A - SQ| > C \). When this condition holds and there is no agenda-setter, the spatial approach predicts a bargaining outcome somewhere on the bargaining line between points A and C.\(^2\) Intergovernmentalism would also make a prediction on the bargaining line between A and C, likely one which reflects

\(^2\) An agenda setter could clarify prediction of the spatial model, however it is very difficult to know who the agenda setter at intergovernmental conferences is (see König and Slapin 2004).
a weighted average of the resources of the three member states. Under this preference configuration it would be very difficult to distinguish between these two theories. In scenario 2, assume $2\times|A-SQ|<B$. Under this preference configuration, the institutional approach would predict an outcome within the unanimity winset of the status quo, $2\times|A-SQ|$. The intergovernmental approach, however, does not necessarily predict an outcome within the winset. When B or C has a large number of resources relative to A, the prediction of the intergovernmental model will lie outside the winset of the status quo. For example, we can assume that B is Germany and C is France, while A is Denmark. Intergovernmentalism would predict a bargaining outcome on the bargaining line between the positions of Germany and France, making Denmark worse off compared to the status quo. Institutionalism, on the other hand, predicts that, at worst, Denmark will be indifferent between the bargaining outcome and the status quo. Here the approaches make competing predictions which can be tested against one another.

From this spatial model, I derive a statistical model that I apply to data collected on the IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam. I examine the probability that negotiators choose a specific constitutional outcome, $x$, from the set of possible outcomes, $X$, on each of $n$ issues discussed at the negotiations. Each member state faces the following choice problem: choose to support alternative $x$ on issue $i$ or choose to support the status quo. In the data I use, for most issues there are only two alternatives for each issue, support the status quo or support the inclusion of the issue in the final treaty draft. I assume that actors derive higher utilities from supporting issues closer to their ideal point. Using quadratic utility functions, the utility to actor A for each of these choices is as follows:
where $SQ$ represents the position of the status quo and $X$ represents the position of the alternative to the status quo. A will choose $X$ whenever $A$ prefers $X$ to $SQ$. For this to hold,

$$A > \frac{SQ + X}{2}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

We can rewrite this inequality as the following equation:

$$A - \frac{SQ + X}{2} - P = 0.$$ \hspace{1cm} (2)

Here, $P$ provides a straightforward way to assess $A$’s support for the alternative $X$. For $P > 0$ $A$ chooses $X$, otherwise $A$ chooses $SQ$. Institutional theory suggests that when $P < 0$, the magnitude of $P$ represents the “cost” to the other member states for buying $A$’s support on that issue. $P$ is only a function of the member state’s relative distance between $SQ$ and $X$. It is not at all related to $A$’s size or resources. Because $A$ loses if $X$ is chosen over the status quo, $A$’s negotiating partners must compensate $A$ for its support, and if they do not compensate $A$, $A$ can veto the treaty. This compensation may take the form of side payments or logrolls. From equation 2, we can also see that as $A$ becomes small (that is, $A$’s position moves closer to the status quo), $P$ grows more negative, all else equal. In other words, as $A$’s preference moves closer to the status quo, $A$’s negotiating partners must compensate $A$ more if $A$ is to support the inclusion of this issue in the final treaty.

To capture institutional theory in the empirical analysis I count the number of actors with preferences located on the status quo for each issue. As more actors locate on the status quo, the cost to those who want to change policy becomes greater. This is easily shown
using equation 2. Assume $A = SQ = 0$. Equation 2 reduces to $\frac{X}{2} + P = 0$. For all positive $X$, $P$ must be negative. Counting the number of actors located at $SQ$ is very similar to summing the $P$’s for actors located on the status quo. It is important to note that power in this model is related solely to the position of member states with respect to the status quo.

Intergovernmental theory, on the other hand, would not expect $P$ to matter for the choice of the outcome. Instead, intergovernmentalists suggest that the outcome should reflect a bargain corresponding to member states’ relative bargaining strength and preferences. I use Bueno de Mesquita’s (1994) model of bargaining in the EU Council of Ministers to capture intergovernmentalist logic. In Bueno de Mesquita’s model, each member state faces a choice between two alternatives. Member states cast “votes” equal to the difference of an actor’s utility for each of the alternatives weighted by the actor’s capabilities and issue salience. Using the same quadratic utility functions, actor A’s quasi-vote, $V_A$, can be written as follows:

$$V_A = (C_A) (S_A) [U_A(X) - U_A(SQ)]$$

where $C$ is a variable which reflects the capabilities or resources of the member state, and $S$ is the issue’s salience for the member state. If $V_A$ is positive, member state A votes for $X$, otherwise the member state votes for $SQ$. The magnitude of $V_A$ reflects a member state’s relative influence over this particular issue. To make a prediction about the outcome of negotiations, Bueno de Mesquita sums $V$ across all member states. If $V$ is positive, the Council chooses $X$, and if negative $SQ$ prevails. This model is different from the institutional approach in two important respects. First, it defines power as the relative capabilities of member states in addition to accounting for member state’s preferences.
Second, because it weighs preferences by capacities, its prediction may lie outside of the
in the unanimity winset of the status quo.

In addition to the prediction of the Bueno de Mesquita model, I use two further
operationalizations of intergovernmentalism in my statistical model to be certain that my
findings do not hinge upon how I formalize the intergovernmental argument. First, I take
the average position of the four largest member states (Germany, France, the UK, and
Italy) on each issue. Second, I include two dummy variables which capture when the
three largest states (Germany, France, and the UK) either agree to support the status quo
or support issue inclusion on each issue.

4. Case selection and data

To examine which sources of power best explain IGC negotiations, I use a dataset
on the 1996 IGC leading to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. Unlike previous IGCs, which
member states called voluntarily according to their own timetable, the 1992 Treaty on
European Union stipulated that the member states hold an IGC in four years to continue
the difficult institutional reforms postponed at the previous Maastricht IGC. This all but
guaranteed that at least some member states would prefer the status quo on important
issues on the table at Amsterdam. At the IGC, member states addressed institutional
reforms necessary for eastern enlargement, such as the size of the Commission and voting
weights in the Council. In addition, Amsterdam provided member states with an
opportunity to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and reduce
the democratic deficit by enhancing transparency in the decision-making process. The
IGC was launched at the Turin Council meeting in March 1996 and concluded at the
Council meeting in Amsterdam on 16–17 June 1997. Negotiations fell well short of expectations in several respects. First, the treaty failed to alter the system of Council voting weights and the number of Commissioners. Second, it did not make significant progress on changing the CFSP. However, the treaty did appoint the secretary general of the EU Council of Ministers as the EU’s “high representative” for the CFSP. It also paved the way to move decision-making on asylum and immigration politics away from pure intergovernmentalism to allow the involvement of the European Parliament and the Commission, although it stipulated that many decisions in these areas would still require unanimity in the Council. Finally, the treaty granted the European Parliament new powers, as a result of both new investiture rules for the European Commission and the reformed codecision procedure (Hix 2002).

My dataset includes the preferences member states, the Commission, and the European Parliament on 228 issues discussed at the Amsterdam IGC, as well as the location of the status quo and the outcome of negotiations for each of these issues. These data cover the full array of issues discussed over the course of the IGC, including reform of the common foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, the EU’s major institutions - the European Parliament, the Commission, and the European Court of Justice-, and the Economic and Monetary Union. The data are constructed from two primary sources. First, I use a report written by the European Parliament taskforce responsible for monitoring and documenting the IGC process. In February 1995, the EP set up a taskforce to monitor the preparatory stages of the 1996 IGC. One of the taskforce’s primary goals was to collect member state and supranational positions on all issues discussed at the IGC. On the basis of publicly available documents, such as
memorandums, press reports, and parliamentary committee and plenary sitting hearings, the taskforce summarized the positions of member states and supranational actors on 252 issues.³ From these 252 issues, researchers under Professor Thomas König identified 228 separate issues for analysis.⁴ On each issue, the taskforce indicated whether actors supported the inclusion of the issue in the treaty or preferred to exclude it, allowing the status quo to prevail. Likewise, König’s research team coded whether the final treaty included or excluded the issue and whether issues were favorable towards EU integration or not. Of the original 228 draft issues, 70 issues were fully included in the treaty. The negotiators came to a lesser compromise on an additional 15 issues, and 143 issues were dropped entirely, leaving the status quo.

To check the validity of the EP data, I compare the positions listed in the EP taskforce report with actor positions collected in a separate research project on the Treaty of Amsterdam. Researchers at the Mannheim Center for Social Research conducted a study of the Amsterdam IGC, also collecting data on member state and supranational positions over issues discussed at the IGC (Thurner, Pappi and Stoiber 2002). Although the Mannheim dataset is less extensive, the issues covered in these data are virtually identical to those in the EP data. The Mannheim data were based on confidential Council reports, public statements by member states, and expert surveys (Thurner, Pappi, and Stoiber 2002, p22). I first recode the Mannheim data so they correspond with the EP taskforce data. I am able to match 74 of the 228 issues in the EP taskforce data to issues

³ See the EP’s “Summary of the Positions of the Member States and European Parliament on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference” document no. JF/bo/290/97 12 May 1997. The positions listed in this document are based upon analysis of the member state white papers and public statements which have been summarized in the EP’s “White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Vol. II” available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/igc1996/pos-toc_en.htm. In an email conversation, Jose Javier Fernandez-Fernandez, the taskforce secretary and coordinator, has confirmed that these position papers along with other public statements were the primary sources for the taskforce report.
⁴ I have reviewed the original coding and I do not alter it here.
in the Mannheim data.\textsuperscript{5} Within these 74 issues, there are 959 actor positions present in both datasets, and of these 959 positions, 803 (84\%) are in agreement. For those positions which disagree across the datasets, I reexamine the public statements of actors and take the position which most closely corresponds to the public statements.\textsuperscript{6} Lastly, if an actor’s preference is missing in the EP data, but present in the Mannheim data, I fill in the missing preference with the Mannheim value.

These new data are among the best available on the preferences of member states and supranational actors at IGCs, and perhaps international negotiations more generally, but they are not perfect. Specifically, there is a problem of missing data. Of the 3876 possible preferences (17 actors times 228 issues), 1065 are missing (approximately 27 per cent). Moreover, the vast majority of the recorded preferences support changing the status quo. Of the 2811 reported preferences, 1995 preferences support altering the status quo while only 816 prefer the status quo. It appears that member states are much more likely to explicitly support an issue’s inclusion than its exclusion from the final treaty. In the original coding of the EP taskforce data, König has assumed that a missing preference is the same as favoring the status quo. This, however, is an assumption which must be tested. I test this assumption by handling the missing preferences in a variety of ways.

The most frequent method for handling missing data in political science is simply list-wise deletion (King et al., 2001). This, however, is only appropriate if the missing values occur completely at random (MCAR), meaning that there is no way to predict the

\textsuperscript{5} I am unable to match more issues both because the Mannheim data are less extensive than the EP data, and because of the way that the Mannheim data are constructed.

\textsuperscript{6} I first reread the governments’ white papers summarized in the EP report. If no further information is found there, I conduct a lexis-nexis search. If I still find no further information on these preferences, my default is to choose the EP Taskforce preference because these are often better documented in EP report compared to the documentation in the Mannheim report.
pattern of missing values in the data. Even if the MCAR assumption holds, list-wise deletion often results in throwing away vast quantities of data. Using list-wise deletion in the current data set would leave only 50 of the original 228 issues. Moreover, if the pattern of missing values can be predicted, meaning MCAR does not hold, using list-wise deletion leads to biased estimates.

Methods for imputing missing data employing EM algorithms, such as Amelia (King et al., 2001), take advantage of covariance among variables within the dataset to impute missing values in a way which does not inflate statistical significance. These methods usually assume that data are missing at random (MAR), meaning that pattern of missing values can be explained by co-variation among variables in the data. Any missing data remaining after accounting for co-variation is assumed to be the result of randomness. However, imputation methods such as Amelia will not work if the missing data are fundamentally different from the non-missing data. This is called non-ignorable missingness, and may result from selection effects created by the strategic considerations of the actors (König et al. 2005). Asserting that the missing values in the current data set are equivalent to the status quo implies that the missing data are fundamentally different than the non-missing data, meaning Amelia is likely to impute incorrect values.

Rather than imputing the missing data using Amelia, I first examine variables which explain the missing values. This will help underscore the reasons why preferences are missing. Moreover, if I am able predict the missing preferences, we know that list-wise deletion is inappropriate. Second, I use non-nested model testing to examine which assumptions about the nature of the missing data are most likely to be correct. I run the analysis on the data assuming that a missing value implies that the actor desires the status
quo, that the actor is indifferent between the status quo and issue inclusion, and that the actor wants to include the issue in the treaty. I examine which of these assumptions best explains the outcome of negotiations.

First, I present a Poisson model to examine the underlying reasons for missing preferences. My unit of analysis is the actor, and the dependent variable, presented in table 1, is simply the number of missing observations per actor. Actors vary greatly in their number of missing preferences. Clearly the European Parliament was able to assess its own preferences quite well. Surprisingly, it was much less successful at determining the preferences of the other supranational actor, the Commission. Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg had relatively clear positions, while Ireland and Denmark had missing preferences more frequently. A missing value implies that both the EP taskforce and the Mannheim research team were unable to determine an actor’s preference on a given issue. This could occur for several reasons. First, an actor may honestly not have a position, something likely related to issue salience. Actors may simply not care enough to take a stance on issues of little importance to them. For example, landlocked states like Luxembourg and Austria are not likely to care about fisheries policy. If this is true, assuming that a missing value is the same as the status quo may be a reasonable assumption. If the actor truly does not care about an issue, they should not be willing to spend their limited political capital to attempt to change the status quo. Unfortunately, I cannot test this argument directly because the data do not contain a measure of issue salience. However, this may be related to an actor’s size. Smaller member states are not
affected by as many issues as large member states. This would imply that small states should have more missing preferences than large states.

Second, member states may not have a preference because the members of government are unable to agree on a position. If the governing coalition cannot agree on a position, they may simply choose not to state a preference. One may also interpret this as supporting the status quo because implicitly it means that the government actors cannot agree on a position which would alter the status quo. To test this, I examine missing preferences as a function of government composition. Specifically I examine whether the member state has a single party government or a governing coalition.

Third, member states may have a preference but they may strategically hide that preference if they feel that their position is unpopular. They may not want to take a losing position for fear that being on the wrong side too often may somehow hurt their bargaining position on other issues. Alternatively, they may not want to publicly state an unpopular position for fear that this could somehow hurt their reputation either with the public at home or with other negotiators. This, again, may be related to member state size. If intergovernmental theories are correct, and size is a source of strength, small countries are likely to hide their preferences if they feel they cannot influence the outcome over the position of the large countries. It does not, however, imply that missing positions should be coded as the preferring the status quo.

Lastly, the original coding of the data implies that if actors prefer the status quo, they are less likely to report their preference, or the taskforce will be less likely to ascertain their preference. Perhaps actors wish to avoid the appearance that they are laggards, and thus prefer to only make positive statements rather than negative
statements. To test this directly, I simply examine the relationship between missing preferences and the average position of member states on the issues for which they do have a reported preference. If the number of missing preferences increases as member states favor the status quo more often, this would provide justification for the assumption that a missing preference is in fact the same as preferring the status quo over change.

Using a Poisson model, I examine the number of times a member state’s preference is missing. As independent variables, I use the log of the member states’ populations, a dummy variable which is one for member states with a multiparty government at the time of Amsterdam, and the average position of the member states on the issues for which they do have a stated preference. I drop the supranational actors from the analysis because they clearly have neither populations nor governments, however I discuss the Commission’s missing values below. The results show that the single best predictor of a missing value is the average stated preference. Member states frequently located on the status quo also have a higher number of missing preferences. Coalition governments lead to a greater the number of missing preferences, as well. Population, on the other hand, has no effect on how often an actor is missing. Table 2 presents first differences generated from my Poisson models.\footnote{The Poisson coefficients and the data can be found in the appendix. I use Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) to create the first differences.}

To create the first differences, I set log population and average position to their means and multiparty government to zero. I then vary the log population from its minimum value to its maximum value holding the other variables constant. I do the same for average position and multiparty government. The analysis demonstrates that, all else
equal, moving from average position of the member state furthest from the status quo to
the position of the member state closest to the status quo increases the number of missing
preferences by approximately 34 issues. Likewise, member states with multiparty
governments have, on average, 13 more missing preferences than member states with
single party governments. Population size has virtually no effect on how often a member
state’s preference is missing.

The Poisson model offers strong evidence that König’s original assumption that a
missing position is equivalent to a status quo position is valid. Member states closer to
the status quo clearly have more missing preferences, and a member state’s status quo
bias is the strongest predictor of missing preferences. Moreover, the variable most likely
to cast doubt on the validity of this assumption, Log Population, is not statistically
significant, and has no substantive impact. Nevertheless, I provide several other non
nested model tests aimed at examining this assumption further.

Unfortunately, because the Commission lacks a population and government, the
Poisson model does not provide any insight into why the Commission has so many
missing preferences. It is nevertheless worthwhile to consider why its preferences are
missing so often, especially when most models of EU legislative politics assume that the
supranational actors have relatively similar preferences (e.g. Tsebelis 1994). A primary
reason may simply be the weak position of the Commission at IGCs. Although a
Commission representative was present at IGC working group and ministerial meetings,
he apparently had very little influence. Belgian representative to the IGC Franklin
Dehousse has written that the Commission was, “extremely weak during the whole [IGC]
process, but especially at the end (one can hardly remember a comment from the
Commission during the two days in Amsterdam which had any kind of impact, even a modest one)” (Dehousse 1999, p9). In addition the EP Taskforce White Paper vol. II contains no mention of any position papers written by the Commission. Because of the Commission’s weak position, it may have refrained from making public statements, thus making it difficult to ascertain its position.

5. Analysis

To test my theoretical models, I assume that member states are faced with a collective choice: for each of the 228 issues they can either choose to retain the status quo or to include the issue in the treaty. With only two choices, I run several probit models using as my independent variables the number of member states on the status quo to capture the institutional argument, and the Bueno de Mesquita model along with the average position of the largest states and the two dummy variables to operationalize intergovernmentalism. The results demonstrate that institutional theory outperforms the intergovernmental model regardless of how I operationalize intergovernmentalism.

While counting the number of member states expressing support for the status quo is straightforward, constructing the Bueno de Mesquita model from the data is less so. First, to capture the member states’ relative capabilities, I divide each member state’s 1997 GDP by total EU GDP in 1997.⁸ Because, historically, the most important aspects of EU integration have been economic and related to the common market, I use GDP to capture the relative bargaining power of member states on the assumption that having a larger market is likely to be the greatest source of bargaining leverage. I have also calculated the variable using the proportion of member state population and proportion of

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⁸ GDP data are taken from Eurostat (www.eu.int/comm/eurostat/). Consulted March 14, 2006
Council voting weights to capture capabilities and my results do not change. To capture the saliency term in the Bueno de Mesquita model, I take advantage of the fact that missing preferences may in fact contain information. Even though the Poisson model has demonstrated that missing preferences are most likely equivalent to a preference for the status quo, it is reasonable to assume that a member state is more willing to go to bat for a stated preference than for an unstated one. Accordingly, I construct the saliency term as a dummy variable which is one if that member state’s preference is known and zero if it is missing. Even though this is a crude measure of saliency, it may be better than dropping the term entirely.\textsuperscript{9} Lastly, to construct the difference between the expected utility for issue inclusion and the status quo, I assume that the position of the status quo is -1 and the position of issue inclusion is 1. This allows member states to be indifferent between issue inclusion and the status quo for two different reasons. First, they may be truly indifferent, meaning that they have a stated preference, but that preference lies at zero halfway between issue inclusion and the status quo, or they may have missing preference on that issue, which would mean the saliency dummy equals zero.\textsuperscript{10}

To further test my assumptions about missing preferences I run my primary model, the outcome of treaty negotiations as a function of the number of actors on the status quo and the Bueno de Mesquita model, in three datasets which make differing assumptions about missing preferences. I then use the non-nested model test proposed by Clarke (2003) to determine which assumptions are the most reasonable. In the first dataset, I simply use list-wise deletion. Next, I make two different assumptions about

\textsuperscript{9} I have also constructed the variable simply dropping the saliency term and it does not affect the results.
\textsuperscript{10} Although member states are reported to have binary preferences on the vast majority of issues, there are some issues in the data where member states have intermediate preferences between the status quo and issue inclusion.
missing preferences to impute the missing data.\footnote{I always use missing preferences as an indicator of saliency when calculating the Bueno de Mesquita model regardless of how I impute missing preferences across these datasets.} I first replace all missing values with the position of the status quo. Second, I assume that a missing position implies indifference between the status quo and issue inclusion\footnote{I also run the model assuming that a missing position implies actors actually favor issue inclusion. There is no evidence for this hypothesis in the data and my non-nested test reveals that this model performs the worst of all models and can easily be rejected.}. Table 3 presents the results of the model in the various datasets.

\begin{center}
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.
\end{center}

Looking at table 3, there are two questions to be answered. First, which variable best explains the treaty outcome, and second, which assumptions about missing data are the most reasonable. Although the Poisson model has demonstrated that MCAR is an inappropriate assumption given these data, I first run a model with list-wise deletion. Even with list-wise deletion, the \textit{Number on Status Quo} variable has a strong effect, both substantively and statistically, while the Bueno de Mesquita prediction (\textit{BDM prediction}) has virtually no effect. Substantively, setting \textit{BDM prediction} to its mean and going from zero member states on the status quo to 15 member states on the status quo reduces the probability of issue inclusion by approximately 66\%. Likewise, setting \textit{Number sq} to its mean and varying the BDM variable from its minimum to its maximum increases the probability of issue inclusion by only 39\%. Even when over three-quarters of the data are thrown away, \textit{Number sq} still achieves statistical significance at the 5\% level.

The second, third and fourth models make more reasonable assumptions about the nature of missing preferences. Model 2 assumes that a missing value equals the status quo, König’s assumption, while models 3 and 4 assume that a missing preference indicates indifference. Model 3 uses only the two independent variables that I employ in
the other models, *Number sq* and *BDM Prediction*, while model 4 controls for the number of missing positions on each issue. To determine which of these models best explains the dependent variable, I use Clarke’s (2003) non-parametric model discrimination test. This test compares the size of each individual log-likelihood between two non-nested competing models. The individual log-likelihoods from model 2 are subtracted from the individual log-likelihoods from model 1, and the positive differences between these log-likelihoods are counted. The number of positive differences will have a binomial distribution ($n, p=0.5$). The assumption is that models which are equally good will have an equal number of positive and negative differences. When there are more positive than negative differences, model 1 outperforms model 2. If the number parameters between the two models are different, the individual log-likelihoods must be corrected using a modified version of the Schwarz correction before comparing the two models (Clarke 2003, p78).13 Using this test, I compare models 3 and 4 to model 2. I can confidently state that model 2, the model which assumes that missing preferences equal a preference for the status quo, is better than model 3, which assumes that missing preferences indicate indifference but does not control for the number of missing preferences ($p=0.037$). On the other hand, model 4, which assumes missing preferences imply indifference but does control for the number of missing preferences, appears to outperform model 2 ($p=0.002$). However, the substantive results from model 4 and model 2 are virtually identical.

In all three models, *Number sq* is statistically significant while *BDM prediction* is only statistically significant in model 3, the worst of the three models. Interestingly, *Number missing*, when included in model 4, behaves very similarly to the *Number sq

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13 Clarke has demonstrated that this simple test performs better than another more common non-nested test, the Vuong test, using Monte Carlo simulations.
variable. This implies that abstaining from stating a preference, or simply not having one, is very similar to stating a preference for the status quo. Substantively, the effect of \textit{Number sq} in models 2 and 4 is even stronger than in the list-wise deletion model. In model 2, holding \textit{BDM prediction} at its mean and varying \textit{Number sq} from 0 to 15 decreases the probability of issue inclusion by 78%. In model 4, holding both \textit{Number missing} and \textit{BDM prediction} at their means while varying \textit{Number sq} from 0 to 15 decreases the probability of issue inclusion by 58%. Varying both \textit{Number missing} and \textit{Number sq} from their minimums to maximums simultaneously while holding \textit{BDM prediction} at its mean, the probability of issue inclusion drops by 80%. Based on this evidence, I assume that missing values are equivalent to the status quo throughout the rest of the analysis. Nevertheless, for major results I test whether the findings hold if instead I assume that missing preferences imply indifference.

To test these results further, I pit the two different operationalizations of intergovernmental theory against the \textit{Number sq} variable. In addition to using Bueno de Mesquita’s model, I also operationalize intergovernmentalism as the average position of the four largest member states, Germany, France, the UK, and Italy, on each issue. Second, I examine whether issues are more likely to be included in or excluded from the final treaty if the three largest member states take a common position. I include two dummy variables in the analysis: \textit{Large state include}, which equals 1 if Germany, France and the UK agree to include an issue in the treaty and zero otherwise, and \textit{Large state exclude}, which equals 1 if Germany, France and the UK agree to exclude an issue from the treaty. I also interact these dummies with \textit{Number sq}. Intergovernmental theory would suggest that \textit{Number sq} should matter less if the three largest member states are not on
the status quo and more if they are on the status quo. This would imply a positive coefficient on the interaction *Large state include*Number sq and a negative coefficient on the interaction *Large state exclude*Number sq. Table 4 presents the results of my analysis.14

**INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE**

The models demonstrate that my findings hold for various operationalizations of intergovernmentalist theory. Regardless of how I conceptualize intergovernmentalism, the variable associated with spatial models, *Number sq*, best explains the treaty outcome. It is the only variable in either model to achieve statistical significance. Moreover, it has a much greater substantive effect than any of the other variables, approximately the same effect that it has in models 1, 2 and 4. Both *Large state average* and *Large state include* have the wrong sign, meaning that, if anything, large states have less power than small states. The dummy variables and interaction terms in model 6 are not statistically significant. A likelihood ratio test reveals that they are also not jointly significant either (χ² (4) = 0.98, p=0.91).15

**Threshold effects**

The above analysis has provided strong evidence for the institutional model over the intergovernmental model; however, there are other implications of the institutional model to explore. The institutional model, as I have presented it, assumes a unanimous decision making process. While the final treaty is subject to unanimity, it is very unlikely that each issue negotiated at the IGC requires unanimous support to become part of the final treaty.

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14 All results in table 4 assume that missing values are equivalent to a position on the status quo.
15 I have also run model 6 without the interaction terms and the result is virtually identical to the result with the interaction terms.
Instead, there may be an informal qualified majority rule. For example, suppose there is de facto 2/3rds qualified majority rule. Once 10 of the 15 member states support an issue, the issue is likely to be included in the final document. If this is true, then member state A in figure 1 would not represent the position of the member state closest to the status quo, but rather the 2/3rds qualified majority pivot. Such a qualified majority rule would suggest a step-like probability function. For example, the probability that an issue is included in the treaty should be the same if all 15 member states support the issue and if only 10 member states support it. However, when 9 member states support an issue, the probability that the issue is included should fall. To determine whether such a threshold exists, figure 2 plots the relationship between the number of member states on the status quo and the number of issues included in the treaty for the entire treaty and then for various issue areas.

Examining the upper left graph which presents the entire issue space, it is notable that even when there is unanimous consent among the member states to include an issue, some issues are left out of the treaty. While puzzling at first, this is easily explained. There are 15 issues where all 15 member states agree to alter the status quo. In two of these cases the sq remains. One issue was whether or not to discuss Economic and Monetary Union at all during the IGC. Because EMU was one of the central focuses of Maastricht, the status quo was to discuss it. However, because not all member states were

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16 Hug and König (2002) and König and Slapin (2004) both demonstrate that on average all member states were better off compared to the status quo at Amsterdam.

17 On a third issue, the extension of qualified majority voting in the Council, most member states preferred a compromise position where certain criteria for extending qualified majority voting would be established rather than extending qualified majority voting to many issues at once. This compromise solution was also the outcome of negotiations and is coded as 0.25.
a part of the monetary union, the member states agreed that they did not want to table the issue at Amsterdam. Despite their reluctance, the EMU was so important member states could not avoid it, and had to broach the topic. The second issue which received unanimous support, but was nevertheless dropped, was the simplification of treaties. All member states viewed simplification of the treaties as desirable, but the EP report suggests that they couldn’t agree how, and were afraid that a new consolidated treaty would face ratification problems, jeopardizing whole parts of the new treaty. If we exclude these two issues, then when all member states agree to change, change occurs 100% of the time.18

Next, we notice that when 14 or 15 actors are on the status quo, change never occurs. One state desiring change is not enough to move the status quo. However, one state on the status quo appears to be enough, at least in one instance, to prevent change from occurring. The probability of issue inclusion drops below 0.5 when five or more member states prefer the status quo, and once nine states are located on the status quo the probability of change becomes quite low. Nevertheless, when looking at the entire issue space, the relationship between the percent issues included in the treaty and Number sq appears quite linear. There is no clear threshold to indicate a constant de facto QMV rule.

A plausible explanation for the lack of a threshold is that different types of issues were subject to different thresholds. When averaging over these various thresholds, the overall effect is lost. The three remaining graphs in figure 1 provide support for this hypothesis. These plots demonstrate that changes to the EU’s institutions (the EP, the

18 One could make the case to exclude these issues from the analysis entirely because, unlike almost every other issue in the dataset, these are not clear cut items which either can be included or excluded from a final written treaty. In fact, discussion of the EMU, rather than being included or excluded from the treaty, is an issue of inclusion or exclusion from the negotiations. Likewise, there would not be one single issue which the negotiators could include in the treaty to simply the structure of the treaty.
Commission, the Council, and the European Court of Justice) were more controversial and required higher support compared to other issues. Institutional changes are more difficult to reverse, have longer, more unpredictable consequences, and are more likely to alter interactions between member states than other types of reform so they may require a higher degree of consensus to change. Once six member states prefer the status quo, institutional change becomes virtually impossible. Even when fewer than six member states prefer the status quo, change is far from guaranteed. For issues involving changes to subsidiarity, such as strengthening the Committee of Regions or increasing the voice of national parliaments, and issues involving justice and home affairs, such as border security and visa policies, the threshold for change is lower. Unlike with institutional issues, change on these issues is likely when nine or fewer member states prefer the status quo. For issues dealing with subsidiarity, change is almost guaranteed when fewer than nine states prefer the status quo. Together these plots demonstrate that although there may not be one single threshold for all issues, we can identify different thresholds across different types of issues.

6. Discussion

My analysis provides strong evidence that institutional theory, which accounts for veto power, outperforms intergovernmental theory, which conceptualizes power as a function of size and resources. I have presented a method for directly extending institutionalism to the study of IGCs, and I have tested this theory against various operationalizations of intergovernmentalism, none of which perform as well as the institutional model. I also find evidence for varying threshold effects across issue areas,
as predicted by the institutional model. Issues which would alter important EU institutions and legislative processes require more support to include in the final treaty than other issues. In addition, this paper advances the study of IGCs by exploring the full range of issues on the bargaining table and does not ignore bargaining over institutions as intergovernmental studies often do. Lastly, instead of ignoring problems of missing data, I examine various methods for handling missing preferences and demonstrate empirically that missing preferences are similar to preferences for the status quo. Moreover, I demonstrate that my findings are robust to how I handle missing data and I offer a method for testing theories of missing data against each other.

The analysis I present here can easily be extended to negotiations over other international organizations, or even constitution building in federal states. It can help explain why, for example, at the US constitutional convention, small states were able to win concessions from large states when negotiating state representation in the US Senate. The small states preferred the status quo of “one state, one vote” found in the Articles of Confederation, while the large states preferred representation proportional to population. Likewise, my results explain the difficult negotiations over rules which govern international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. At the Doha round where the member states of the WTO have been attempting to rewrite the rules of global trade since 2001, little progress has been made because proposed changes are subject to unanimity rule. Smaller, poorer countries can block changes even on issues where the world’s economic powerhouses, the US and the EU, agree.19 In both these instances, intergovernmentalism would suggest that the large states are able to force their position on their smaller negotiating partners. Future work can reexamine these results in any

number of bargaining setting which pit the interests large and small member states against one another.

7. Conclusion

Changes to the treaties governing the European Union have immense and lasting consequences for member states. In this paper, I have attempted to fill in a gap in the literature on intergovernmental bargaining by testing competing theories against each other to determine why some member states are more powerful at intergovernmental negotiations compared to their negotiation partners. I have outlined two prominent, competing bargaining theories found in the literature on EU integration and demonstrated how their logic applies to bargaining at IGCs. In addition, I have shown that the same logic can be applied to bargaining over rules in federal polities and international organizations. In short, size is not sufficient for strength. The power to veto is significantly more important than power derived from resources when explaining the outcomes of negotiations at EU IGCs.
Appendix

A1. Poisson model to predict missing preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Position</td>
<td>-1.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty Government</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Population</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.16***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-60.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Errors listed in parentheses
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
References


Hoffman, Stanley (1966) “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe.” *Daedalus* 95(3): 862-915.


Figure 1.

Scenario 1

SQ  A  B  C

Scenario 2

SQ  A  B  C
Figure 2: Percent issues included in treaty by number of member states preferring the SQ.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Number of Missing Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: First differences from Poisson Models, Change in Number of Missing Preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Change from minimum to maximum</th>
<th>95% confidence interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Position</td>
<td>-35.41</td>
<td>-52.69, -18.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty Government</td>
<td>11.67</td>
<td>2.40, 20.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Population</td>
<td>-3.91</td>
<td>-19.78, 11.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables</td>
<td>(1) List-wise deletion</td>
<td>(2) Missing = sq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number SQ</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>-0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Missing</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDM Prediction</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.91***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-22.80</td>
<td>-108.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p<0.05, *** significant at p<0.01

Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Table 4: Probit, alternative specifications of intergovernmentalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number SQ</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large State Average Position</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large State Include</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large State Exclude</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large State Include*Number SQ</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large State Exclude*Number SQ</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.81***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Likelihood</td>
<td>-108.52</td>
<td>-108.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Errors listed in parentheses
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%